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 FOREWORD  
Ireland’s population is growing ever more diverse. Almost 12% of people living 
here have a nationality other than Irish. We have seen a large increase in recent 
years in people choosing to become Irish citizens and in addition, the numbers of 
second generation migrants continue to grow. 
 
This increasing diversity offers many benefits to our communities – from 
enhancing our skills base to enriching our cultural life. When we truly value 
diversity and take steps to demonstrate that value, we send a powerful message 
of inclusion and anti-discrimination into our society. 
 
Ireland’s National Strategy for Migrant Integration is underpinned by the vision 
that migrants are facilitated to play a full role in Irish society, that integration is a 
core principle of Irish life and that Irish society and institutions work together to 
promote integration. 
 
Those working to realise this vision, across the public, private and voluntary 
sectors, need access to detailed information to inform and guide their work. It is 
by reference to reliable data on how migrants to Ireland are faring on key drivers 
of integration such as education, employment, social inclusion and active 
citizenship, that we can design and target effective interventions to support 
integration and remove barriers to it.  
 
This is why I funded the ESRI to complete this Monitoring Report on Integration. 
This report brings together these data, measures changes over time, and 
describes policy implications. It will be a valuable resource for policymakers and 
practitioners alike. 
 
The Monitoring Report provides essential evidence on outcomes for migrant 
groups in Ireland and shows how these compare with outcomes for the native 
population. This vital evidence will help to inform the design of the supports 
required to facilitate successful integration. 
 
Our increased diversity brings with it both challenges and opportunities. High 
quality, up-to-date evidence equips us better to meet both. I welcome this 
report.  
 
 
David Stanton, T.D. 
Minister of State at the Department of Justice and Equality with special 
responsibility for Equality, Immigration and Integration. 
 

ABOUT THE ESRI 
The mission of the Economic and Social Research Institute is to advance evidence-
based policymaking that supports economic sustainability and social progress in 
Ireland. ESRI researchers apply the highest standards of academic excellence to 
challenges facing policymakers, focusing on 12 areas of critical importance to 21st 
Century Ireland.  
 
The Institute was founded in 1960 by a group of senior civil servants led by  
Dr T.K. Whitaker, who identified the need for independent and in-depth research 
analysis to provide a robust evidence base for policymaking in Ireland.  
 
Since then, the Institute has remained committed to independent research and 
its work is free of any expressed ideology or political position. The Institute 
publishes all research reaching the appropriate academic standard, irrespective 
of its findings or who funds the research.  
 
The quality of its research output is guaranteed by a rigorous peer review 
process. ESRI researchers are experts in their fields and are committed to 
producing work that meets the highest academic standards and practices. 
 
The work of the Institute is disseminated widely in books, journal articles and 
reports. ESRI publications are available to download, free of charge, from its 
website. Additionally, ESRI staff communicate research findings at regular 
conferences and seminars. 
 
The ESRI is a company limited by guarantee, answerable to its members and 
governed by a Council, comprising 14 members who represent a cross-section of 
ESRI members from academia, civil services, state agencies, businesses and civil 
society. The Institute receives an annual grant-in-aid from the Department of 
Public Expenditure and Reform to support the scientific and public interest 
elements of the Institute’s activities; the grant accounted for an average of 30 per 
cent of the Institute’s income over the lifetime of the last Research Strategy. The 
remaining funding comes from research programmes supported by government 
departments and agencies, public bodies and competitive research programmes. 
 
Further information is available at www.esri.ie 
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GLOSSARY: ABBREVIATIONS AND IRISH TERMS 
 
CSO Central Statistics Office 
DSP/DEASP Department of Social Protection (now Department of Employment Affairs and 
Social Protection). 
EAL English as an additional language 
EEA European Economic Area, which comprises the EU Member States plus 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway 
EPIC Employment for People from Immigrant Communities 
ESOL English for Speakers of Other Languages 
ESRI Economic and Social Research Institute 
ETB Education and Training Board 
EU European Union 
EU28 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK. 
EU-East EU-East comprises the EU Member States that acceded between 2004 and 
2013, i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia 
EU-West ‘Old’ EU15 Member States excluding Ireland and the UK: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden. 
EUDO EU Democracy Observatory on Citizenship 
EU-SILC EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
FLAC Free Legal Advice Centres 
HRC Habitual residence condition 
INIS Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service 
ISCED International Standard Classification of Education 
LFS Labour Force Survey 
MCRI Migration and Citizenship Research Initiative 
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UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Given that a significant proportion of the population living in Ireland is of non-Irish 
origin, how are non-Irish nationals integrating into Irish society? How do they 
compare to the Irish population in terms of employment rates, educational 
qualifications, income and poverty rates, health outcomes, housing and 
participation in Irish political life? 
 
This Integration Monitor is the sixth of a series of reports which consider 
outcomes in a wide range of life domains, including employment, education, 
social inclusion and active citizenship. It is based on indicators proposed at the 
European Ministerial Conference on Integration held in Zaragoza in 2010. These 
indicators are comparable across European Union (EU) Member States, based on 
existing data and focused on outcomes. It should be noted that some differences 
between Irish and non-Irish may be a result of differences in age, gender, duration 
in Ireland, educational background and work experience. Accounting for these 
differences using statistical modelling is beyond the scope of this report, but 
readers are alerted to relevant differences. This Monitor’s special topic is: 
‘Muslims in Ireland’, based primarily on data from the 2016 Irish Census.  
 
Migrants to Ireland are diverse in terms of country of origin, and outcomes vary 
across groups. This summary focuses on overall differences between Irish and 
non-Irish nationals: individual chapters give more information on differences 
between national groups – UK, EU-West, EU-East and non-EU nationals.1 Key 
indicators at a glance are presented in Table A below. 
INTEGRATION MONITOR: KEY FINDINGS 
The Irish labour market is showing signs of continued recovery after a deep 
recession. Chapter 2 shows that in early 2017 both employment and labour 
market activity rates were slightly higher among non-Irish nationals than Irish 
nationals (see Table A). The unemployment rate has continued to fall for both 
Irish and non-Irish nationals since 2015; and in the first quarter of 2017, at just 
over 7 per cent, the unemployment rate was very similar for both groups.  
 
                                                          
 
1  EU-West refers to the ‘old’ Member States, prior to enlargement in 2004, excluding the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Ireland. EU-East refers to the ‘new’ Member States that joined the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013. Where numbers 
permit, non-EU nationals are further divided based on broad region of origin. 
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There are important differences in the labour market outcomes for different 
groups of non-Irish nationals. In general, non-EU nationals tend to have lower 
employment rates and higher unemployment rates than Irish nationals. As in 
previous Monitors, the most disadvantaged group is African nationals, who have 
much lower employment and activity rates than other immigrant groups. The 
African employment rate is 45 per cent compared to an average of 70 per cent for 
non-Irish nationals. This pattern has persisted throughout the recession and 
recovery. 
 
Employment rates of immigrants in Ireland are comparable to those found across 
the EU. In other European countries, unemployment is typically higher among 
immigrants than natives. In 2017, the unemployment gap between immigrants 
and natives is smaller in Ireland than the European average, and is not statistically 
significant.  
 
Chapter 3 compares educational qualifications among Irish and non-Irish adults in 
2016-2017 and presents academic achievement scores at age 15 (see Table A). A 
somewhat higher proportion of non-Irish than Irish nationals aged 25 to 34 had 
third-level educational qualifications (56 per cent non-Irish versus 51 per cent 
Irish). The proportion of young adults (aged 20-24) who had left school before 
finishing upper secondary education was similar between the two groups. At just 
under 5 per cent of the age cohort, the share of early leavers is very low (see 
Table A).  
 
Just under 15 per cent of students taking the Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) test in 2015 in Ireland were from an immigrant 
background. As in previous Monitors, home language is salient for achievement 
scores. Comparing English reading, we find immigrant students from English-
speaking backgrounds do not differ from their Irish peers, but immigrants from 
non-English speaking backgrounds have lower mean scores at age 15 (see Table 
A). In Mathematics, differences in mean scores between the groups are smaller 
and not statistically significant. The same is true for Science scores (see Chapter 
3).  
 
Income, poverty, health and homeownership are used as core indicators of social 
inclusion in Chapter 4. After adjusting for household needs, the median annual 
net income for non-Irish nationals in 2016 was lower than that of Irish nationals, 
and the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate, at 21 per cent, was higher for non-Irish nationals 
than Irish nationals (just under 16 per cent) (see Table A). The consistent poverty 
rate, which takes into account the experience of deprivation as well as income 
poverty, was higher for non-Irish nationals (just under 13 per cent) than for Irish 
Executive summary | xiii 
nationals (8 per cent) in 2016.2 The consistent poverty rate for non-EU nationals, 
at 29 per cent, was particularly high (see Chapter 4).  
 
TABLE A  KEY INTEGRATION INDICATORS AT A GLANCE 
 Irish Non-Irish 
Employment (working age) 2017   
Employment Rate 66.4% 69.6% 
Unemployment Rate 7.1% 7.5% 
Activity Rate 71.5% 75.2% 
Education    
Share of 25-34 age group with tertiary education  
(2016-2017 pooled) 51.0% 56.0% 
Share of early leavers from education (20-24 age group)  
(2016-2017 pooled) 4.9% 4.8% 
Mean English reading scores at age 15 (2015) 525 English Speakers: 523;  non-English Speakers: 500 
Mean Mathematics score at age 15 (2015) 506 English Speakers: 503;  non-English Speakers: 494 
Social Inclusion (2016)   
Median annual net income (needs adjusted) €20,890 €17,804 
At risk of poverty rate 15.7% 22.5% 
Consistent poverty rate 7.9% 12.7% 
Share of population (aged 16+) perceiving their health as good or 
very good 82.1% 88.1% 
Proportion of households that are property owners 78.7% 34.2% 
Active Citizenship (end-2017)   
Annual citizenship acquisition rate (non-EEA adults who acquired 
citizenship in 2017 as share of non-EEA nationals holding ‘live’ 
immigration permissions) 
 2.9% 
Ratio of non-EEA nationals who acquired citizenship since 2005 
to the estimated immigrant population of non-EEA origin at end-
2017 (upper bound estimate) 
 45% 
Share of non-EEA adults with live residence permissions holding 
long-term residence  1.2% 
Share of immigrants among elected national representatives   0.6% 
 
Sources:  LFS Q1 2017 for employment indicators; LFS Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 for education indicators (except achievement scores, 
which are based on PISA 2015 data); EU-SILC 2016 for social inclusion indicators. Citizenship and long-term residence 
indicators: Irish Naturalisation and Citizenship Service, Eurostat. Political participation indicator: Immigrant Council of 
Ireland. See Appendix 2 for further details of sources. 
 
 
Non-Irish nationals tend to report better health than Irish nationals, though part 
of this difference is linked to the lower average age of immigrants. Rates of 
homeownership were much lower among non-Irish than Irish nationals in 2016 
(Table A). However, since 2014 there has been a large increase in homeownership 
across all migrant groups (except for the non-EU), which could indicate an 
 
                                                          
 
2  The at risk of poverty rate, which refers to the percentage of a group falling below 60 per cent of the median 
equivalised disposable income, is the official poverty threshold used by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) and agreed 
at EU level. ‘Consistent poverty’ combines at risk of poverty with enforced deprivation of two or more of a range of 
items.  
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much lower employment and activity rates than other immigrant groups. The 
African employment rate is 45 per cent compared to an average of 70 per cent for 
non-Irish nationals. This pattern has persisted throughout the recession and 
recovery. 
 
Employment rates of immigrants in Ireland are comparable to those found across 
the EU. In other European countries, unemployment is typically higher among 
immigrants than natives. In 2017, the unemployment gap between immigrants 
and natives is smaller in Ireland than the European average, and is not statistically 
significant.  
 
Chapter 3 compares educational qualifications among Irish and non-Irish adults in 
2016-2017 and presents academic achievement scores at age 15 (see Table A). A 
somewhat higher proportion of non-Irish than Irish nationals aged 25 to 34 had 
third-level educational qualifications (56 per cent non-Irish versus 51 per cent 
Irish). The proportion of young adults (aged 20-24) who had left school before 
finishing upper secondary education was similar between the two groups. At just 
under 5 per cent of the age cohort, the share of early leavers is very low (see 
Table A).  
 
Just under 15 per cent of students taking the Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) test in 2015 in Ireland were from an immigrant 
background. As in previous Monitors, home language is salient for achievement 
scores. Comparing English reading, we find immigrant students from English-
speaking backgrounds do not differ from their Irish peers, but immigrants from 
non-English speaking backgrounds have lower mean scores at age 15 (see Table 
A). In Mathematics, differences in mean scores between the groups are smaller 
and not statistically significant. The same is true for Science scores (see Chapter 
3).  
 
Income, poverty, health and homeownership are used as core indicators of social 
inclusion in Chapter 4. After adjusting for household needs, the median annual 
net income for non-Irish nationals in 2016 was lower than that of Irish nationals, 
and the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate, at 21 per cent, was higher for non-Irish nationals 
than Irish nationals (just under 16 per cent) (see Table A). The consistent poverty 
rate, which takes into account the experience of deprivation as well as income 
poverty, was higher for non-Irish nationals (just under 13 per cent) than for Irish 
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intention to settle in Ireland for a long period of time. Chapter 4 shows how over 
half of non-Irish nationals in 2016 lived in private rented accommodation, 
compared to 7 per cent of Irish people, though there was no marked difference in 
housing quality between Irish and non-Irish nationals overall.  
 
Very significant changes have been seen in the active citizenship domain in the 
last decade. Three indicators were proposed at the Zaragoza conference to assess 
active citizenship: the share of immigrants who have acquired citizenship; the 
share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits; and the 
share of immigrants among elected representatives (see Table A).  
 
Around 3,700 non-EEA adults acquired Irish citizenship in 2017, which represents 
just under 3 per cent of the adult non-EEA population at end-2017. Taking a 
longer-term perspective, between 2005 and end-2017, a total of 102,735 non-EEA 
nationals aged 16 and over acquired Irish citizenship. The number naturalised 
represents 45 per cent of the estimated population of non-EEA origin resident at 
end 2017, assuming that those naturalised in this period did not leave Ireland, so 
it is likely to be an upper bound estimate.  
 
While the numbers of non-EEA nationals acquiring citizenship through 
naturalisation has fallen sharply since the 2012 peak, naturalisation is rising 
rapidly among EEA nationals. In fact in 2017, 45 per cent of naturalisations were 
to residents of EEA origin, and the top nationality acquiring Irish citizenship was 
Polish (see Chapter 5). While rising rapidly, the naturalisation rate for EEA 
nationals is very low.  
 
Ireland does not have a statutory long-term residence immigration status with 
clear rights and entitlements attached. The share of non-EEA nationals holding 
long-term residence permits, under the current administrative scheme, was 
estimated to be 1.2 per cent at year-end 2017. The share of immigrants among 
elected (national) representatives remained at 0.6 per cent. Chapter 5 notes that 
the lack of political engagement among migrants may be a concern going forward.  
SPECIAL FOCUS: MUSLIMS IN IRELAND 
Chapter 6 presents a profile of Muslims in Ireland using 2016 Census data. The 
chapter presents basic figures on age and gender of the Muslim population – 
details of their countries of origin and how this has changed in recent years. It also 
documents labour market and educational outcomes, before considering other 
aspects of wellbeing such as family life, relationships, housing and health and how 
these compare to outcomes for the Irish population. 
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The Census data show a strong and steady growth in the Muslim population in 
Ireland from a low base in 2002 (around 20,000) to 2016 (over 62,000). The 
Muslim population is young, compared to the Irish population. By 2016, over half 
(55 per cent) were Irish citizens. Regarding the flow of Muslim immigrants in 
recent years, we observe a shift in origin, with more arriving from South Asia, and 
fewer from Sub-Saharan Africa. Around 40 per cent of Muslims living in Ireland 
define themselves as ethnically Asian.  
 
Muslims living in Ireland are on average more highly educated than the overall 
population and a higher proportion of them are students (around 22 per cent). 
However, we also find that they have lower employment and higher 
unemployment rates. Employment rates are particularly low among Muslim 
women. Muslims in Ireland live disproportionately in urban areas, in particular in 
Dublin, and a sizeable majority live in private rental accommodation.  
FUTURE DATA COLLECTION 
The value of monitoring the integration of migrants will only be as good as the 
data on which it is based. One issue in Ireland is how well represented non-Irish 
nationals are in social surveys. To be confident that the situation of non-Irish 
nationals is accurately measured, migrants need to be appropriately represented 
in such surveys. Another issue is small sample sizes. Immigrant or ethnic minority 
boost samples would be useful to address this problem, particularly for measuring 
poverty and deprivation, and would allow analysts to distinguish more policy-
relevant groups. Exploiting administrative data sources in areas such as education, 
health and social welfare would enhance our understanding of migrant 
integration from survey data.  
 
The sizeable group of immigrants who now possess Irish citizenship may be 
positive for their integration into Irish society but means that measuring 
integration on the basis of nationality may exclude an increasing number of 
naturalised citizens. This strengthens the case for including alternative measures 
such as ethnicity or parents’ country of birth in social surveys, as well as a broader 
reflection on whose outcomes are being measured. 
POLICY ISSUES 
A number of policy issues emerged from this Monitor. While the unemployment 
gap between Irish and non-Irish nationals has narrowed, the persisting high 
unemployment and low employment rate among African nationals is of concern. 
Chapter 2 argues that poorer labour market outcomes among this group are likely 
to be a combination of somewhat lower educational outcomes, time spent in the 
asylum system and not in the labour market for those who were seeking 
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protection, and potentially also the experience of racism and discrimination in the 
Irish labour market. Investigating the outcomes of African migrants in more depth 
might allow us to point at some potential policy responses. Forthcoming work by 
the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection will also be helpful in 
this regard.  
 
Chapter 3 notes that a gap remains in English reading outcomes between Irish 15-
year-olds and those from a non-English speaking migrant background. This 
underlines the importance of monitoring needs, spending and effectiveness of 
English language tuition in Irish schools.  
 
Chapter 4 finds high rates of consistent poverty among the non-EU population in 
Ireland in 2016. 29 per cent of the non-EU population count as both at risk of 
poverty and deprived on two or more items, compared to 8 per cent of the Irish 
population. More detailed analysis could investigate the link between non-
employment and poverty and which national groups are most at risk, to 
supplement ongoing work on the Jobseeker’s Longitudinal Dataset.  
 
Political participation of migrants in Ireland is in principle favourable given 
generous voting rights. In practice, however, Chapter 5 documents a serious 
under-representation of migrant candidates in politics and on the voting register. 
Continued efforts to encourage migrant voter registration and voting would 
potentially increase migrant participation in Irish politics.  
 
The Migrant Integration Strategy, published in early 2017, is ambitious in scope, 
covers a range of policy areas and represents a significant statement of policy 
intent. Whether those policy goals are achieved depends on how effectively the 
strategy is implemented. As integration policy is mainstreamed in Ireland, the 
implementation of this strategy is the responsibility of all government 
departments and agencies that interact with migrants, not just the Department of 
Justice and Equality. Projects funded by government but delivered by NGOs are 
also an important component of the strategy. It is important that any integration 
strategy is accompanied by evaluation of measures and monitoring of migrant 
outcomes, to ensure policies are effectively meeting the needs of the migrant 
population. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
Introduction, Policy and Context 
By Samantha Arnold and Frances McGinnity 
 
Integration allows immigrants to contribute to the economic, social, cultural and 
political life of their host country, and is important for social cohesion. Integration 
is also important for encouraging acceptance of immigrants by the host country 
population. While facilitating migrant integration may be challenging for host 
countries, international evidence shows that the consequences of failed 
integration may become apparent in a number of ways, from early school-leaving 
and residential segregation to inter-ethnic violence.  
 
The 2018 Integration Monitor follows a series of five Annual Integration Monitors 
published between 2011 and 2017. The Integration Monitor seeks to measure the 
integration of immigrants into Irish society in four key domains or policy areas: 
employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. This report also 
presents a special theme on ‘Muslims in Ireland’.  
 
This chapter provides an introduction to and context for the indicators. Section 
1.1 considers the challenges of measuring integration and monitoring outcomes, 
and the indicators used. Section 1.2 outlines the main trends in migration in 
Ireland and presents selected results from Census 2016 (Box 1.2). 
1.1 THE CHALLENGES OF MONITORING INTEGRATION 
1.1.1  Defining and measuring integration 
Defining integration is not straightforward. Integration can refer to the process of 
settlement, interaction with the host society, and social change that follows 
immigration. Migrants need to ‘secure a place for themselves’ – find a home, a 
job, income, schools, access to healthcare – and also a place in the social and 
cultural sense. Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016, p. 14) suggest integration 
may be defined simply as ‘the process of becoming an accepted part of society’, 
both as an individual and as a group.  
 
For the EU, integration relates to third-country nationals (those from outside the 
European Union), and does not include EU nationals moving to other EU 
countries. However, this Integration Monitor measures outcomes for non-EU and 
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protection, and potentially also the experience of racism and discrimination in the 
Irish labour market. Investigating the outcomes of African migrants in more depth 
might allow us to point at some potential policy responses. Forthcoming work by 
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Chapter 3 notes that a gap remains in English reading outcomes between Irish 15-
year-olds and those from a non-English speaking migrant background. This 
underlines the importance of monitoring needs, spending and effectiveness of 
English language tuition in Irish schools.  
 
Chapter 4 finds high rates of consistent poverty among the non-EU population in 
Ireland in 2016. 29 per cent of the non-EU population count as both at risk of 
poverty and deprived on two or more items, compared to 8 per cent of the Irish 
population. More detailed analysis could investigate the link between non-
employment and poverty and which national groups are most at risk, to 
supplement ongoing work on the Jobseeker’s Longitudinal Dataset.  
 
Political participation of migrants in Ireland is in principle favourable given 
generous voting rights. In practice, however, Chapter 5 documents a serious 
under-representation of migrant candidates in politics and on the voting register. 
Continued efforts to encourage migrant voter registration and voting would 
potentially increase migrant participation in Irish politics.  
 
The Migrant Integration Strategy, published in early 2017, is ambitious in scope, 
covers a range of policy areas and represents a significant statement of policy 
intent. Whether those policy goals are achieved depends on how effectively the 
strategy is implemented. As integration policy is mainstreamed in Ireland, the 
implementation of this strategy is the responsibility of all government 
departments and agencies that interact with migrants, not just the Department of 
Justice and Equality. Projects funded by government but delivered by NGOs are 
also an important component of the strategy. It is important that any integration 
strategy is accompanied by evaluation of measures and monitoring of migrant 
outcomes, to ensure policies are effectively meeting the needs of the migrant 
population. 
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EU immigrants. According to the European Union’s 2004 Common Basic Principles 
of Integration, integration is ‘a dynamic, two-way process of mutual 
accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States’ (see Appendix 
1).  
 
In Ireland, integration is defined as the ‘ability to participate to the extent that a 
person needs and wishes in all major components of society without having to 
relinquish his or her own cultural identity’ (Department of Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform, 1999 in Department of Justice and Equality, 2017). 
 
Integration is high on the EU policy agenda: the 2011 European Agenda for 
Integration of Third-Country Nationals was followed in June 2016 with the 
publication of an Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, which 
aims to support the development of Member State integration policies. The 
Action plan targets all third-country nationals and has regard to the specific 
challenges faced by refugees.3  
 
This policy focus has been accompanied by an awareness of the need to monitor 
integration. One of the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy4 
(see Appendix 1) is the understanding that developing clear indicators is necessary 
to adjust policy and evaluate progress on integration. These indicators should be 
based on existing and comparable data for most Member States, limited in 
number, simple to understand and focused on outcomes. This is the approach 
adopted in 2010 by EU Ministers in the Zaragoza Declaration (see Section 1.1.2).5 
 
Collett and Petrovic (2014) also highlight the importance of monitoring in their 
review of mainstreaming approaches to integration policy in four European 
countries. Mainstreaming can be a very effective policy approach to the 
integration of migrants, particularly in the longer term when narrowly defined 
stand-alone immigrant integration policies may fall short. However these authors 
also stress that when a policy is mainstreamed, it is important to have specific 
data on immigrants to ensure that they are being reached and their needs are 
being served by the policies. Without monitoring of outcomes, mainstreaming can 
mean that the needs of immigrants are being ignored or at least not effectively 
addressed (Collett and Petrovic, 2014). 
 
 
                                                          
 
3  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/integration/index_en.htm. 
4  Council of the EU (2004), adopted following agreement among EU Member States about the need for more dynamic 
policies to promote the integration of third-country nationals in Member States. 
5  Swedish presidency conference conclusions on indicators and monitoring of the outcome of integration policies, 
proposed at the European Ministerial Conference on Integration, Zaragoza, Spain (April 2010). Hereafter these 
indicators are referred to as the Zaragoza indicators. 
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Ireland pursues a policy of mainstream service provision in the area of integration, 
with targeted initiatives to meet specific short-term needs (Department of Justice 
and Equality, 2017). A unit within the Department of Justice and Equality, the 
Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration, has a cross-departmental 
mandate to lead and co-ordinate migrant integration. The delivery of integration 
services rests with individual government departments and agencies. While 
government departments and agencies are crucial to service delivery, a key 
method of delivering on the objectives of the Migrant Integration Strategy (see 
below) is also working with non-governmental delivery partners.6 
 
In February 2017 the Government published The Migrant Integration Strategy – A 
Blueprint for the Future.7 The Strategy is monitored by the Migrant Integration 
Strategy Monitoring and Co-ordination Committee operating under the auspices 
of the Department of Justice and Equality. This Committee is responsible for 
agreeing indicators for measuring progress. A number of government agencies are 
individually responsible for monitoring progress in their departments as well (see 
Section 1.1.2). Progress on the implementation of the actions set out in the 
Strategy is to be reviewed at the end of 2018, following which a report will be 
prepared for Government (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017).  
 
In addition to the policy argument for monitoring, Bijl and Verweij (2012) highlight 
the benefits of providing factual information about immigrants and integration in 
what can sometimes be politically charged debates on the topic (see also Casey, 
2016). Negative attitudes to immigration have increased considerably in the UK in 
the last 15 years (Casey, 2016), and immigration has become a highly salient 
political issue. Negative attitudes to immigrants and immigration rose somewhat 
during the economic recession in Ireland (McGinnity et al., 2018), but as Fanning 
(2018) argues, Ireland has not had a marked political or media backlash against 
immigration.  
1.1.2  Integration indicators 
The main aim of this Integration Monitor is to provide a balanced and rigorous 
assessment of the situation of immigrants in Ireland using the most up-to-date 
and reliable data available. The framework for that assessment is based on the set 
of integration indicators included in the Zaragoza Declaration, adopted in April 
 
                                                          
 
6  Where possible, references to measures and projects run by NGOs in this Monitor will indicate whether they are 
government funded. 
7  Specifically, the report was published by a group chaired by the Department of Justice and Equality and comprising 
representatives from: Department of the Taoiseach; Department of Public Expenditure and Reform; Department of 
Education and Skills; Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government; Department of Jobs, 
Enterprise and Innovation; Department of Health and the Health Service Executive; Department of Children and 
Youth Affairs; Department of Social Protection; Department of Arts, Heritage and Gaeltacht Affairs; Department of 
Transport, Tourism and Sport; Department of Defence; CSO; An Garda Síochána; and the County and City Managers’ 
Association (Department of Justice and Equality, 2014). 
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3  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/integration/index_en.htm. 
4  Council of the EU (2004), adopted following agreement among EU Member States about the need for more dynamic 
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2010 by EU Ministers responsible for integration, and approved at the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council on 3-4 June, 2010. These are also known as the ‘Zaragoza 
indicators’.8 A number of key principles guided the choice of these indicators. This 
section considers some of their strengths and limitations.  
 
First, the indicators are focused on outcomes. For each indicator, outcomes for 
immigrants are compared with those for the native population, in this case the 
Irish population, which means that the focus is on the difference between the 
Irish and the immigrant populations. The two exceptions to this principle of 
comparing outcomes are the indicators concerning citizenship and long-term 
residence (see Table 1.1), which describe the context and opportunities for 
integration rather than measure empirical outcomes.  
 
Second, the indicators are limited in number and largely draw on nationally 
representative and internationally comparable data sources that already exist. 
This approach makes them cost-effective and, in principle, highly comparable, but 
it does have some disadvantages: 
(i)  The existing data sources may not be designed to represent and measure 
outcomes for immigrants. This is discussed further in Section 1.1.3. 
(ii)  The indicators principally measure the structural dimensions of integration. 
These dimensions are objective, and include the likes of labour market 
participation and educational attainment. Cross-national data on an ongoing 
basis do not exist for many subjective indicators, such as sense of belonging 
or the experience of racism and discrimination, so these are not included as 
core indicators.  
(iii)  All of the indicators study integration at the individual level, neglecting 
factors that are pertinent to the integration of communities. In general, this 
is not a major drawback, because poorly integrated communities tend to be 
comprised of poorly integrated individual migrants. However, there are 
some exceptions. In particular, migrant communities can be spatially 
segregated in or concentrated in disadvantaged areas. These issues will not 
show up in the Zaragoza indicators, but research is underway to investigate 
them in Ireland.  
(iv) The focus on quantitative, nationally representative data means the 
Integration Monitor lacks a sense of the lived experience of integration: this 
is better captured by qualitative work using interviews and case studies.9 
This report measures integration at a national level, although it is clear that 
integration often takes place at a local level. Gilmartin and Dagg (2018) 
 
                                                          
 
8  See https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/declaration-of-the-european-ministerial-conference-on-
integration-zaragoza-15-16-april-2010. 
9  Examples of such studies include Gilligan et al. (2010); MCRI (2008); UNHCR (2014). 
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compare integration outcomes between non-Irish nationals that have settled 
in Dublin and those residing in the Border region. They show that relative to 
the native population in each area, non-Irish residents in the Border region 
exhibit poorer integration outcomes than their counterparts in Dublin. 
 
Third, the indicators are designed to be comparable over time. While the data do 
not allow us to follow individuals over time, we can measure changes for groups 
in the population. An emphasis on change is important for two reasons. Firstly, 
from a policy perspective, the direction of change is important: for example, are 
poverty rates rising or falling? From a research perspective, comparing change 
over time can overcome some of the limitations of the indicators. Secondly, an 
indicator might underestimate the proportion of an immigrant group who own 
their own homes, but if it does so consistently over time, it will still detect 
changes in that proportion. 
 
Fourth, the indicators should be simple to understand and accessible. Basing 
indicators on familiar concepts such as unemployment and poverty means that 
they should have resonance for both policymakers and the general public. This 
transparency requirement also means they need to be defined clearly (see 
Appendix 2). Opting for simple, accessible ‘headline’ figures means there is no 
statistical modelling in this Integration Monitor. This means that some of the 
differences between Irish and non-Irish nationals may be because of, for example, 
education or age differences. This is noted in the text where particularly relevant.  
 
Table 1.1 presents the indicators used in this Integration Monitor, which draw on 
those proposed at Zaragoza (see also Appendix 2). 
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8  See https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/declaration-of-the-european-ministerial-conference-on-
integration-zaragoza-15-16-april-2010. 
9  Examples of such studies include Gilligan et al. (2010); MCRI (2008); UNHCR (2014). 
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TABLE 1.1  OUTLINE OF CORE INDICATORS, BROADLY EQUIVALENT TO THOSE PROPOSED AT 
ZARAGOZA 
  
1. Employment Employment rate 
Unemployment rate 
Activity rate 
2. Education Highest educational attainment 
Share of 25- to 34-year-olds with tertiary educational attainment 
Share of early leavers from education and training 
Mean English reading and Mathematics scores for 15-year-olds (PISA)  
3. Social 
inclusion 
Median net income (household income and equivalised income) 
At risk of poverty rate 
Share of population perceiving their health status as good or very good 
Share of property owners among immigrants and in the total population 
4. Active 
citizenship 
Ratio of immigrants who have acquired citizenship to non-EEA immigrant population 
(best estimate) 
Share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits (best estimate) 
Share of immigrants among elected local representatives 
 
Note:  In some instances the indicators are slightly different because of data constraints (see Appendix 2). 
 
In addition, the indicators arose from the EU’s Common Basic Principles and are 
consistent with them (i.e. Principles 3, 5, 6 and 9 respectively. See Appendix 1). 
Current Irish integration policy (the Migrant Integration Strategy) has regard to 
the EU Common Basic Principles on Integration.  
 
The Migrant Integration Strategy’s focus is on ensuring the equitable provision of 
public services within a mainstreamed system. Additional key strategic themes 
include: promoting interculturalism; embedding integration within social inclusion 
activities such as sports clubs, unions, the media; effective and equitable provision 
of services through the private sector; encouraging local level integration 
measures; building capacity, encouraging self-determination and political 
participation among migrants themselves. Table 1.2 lists key actions in the 
Strategy, which are most directly relevant to the Zaragoza indicators set out in 
Table 1.1.  
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TABLE 1.2  OUTLINE OF ACTIONS IN THE MIGRANT INTEGRATION STRATEGY RELEVANT TO 
THE CORE INDICATORS  
  
1. Employment Continued publication of disaggregated data on unemployment (Action 38). Education and 
training appropriate to the needs of migrants including unemployed migrants (Actions 39 
and 40) and engagement with migrants who are registered jobseekers (Action 41).  
2.  Education Improved provision of ESOL classes and annual monitoring of the numbers of non-English 
speaking migrant children in schools (Actions 29, 32, 33, 35, 37). Training of teachers and 
attracting migrants into the teaching profession (Actions 27 and 31).  
3.  Social 
inclusion 
Monitoring progress on reducing poverty and social exclusion among migrants (Action 20). 
Improved access to services through training and by ensuring language-appropriate 
information and interpreting services (Actions 15, 16, 18 and 19). 
4.  Active 
citizenship 
Encouraging migrants to participate in local and national politics (Action 58) and register to 
vote (Action 59) including by providing multi-lingual information on how to register and on 
elections (Action 60).  
 
Source: Migrant Integration Strategy. 
 
As well as the core indicators, each Integration Monitor includes a different 
special thematic focus. This year the focus is on ‘Muslims in Ireland’, using 2016 
Census data. It is important to indicate that not all Muslims captured in the 
Census are immigrants. 
 
The focus on outcomes distinguishes this Integration Monitor from the Migrant 
Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). The MIPEX tool aims to assess, compare and 
improve integration policy indicators by providing ongoing assessment of policies. 
That said, policy forms the context for the outcomes measured here and will be 
discussed briefly in this report, particularly in the access information in Boxes 2.1, 
3.1, 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2.10  
1.1.3  Challenges of monitoring outcomes among immigrants 
Even when indicators are fixed, monitoring immigrant outcomes is challenging. 
This is related to how immigrants are defined, their representation in survey data 
and the changing composition of the group.  
 
The general definition of immigrants in this Integration Monitor is based on 
nationality and is consistent with the previous publications in the series. While the 
EU’s definition of immigrants is those coming from outside the EU, this Integration 
Monitor does measure outcomes for EU immigrants. However, the nationality 
definition misses second-generation immigrants and naturalised citizens, who are 
not typically identified using general social surveys. Most immigration into Ireland 
is relatively recent, but because a significant proportion of immigrants are now 
 
                                                          
 
10  These boxes are not intended as a statement of entitlements, and readers should refer to the relevant official bodies 
for further information (additional sources of information are indicated in the boxes).  
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TABLE 1.1  OUTLINE OF CORE INDICATORS, BROADLY EQUIVALENT TO THOSE PROPOSED AT 
ZARAGOZA 
  
1. Employment Employment rate 
Unemployment rate 
Activity rate 
2. Education Highest educational attainment 
Share of 25- to 34-year-olds with tertiary educational attainment 
Share of early leavers from education and training 
Mean English reading and Mathematics scores for 15-year-olds (PISA)  
3. Social 
inclusion 
Median net income (household income and equivalised income) 
At risk of poverty rate 
Share of population perceiving their health status as good or very good 
Share of property owners among immigrants and in the total population 
4. Active 
citizenship 
Ratio of immigrants who have acquired citizenship to non-EEA immigrant population 
(best estimate) 
Share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits (best estimate) 
Share of immigrants among elected local representatives 
 
Note:  In some instances the indicators are slightly different because of data constraints (see Appendix 2). 
 
In addition, the indicators arose from the EU’s Common Basic Principles and are 
consistent with them (i.e. Principles 3, 5, 6 and 9 respectively. See Appendix 1). 
Current Irish integration policy (the Migrant Integration Strategy) has regard to 
the EU Common Basic Principles on Integration.  
 
The Migrant Integration Strategy’s focus is on ensuring the equitable provision of 
public services within a mainstreamed system. Additional key strategic themes 
include: promoting interculturalism; embedding integration within social inclusion 
activities such as sports clubs, unions, the media; effective and equitable provision 
of services through the private sector; encouraging local level integration 
measures; building capacity, encouraging self-determination and political 
participation among migrants themselves. Table 1.2 lists key actions in the 
Strategy, which are most directly relevant to the Zaragoza indicators set out in 
Table 1.1.  
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naturalised Irish citizens this has implications for how best to define the 
immigrant population (see Chapter 5). This is a point we return to in Chapter 7, 
where we also discuss the fact that ethnicity and religion are not measured in 
most ongoing social surveys in Ireland.  
 
A second challenge for monitoring is how effectively survey data collect 
information on immigrants. These large, nationally representative datasets are 
not designed to represent and record details of immigrants. A key concern is the 
tendency for certain groups to be under-represented in survey data due to, for 
example, poor language skills. There is also a very diverse range of nationalities 
among immigrants to Ireland. Small numbers in particular nationality groups often 
mean they need to be combined into larger nationality groups, thus losing detail 
about the experience of specific nationalities. Some groups, such as the homeless 
and those living in residential homes or direct provision centres, are excluded 
from household surveys by design.  
 
EU nationals are distinguished from non-EU nationals as they have very different 
rights and freedom of movement in Ireland. As previous research (Barrett et al., 
2006) has indicated that the experience in Ireland of people from the United 
Kingdom differs from other EU nationals, we have distinguished UK nationals 
separately, where possible. EU-West nationals and EU-East nationals are also 
distinguished separately.11 In this Integration Monitor, where data permit, we 
distinguish non-EU nationals into the following groups: ‘Africa’; ‘North America, 
Australia and Oceania’; ‘Asia’, which comprises South, South-East and East Asia; 
and ‘Rest of Europe and Rest of the World’ which comprises Central America and 
Caribbean, South America, Near and Middle East, and other countries. However, 
where data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions are used (Chapter 4), 
these latter groups are aggregated into a ‘non-EU’ category. 
 
A third challenge with monitoring immigrant outcomes is the change in size and 
composition of the immigrant population over time, so that the year-on-year 
comparisons are potentially not of the same groups. Recent migration flows to 
and from Ireland illustrate how migration patterns closely reflect economic 
conditions: economic growth brings strong labour demand and stimulates 
immigration, whereas recession and falling labour demand stimulate emigration. 
Thus migration flows are important for understanding changes to the stock of 
immigrants; this is discussed in the next section.  
 
                                                          
 
11  EU-West comprises the older EU15 Member States excluding the UK and Ireland, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. EU-East comprises 
the EU Member States that acceded between 2004 and 2013, i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN TRENDS IN MIGRATION IN IRELAND 
In this section we discuss the main trends in immigration in recent years with a 
particular focus on developments since the 2016 Integration Monitor, which 
reflect trends and developments in law and policy up to December 2015.  
 
In 2017, Ireland had one of the highest percentages of foreign-born residents 
among EU Member States at 17 per cent.12 The proportion of residents born in 
other EU Member States increased by 3 percentage points from 2015 to 2017 
(from 10 per cent to 13 per cent).13 The proportion of residents from non-EU 
Member States decreased by 3 percentage points from 2015 to 2017 (from 7 per 
cent to 4 per cent). Figure 1.1 shows that aside from Luxembourg (not shown), 
Cyprus and Ireland have the highest proportion of residents born in other EU 
Member States at 13 per cent. 
 
FIGURE 1.1  FOREIGN-BORN RESIDENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION 2017  
 
 
Source:  Eurostat (at 1 January 2017).  
Notes:  The following data for Luxembourg are excluded: 40 per cent born in other EU Member States, 7 per cent born in non-EU 
Member States. Stateless residents not included.  
 
                                                          
 
12  Source: Eurostat. Note that ‘foreign-born’ are typically first-generation immigrants, and may consist of both foreign 
nationals and foreign-born nationals of the host country.  
13  Foreign-born also includes those born in Northern Ireland. These are counted among those born in other EU Member 
States.  
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naturalised Irish citizens this has implications for how best to define the 
immigrant population (see Chapter 5). This is a point we return to in Chapter 7, 
where we also discuss the fact that ethnicity and religion are not measured in 
most ongoing social surveys in Ireland.  
 
A second challenge for monitoring is how effectively survey data collect 
information on immigrants. These large, nationally representative datasets are 
not designed to represent and record details of immigrants. A key concern is the 
tendency for certain groups to be under-represented in survey data due to, for 
example, poor language skills. There is also a very diverse range of nationalities 
among immigrants to Ireland. Small numbers in particular nationality groups often 
mean they need to be combined into larger nationality groups, thus losing detail 
about the experience of specific nationalities. Some groups, such as the homeless 
and those living in residential homes or direct provision centres, are excluded 
from household surveys by design.  
 
EU nationals are distinguished from non-EU nationals as they have very different 
rights and freedom of movement in Ireland. As previous research (Barrett et al., 
2006) has indicated that the experience in Ireland of people from the United 
Kingdom differs from other EU nationals, we have distinguished UK nationals 
separately, where possible. EU-West nationals and EU-East nationals are also 
distinguished separately.11 In this Integration Monitor, where data permit, we 
distinguish non-EU nationals into the following groups: ‘Africa’; ‘North America, 
Australia and Oceania’; ‘Asia’, which comprises South, South-East and East Asia; 
and ‘Rest of Europe and Rest of the World’ which comprises Central America and 
Caribbean, South America, Near and Middle East, and other countries. However, 
where data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions are used (Chapter 4), 
these latter groups are aggregated into a ‘non-EU’ category. 
 
A third challenge with monitoring immigrant outcomes is the change in size and 
composition of the immigrant population over time, so that the year-on-year 
comparisons are potentially not of the same groups. Recent migration flows to 
and from Ireland illustrate how migration patterns closely reflect economic 
conditions: economic growth brings strong labour demand and stimulates 
immigration, whereas recession and falling labour demand stimulate emigration. 
Thus migration flows are important for understanding changes to the stock of 
immigrants; this is discussed in the next section.  
 
                                                          
 
11  EU-West comprises the older EU15 Member States excluding the UK and Ireland, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. EU-East comprises 
the EU Member States that acceded between 2004 and 2013, i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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Ireland has experienced extensive migratory change over the past two decades, 
linked to changing economic conditions and the expansion of the EU. Prior to the 
mid-1990s Ireland was a country with a long history of net emigration, but a 
period of economic growth from the early 1990s attracted returning Irish 
emigrants and other immigrants. In 2004 the enlargement of the EU led to 
particularly high net inward migration. Ireland, the UK and Sweden were the only 
three EU Member States to open their labour markets, without restrictions, to 
workers from new Member States. Inflows of migrants peaked during the 
economic boom in 2006/2007. However, due in part to a collapse in the property 
market, together with deteriorating international economic conditions, Ireland 
entered into recession in 2008. As a result, immigration plummeted. In 2010 
Ireland re-entered a phase of significant net emigration, across all groups.14 
Revised estimates provided by the CSO presented in Figure 1.2 show that the year 
to April 2017 was the fifth consecutive year of decreased emigration. The 2017 
net migration figure stood at an estimated 19,800.15  
 
FIGURE 1.2  IMMIGRATION, EMIGRATION AND NET MIGRATION, 1987-2017 
 
 
Source:  CSO ‘Population and Migration Estimates’,16 various releases.  
Notes:  Year to April of reference year. 
 
                                                          
 
14  All groups (Irish, UK, EU-West, EU-East and Rest of the World) saw an increase in emigration between 2010 and 2011 
(Irish, UK, EU-West/East) and/or between 2011 and 2012 (Irish, EU-West/East and Rest of the World).  
15  The Population and Migration Estimates have been revised following the 2016 Census, and are not directly 
comparable to those shown in the last Integration Monitor (Barrett et al., 2017).  
16  The CSO creates these Population and Migration Estimates using the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Census, when 
available. Estimates are also compiled against the backdrop of movements in other migration indicators such as the 
number of Personal Public Service numbers allocated to non-Irish nationals, the number of work permits issued/ 
renewed and the number of asylum applications.  
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Using revised estimates from the CSO Population and Migration Estimates, Figure 
1.2 demonstrates that immigration inflows have risen 11 per cent from 2015 to 
2017 (from around 75,900 to 84,600). Emigration flows have also decreased by 7 
per cent from 2015 to 2017 (from around 70,000 to 64,800), but are 80 per cent 
higher than the flow recorded in 2006 (36,000).  
 
Figure 1.3 shows that immigration increased for all national groups from 2015 to 
2017, except EU-East, for whom immigration fell by an estimated 1,300 since 
2015. Immigration by (returning) Irish nationals increased by 3 per cent from 2015 
(26,600) to 2017 (27,400). Among non-Irish groups, the biggest change was in the 
non-EU group, whose immigration rate grew by an estimated 7,500 compared 
with 2015 (an increase of 34 per cent). 
 
FIGURE 1.3  NATIONALITY OF IMMIGRATION FLOWS, 2010-2017 
 
 
Source:  CSO ‘Population and Migration Estimates’, various releases.  
Notes:  Year to April of reference year. 
 
 
Figure 1.4 shows the nationality breakdown of emigration flows from 2010 to 
2017. Overall, emigration flows (of Irish plus non-Irish nationals) have decreased 
since 2015 (from an estimated 70,000 to 64,800). There has been a large increase 
in Irish emigration flows from 2009 onwards, but it has decreased from its peak of 
89,000 in 2013. Emigration peaked in 2013 (89,000), decreasing to an estimated 
64,800 in 2017. In 2017, Irish nationals accounted for 48 per cent (30,800) of the 
emigrant flow compared with 61 per cent in 2015 (42,500). From 2015 to 2017, 
the outward flow of the non-EU groups increased by 56 per cent (from an 
estimated 8,800 to 13,700); EU-East increased by 35 per cent (from 7,100 to 
9,600); and EU-West increased by 12 per cent (6,000 to 6,700). The outward flow 
of UK nationals decreased from 2015 to 2017 by 29 per cent (from around 5,600 
to 4,000).   
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linked to changing economic conditions and the expansion of the EU. Prior to the 
mid-1990s Ireland was a country with a long history of net emigration, but a 
period of economic growth from the early 1990s attracted returning Irish 
emigrants and other immigrants. In 2004 the enlargement of the EU led to 
particularly high net inward migration. Ireland, the UK and Sweden were the only 
three EU Member States to open their labour markets, without restrictions, to 
workers from new Member States. Inflows of migrants peaked during the 
economic boom in 2006/2007. However, due in part to a collapse in the property 
market, together with deteriorating international economic conditions, Ireland 
entered into recession in 2008. As a result, immigration plummeted. In 2010 
Ireland re-entered a phase of significant net emigration, across all groups.14 
Revised estimates provided by the CSO presented in Figure 1.2 show that the year 
to April 2017 was the fifth consecutive year of decreased emigration. The 2017 
net migration figure stood at an estimated 19,800.15  
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14  All groups (Irish, UK, EU-West, EU-East and Rest of the World) saw an increase in emigration between 2010 and 2011 
(Irish, UK, EU-West/East) and/or between 2011 and 2012 (Irish, EU-West/East and Rest of the World).  
15  The Population and Migration Estimates have been revised following the 2016 Census, and are not directly 
comparable to those shown in the last Integration Monitor (Barrett et al., 2017).  
16  The CSO creates these Population and Migration Estimates using the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Census, when 
available. Estimates are also compiled against the backdrop of movements in other migration indicators such as the 
number of Personal Public Service numbers allocated to non-Irish nationals, the number of work permits issued/ 
renewed and the number of asylum applications.  
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FIGURE 1.4  NATIONALITY OF EMIGRATION FLOWS, 2010-2017 
 
 
Source:  CSO ‘Population and Migration Estimates’, various releases.  
Notes:  Year to April of reference year. 
 
 
Figure 1.5 shows the breakdown of all registrations, or residence permissions, of 
non-EEA nationals17 aged 16 and over from 2008 to 2017. EEA nationals and non-
EEA nationals aged under 16 were not required to register. In 2014, the 
Employment Permits (Amendment) Act 2014 removed the exemption for those 
under 16 to register, but this provision has not yet been operationalised, meaning 
that we still have no reliable data on this group. 
 
The most recent confirmed data to year-end 2017, when there were 128,066 
registrations recorded, represent a decline of 13,750 (from 141,816) registrations 
since 2008 (a decrease of 10 per cent). The overall number of residence permits 
held by non-EEA adults increased from 2016 to 2017 by over 17,000 (15 per cent 
from 110,927).  
 
 
                                                          
 
17  The European Economic Area (EEA) comprises the countries of the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.  
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FIGURE 1.5  RESIDENCE PERMISSIONS (NON-EEA NATIONALS AGED 16 AND OVER), 2008-2017 
 
Source:  Eurostat (table: migr_resvalid).  
Notes:  All valid permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship on 31 December of each year. Data are not available for protection 
reasons (refugee and subsidiary protection) in 2008 and 2009.  
 
 
Figure 1.5 shows that the number of residence permissions issued for the purpose 
of work overall has increased since 2016 by 25 per cent (from around 20,973 to 
26,133). The share of the overall residence permissions issued increased slightly 
from 19 per cent in 2016 to 20 per cent in 2017, perhaps due in part to reforms of 
employment permit legislation in Ireland (see Barrett et al., 2017).  
 
The number of residence permissions issued for family reasons has increased 
since 2016 by 11 per cent (from around 27,243 to 30,184). The share of residence 
permissions issued to family members decreased slightly from 25 per cent to 24 
per cent between 2016 and 2017.  
 
The number of residence permissions issued for education reasons has increased 
since 2016 by 13 per cent (from around 35,323 to 39,779). The share of residence 
permissions issued for education reasons also decreased from 32 per cent in 2016 
to 31 per cent in 2017.  
 
The number of residence permissions issued for protection reasons has increased 
since 2016 by 20 per cent (from around 1,659 to 1,983), in part reflecting Ireland’s 
participation in EU relocation and resettlement schemes (Barrett et al., 2017; 
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since 2008 (a decrease of 10 per cent). The overall number of residence permits 
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17  The European Economic Area (EEA) comprises the countries of the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.  
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Arnold et al., 2018). The share of residence permissions issued for protection 
reasons remained constant at 1.5 per cent in 2016 and 2017.  
 
Provisional data released by the Department of Justice and Equality indicate that 
at year-end 2017 the top ten registered nationalities, accounting for over 50 per 
cent of all persons registered were: Brazil (15 per cent), India (14 per cent), China 
(9 per cent), US (7 per cent), Pakistan (6 per cent), Nigeria (4 per cent), Philippines 
(4 per cent), Malaysia (3 per cent), Canada (3 per cent) and South Africa (3 per 
cent) (Department of Justice and Equality, 2018a).  
 
BOX 1.1  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION IN 
IRELAND 
 
                                                          
 
18  Direct provision accommodation centres are state-run full board facilities for persons seeking protection. 
19  Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner, Annual Report 2015. Available at www.orac.ie. 
20  Reception and Integration Agency Annual Report 2014. Available at www.ria.gov.ie. 
21  Reception and Integration Agency Annual Report 2015. Available at www.ria.gov.ie. 
22  Reception and Integration Agency Annual Report 2016. Available at www.ria.gov.ie. 
23  Reception and Integration Agency Monthly report for December 2017. Available at www.ria.gov.ie. 
Since the publication of the last Monitor in 2017, efforts have been made to implement the 
recommendations arising from the 2014 Working Group Report to Government on Improvements 
to the Protection Process, including Direct Provision18 and Supports to Asylum Seekers (McMahon 
Report).  
The International Protection Act 2015 commenced in December 2016. The Act introduced a single 
application procedure for the first time. It was foreseen that asylum applicants would spend less 
time awaiting a decision, and thus spend less time out of work in the direct provision system. 
However, due to a backlog of cases and the process of transitioning to the new asylum system, 
interview waiting times have actually increased from 13 weeks at the end of 201519 to 18-20 
months in 2017 (Arnold, et al., 2018).  
By contrast, the proportion of residents living in direct provision for more than five years recently 
began to decrease. In 2014, around 38 per cent of residents were in the system for five years or 
more,20 decreasing to around 24 per cent in 2015,21 and around 13 per cent in 2016.22 Provisional 
figures for end-2017 indicate that there were 4,678 residents, around 8 per cent of whom were 
living in direct provision for more than five years.23 In 2015 there were an estimated 7,937 people 
in the protection system; 4,330 (or 55 per cent) of whom resided outside direct provision or had 
left the State (McMahon Report, 2015). It was reported in 2018 that a higher than normal 
proportion of applicants taking up the offer of direct provision accommodation has impacted 
upon bed capacity (Arnold et al., 2018). From August 2017, the weekly allowance paid to residents 
increased from €19.10 per adult and €15.60 per child to €21.60 per resident.  
In June 2018, the European Communities (Reception Conditions) Regulations 2018, which 
transposed the EU (recast) Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU), came into effect. Under 
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BOX 1.2  SELECTED RESULTS FROM CENSUS 2016 
Nationality 
In April 2016 there were 535,475 non-Irish nationals living in Ireland (down from 544,357 in April 
2011) from over 200 different nations. The proportion of the total population who were non-Irish 
nationals fell from 12.2 per cent in 2011 to 11.6 per cent in 2016. The fall in 2016 can be explained in 
 
                                                          
 
[1]  IRPP Statistics 26 February 2018. Available at www.integration.ie. 
the Regulations, co-operating asylum applicants who have not received a first instance decision 
within nine months may apply for permission to access the labour market. A person who holds 
permission to work is also entitled to avail of vocational training under the Regulations. In August 
2018 the government launched a consultation process on draft National Standards for 
accommodation offered to people in the protection process. (Department of Justice and Equality, 
2018.) 
Ireland’s Response to the Refugee Crisis 
In 2015, the Irish Government established the Irish Refugee Protection Programme (IRPP), and a 
cross-departmental Task Force, chaired by the Department of Justice and Equality. The 
Government confirmed its commitment to provide international protection for up to 4,000 
persons in light of the EU Resettlement and Relocation Programmes (European Commission, 
2015). As of the end of March 2018, 1,022 asylum seekers were relocated from other European 
countries and as of the end of June 2018 (Department of Justice and Equality, 2018b), 820 
programme refugees were resettled from UNHCR camps in non-EU countries under these 
programmes[1] (Department of Justice and Equality, 2018b). The Irish Government has made 
further pledges for programme refugees (945 persons) and established a new Humanitarian 
Admission Programme (530 persons) to fulfil the initial commitment to provide protection to 
4,000 refugees and asylum seekers. The Humanitarian Admission Programme will provide a 
pathway to enter and reside in Ireland for up to 530 family members of citizens, beneficiaries of 
international protection and programme refugees originating from: Syria, Afghanistan, South 
Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Myanmar, Eritrea and 
Burundi. 
Programme refugees have rights similar to Irish citizens including access to the labour market and 
third-level education. Relocated asylum seekers enjoy an accelerated asylum procedure. 
Beneficiaries of international protection avail of various supports including in respect of social 
protection, housing, education and labour market access.  
While the numbers of beneficiaries of international protection, programme refugees and asylum 
seekers have been increasing in recent years, information on their integration outcomes cannot 
be extracted from existing survey data sources and are thus not reported in this Integration 
Monitor. 
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cent of all persons registered were: Brazil (15 per cent), India (14 per cent), China 
(9 per cent), US (7 per cent), Pakistan (6 per cent), Nigeria (4 per cent), Philippines 
(4 per cent), Malaysia (3 per cent), Canada (3 per cent) and South Africa (3 per 
cent) (Department of Justice and Equality, 2018a).  
 
BOX 1.1  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION IN 
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18  Direct provision accommodation centres are state-run full board facilities for persons seeking protection. 
19  Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner, Annual Report 2015. Available at www.orac.ie. 
20  Reception and Integration Agency Annual Report 2014. Available at www.ria.gov.ie. 
21  Reception and Integration Agency Annual Report 2015. Available at www.ria.gov.ie. 
22  Reception and Integration Agency Annual Report 2016. Available at www.ria.gov.ie. 
23  Reception and Integration Agency Monthly report for December 2017. Available at www.ria.gov.ie. 
Since the publication of the last Monitor in 2017, efforts have been made to implement the 
recommendations arising from the 2014 Working Group Report to Government on Improvements 
to the Protection Process, including Direct Provision18 and Supports to Asylum Seekers (McMahon 
Report).  
The International Protection Act 2015 commenced in December 2016. The Act introduced a single 
application procedure for the first time. It was foreseen that asylum applicants would spend less 
time awaiting a decision, and thus spend less time out of work in the direct provision system. 
However, due to a backlog of cases and the process of transitioning to the new asylum system, 
interview waiting times have actually increased from 13 weeks at the end of 201519 to 18-20 
months in 2017 (Arnold, et al., 2018).  
By contrast, the proportion of residents living in direct provision for more than five years recently 
began to decrease. In 2014, around 38 per cent of residents were in the system for five years or 
more,20 decreasing to around 24 per cent in 2015,21 and around 13 per cent in 2016.22 Provisional 
figures for end-2017 indicate that there were 4,678 residents, around 8 per cent of whom were 
living in direct provision for more than five years.23 In 2015 there were an estimated 7,937 people 
in the protection system; 4,330 (or 55 per cent) of whom resided outside direct provision or had 
left the State (McMahon Report, 2015). It was reported in 2018 that a higher than normal 
proportion of applicants taking up the offer of direct provision accommodation has impacted 
upon bed capacity (Arnold et al., 2018). From August 2017, the weekly allowance paid to residents 
increased from €19.10 per adult and €15.60 per child to €21.60 per resident.  
In June 2018, the European Communities (Reception Conditions) Regulations 2018, which 
transposed the EU (recast) Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU), came into effect. Under 
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part by the rise in the number of those with dual Irish nationality. The number of persons with dual 
Irish nationality increased by 87 per cent since April 2011 (from 55,905 to 104,784). EU nationals 
accounted for 9 per cent (408,918 persons) resident in Ireland in 2016 compared to non-EU 
nationals who represented 3 per cent (126,557 persons) of the total population living in Ireland in 
2016.  
Polish nationals were the largest non-Irish nationality grouping recorded in 2016, representing 23 
per cent of the non-Irish population. UK nationals were the second largest group with 103,113 living 
in Ireland in 2016 (19 per cent of the non-Irish population). 
Ethnicity  
The Census shows that 185,683 people reported an ethnicity other than ‘White Irish’. The majority 
(94 per cent) of people who indicated they were ‘White Irish’ were born in Ireland. Of the 6 per cent 
(226,078) born elsewhere, 121,174 were born in England and Wales (121,174) and Northern Ireland 
(53,915). Some 20,301 were born in the Americas, 17,017 of whom were born in the US. One in 
three of those with ‘Black or Black Irish – African’ ethnicity (39 per cent) were born in Ireland (22,331 
persons), as were 31 per cent (2,126) of those with other Black backgrounds. The remainder of this 
group were born primarily in Nigeria which accounted for 27 per cent.  
Language  
Some 368,107 non-Irish nationals speak a language other than Irish or English at home. French, 
Polish, German and Spanish were the most common languages spoken at home. Of the non-Irish 
nationals who arrived in 1996 or before who speak a language other than Irish or English at home, 
80 per cent indicated that they spoke English very well in April 2016. For those who arrived in 2015, 
only 44 per cent indicated that they spoke English very well. The Census 2016 illustrates how ability 
improves with length of time living in Ireland. 
Spatial distribution of non-Irish nationals 
Dublin City (91,876 persons), Fingal (46,909) and Cork County (42,002) had the highest numbers of 
non-Irish nationals in 2016. Leitrim (3,526) and Sligo (5,892) had the lowest numbers. The highest 
proportion of non-Irish nationals was in Galway City (19 per cent or 91,876 persons) and the smallest 
was in Donegal (7.3 per cent or 2,505 persons). Non-Irish nationals were more likely to live in urban 
areas. Ballyhaunis in Co. Mayo was the town with the highest proportion of non-Irish nationals (40 
per cent or 941 persons), followed by Edgeworthstown in Co. Longford (32 per cent or 667 persons). 
Households headed by non-Irish nationals  
Around 204,000 households were headed by a non-Irish nationals (12 per cent of all households), 
around 49,000 of which were headed by a UK national and 45,000 of which were headed by a Polish 
national.  
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CHAPTER 1 APPENDIX 
 
 
The largest proportion of non-Irish nationals in 2017 was recorded in the age 
range ‘25 to 44 years’ (see Table A1.2). Migrants from Rest of Europe and Rest of 
the World recorded the highest proportion in this age range at 72 per cent, 
followed by Asia at 63 per cent. UK nationals were over-represented in the age 
range ‘45 to 65 years’ (39 per cent) compared to other nationalities. The UK also 
had the highest proportion of nationals in the age range ‘65+ years’ at 21 per 
cent, followed by North America, Australia and Oceania at 5 per cent and EU-West 
at 3 per cent. The proportion of nationals from North America, Australia and 
Oceania in the age range ‘0 to 14 years’ was the highest at 19 per cent, followed 
by EU12 at 16 per cent (Table A1.2). The gender of non-Irish nationals in Ireland in 
2016 was largely balanced across all groups (Table A1.3).  
 
Non-Irish nationals also differ considerably as to how long they have been living in 
Ireland. Table A1.4 shows that over 60 per cent of UK nationals had been living in 
Ireland for more than ten years: nearly 30 per cent of them had been living in 
Ireland more than 20 years. Other migrant groups have come to Ireland relatively 
recently. Around 40 per cent of people from EU-East had been living in Ireland for 
over ten years. Around 25 to 30 per cent of people from Asia, Africa, EU-West, 
and North America, Australia and Oceania had been in Ireland for over ten years. 
The proportion of Rest of Europe and Rest of the World who had come in the past 
ten years was lower at 18 per cent. Almost half of North America, Australia and 
Oceania, EU-West and Asia migrants and almost 60 per cent from the Rest of the 
World had been living in Ireland five years or less.  
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TABLE A1.1  NATIONALITY BY YEAR, LFS Q1 2013 – Q1 2017 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
 % Count % Count % Count % Count % Count 
Irish 88.4 50,104 88.6 47,732 88.6 45,032 88.5 37,632 88.2 40,053 
Non-Irish 11.7 4,963 11.4 4,648 11.4 4,165 11.6 3,653 11.8 3,973 
           
UK 2.4 891 2.3 737 2.3 631 2.2 647 2.2 743 
EU-West 1.1 440 1.2 560 1.3 485 1.4 528 1.4 505 
EU-East 5.1 2,409 5.2 2,178 5.3 1,981 5.3 1,649 5.2 1,755 
Africa 0.8 344 0.6 251 0.5 183 0.5 145 0.4 139 
North America, 
Australia, Oceania 0.3 127 0.3 133 0.3 141 0.3 102 0.4 141 
Asia 1.2 459 1.0 429 1.0 404 0.9 278 1.1 360 
Rest of Europe and 
Rest of the World 0.7 293 0.8 360 0.8 340 1.0 304 1.0 330 
Total 100 55,067 100 52,380 100 49,197 100 41,285 100 44,026 
 
Source:  Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2010-Q1 2017.  
Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted. 
 
 
TABLE A1.2  NATIONALITY BY AGE, LFS Q1 2017 
 
0 to 14 
years 
15 to 24 
years 
25 to 44 
years 
45 to 64 
years 65+ years Total % 
Total 
Count 
Irish 22.3 12.4 25.99 24.69 14.63 100 37,632 
Non-Irish 12.0 10.7 53.8 18.3 5.2 100 3,653 
Of which:  
UK 5.6 8.1 25.5 39.4 21.5 100 647 
EU-West 7.6 14.7 60.3 14.0 3.5 100 528 
EU-East 15.9 10.4 59.8 13.6 0.4 100 1,649 
Africa 11.7 16.2 55.8 13.1 3.2 100 145 
North America,  
Australia, Oceania 19.2 8.9 42.2 24.5 5.4 100 102 
Asia 11.3 13.6 62.7 11.4 1.1 100 278 
Rest of Europe and  
Rest of the World 9.8 7.8 71.6 9.5 1.3 100 304 
Total 21.1 12.2 29.3 23.9 13.5 100 41,285 
 
Source:  Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2017.  
Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted. 
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TABLE A1.3  NATIONALITY BY GENDER, LFS Q1 2017 
 
Male  
% 
Female  
% 
Total  
% Total Count 
Irish 49.5 50.6 100 37,632 
Non-Irish 49.8 50.2 100 3,653 
Of which:     
UK 51.3 48.7 100 647 
EU-West 47.9 52.1 100 528 
EU-East 49.5 50.5 100 1,649 
Africa 56.7 43.3 100 145 
North America, Australia, Oceania 42.4 57.6 100 102 
Asia 54.8 45.2 100 278 
Rest of Europe and Rest of the World 45.7 54.3 100 304 
Total 49.5 50.5 100 41,285 
 
Source:  Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2017.  
Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted. 
 
TABLE A1.4  NATIONALITY BY DURATION OF RESIDENCE IN IRELAND, LFS Q1 2017 
 
Born in 
Ireland % 
< 5 years 
% 
5 to 10 
years 
% 
11 to 20 
years 
% 
> 21 
years 
% 
Total % Total Count 
Irish 94.2 0.3 0.8 2.4 2.3 100 37,610 
Non-Irish 5.0 29.7 26.3 31.8 7.2 100 3,589 
Of which:        
UK 6.2 13.6 15.9 36.7 27.6 100 636 
EU-West 4.3 46.1 20.9 19.2 9.5 100 518 
EU-East 5.2 21.8 33.4 39.5 0.1 100 1,625 
Africa 5.9 27.0 40.8 24.2 2.2 100 141 
North America, 
Australia, Oceania 3.0 51.8 16.8 15.8 12.5 100 101 
Asia 4.9 46.2 24.3 24.0 0.5 100 272 
Rest of Europe and 
Rest of the World 3.4 59.0 20.1 15.4 2.3 100 296 
Total 83.8 3.7 3.8 5.8 2.3 100 41,199 
 
Source:  Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2017.  
Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted. N = 86 missing cases for ‘years of residence’ in 2017. 
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Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
Employment and Integration 
By Philip O’Connell and Éamonn Fahey 
 
Employment is central to the process of economic integration and social inclusion 
for all members of a society. The OECD (2015) notes that: 
Jobs are immigrants’ chief source of income. Finding one is therefore 
fundamental to their becoming part of the host country’s economic 
fabric. It also helps them – though there is no guarantee – to take their 
place in society as a whole by, for example, clearing the way into decent 
accommodation and the host country’s health system. Work also confers 
social standing in the eyes of the immigrant’s family, particularly 
children, and with respect to the host-country population. (p. 79). 
 
Employment leads to financial independence and reduces the risk of poverty and 
social exclusion; it allows an immigrant to contribute to the economy, and it 
confirms social standing in the host society. Recent years have seen a substantial 
recovery in the Irish labour market, following the very serious decline in labour 
market conditions during the 2008-2012 recession. With a recovery in the Irish 
labour market since 2012, a key question for this chapter concerns the extent to 
which immigrants have benefited from the overall growth in employment and 
decline in unemployment in recent years.  
 
This chapter presents key indicators of employment integration by nationality, 
including employment, unemployment, economic activity and self-employment 
rates. The data used in this chapter are derived from the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS). The LFS is a large-scale nationally representative survey of households in 
Ireland, conducted by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The LFS replaced the 
Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) from Quarter 3, 2017 and its 
publication also incorporates revised population estimates arising from the 2016 
Census. The impact of these changes for the current and previous Monitors is 
outlined in the Appendix to Chapter 2. In general, the revised LFS data show 
higher employment and activity rates than the QNHS for both Irish and non-Irish 
nationals. The 2016 Integration Monitor indicated that employment rates of Irish 
and non-Irish nationals were about equal at just 60 per cent of the population 
aged 15-64 years of age: the revised estimates from the LFS would suggest that 
the non-Irish employment rate (63.4 per cent) was 1.6 percentage points higher 
than the Irish rate (61.8 per cent). The LFS data also show higher unemployment 
rates than the QNHS data, particularly among Irish nationals. As a result, the 
22 | Monitor in g report  on integrat ion 2018  
revised data indicate a smaller unemployment gap between Irish and non-Irish, 
suggesting that the impact of the recession on unemployment among immigrants 
may not have been quite as severe as the QNHS data had led us to believe.  
 
Unless otherwise stated, the report refers to data from LFS Quarter 1, 2016 and 
2017 to remain consistent with previous editions of the Integration Monitor, 
which also used Quarter 1 data. The indicators discussed in this chapter are based 
on special analyses of the LFS data conducted for this report and refer to the 
working-age population, 15-64 years.24  
2.1  EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITY RATES 
Overall, total employment increased by just under 16 per cent between Quarter 1 
2012 and 2017, and the unemployment rate fell from 15.8 per cent to just over 7 
per cent over the same period (CSO, 2018). This reflects a sustained improvement 
in the labour market since the recession which began in 2008, and employment 
would continue to grow, and unemployment to fall, throughout the remainder of 
2017 and early 2018 (CSO, 2018).  
 
Figure 2.1 presents the rates of employment, unemployment and activity for Irish 
and non-Irish nationals aged 15-64 years for the first quarters of 2016 and 2017. 
There is clear evidence of a gradual improvement in the labour market compared 
to 2012 when the employment rate was 58.2 and 58.9 for Irish and non-Irish 
nationals respectively (McGinnity et al., 2014). The employment rate is measured 
as the proportion of working adults in the working age population (15-64 years). 
This increased by less than 2 percentage points for the Irish group between 2016 
and 2017, and by more than 2 points among non-Irish nationals. In 2017 the 
employment rate among non-Irish nationals, at 69.6 per cent of 15-64-year-olds, 
was 3 percentage points higher than that of Irish nationals.  
 
 
                                                          
 
24  It should be noted that the differences observed between population sub-groups refer only to the Quarter 1 data, 
and would not necessarily represent differences in the other quarters of 2016 and 2017. However, despite variation 
between quarters over the year, these analyses can provide useful insights into ongoing differences by nationality.  
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FIGURE 2.1  KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS FOR IRISH AND NON-IRISH NATIONALS, Q1 2016 
AND Q1 2017 
 
 
Source: Special analysis of the LFS microdata for Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (15-64 year age group). 
Note: Differences between Irish and non-Irish employment and activity rates are statistically significant (p < .05) in both years; 
differences in unemployment are not significant in either year.  
 
The unemployment rate is the number of unemployed expressed as a percentage 
of the labour force, which is the sum of the numbers employed plus 
unemployed.25 Unemployment decreased for both Irish and non-Irish nationals 
between 2016 and 2017: the unemployment rate of Irish nationals decreased 
from 8.8 per cent in 2016 to 7.1 per cent in 2017. The unemployment rate was 
about one percentage point higher among non-Irish nationals, at 9.8 per cent in 
2016 and the rate decreased by almost two and a half percentage points over the 
year and, as a result, the gap between unemployment rates of Irish and non-Irish 
nationals narrowed to less than half of a percentage point in the first quarter of 
2017. The gap is not significant in either year, representing a substantial 
narrowing of the disparity in unemployment between Irish and non-Irish nationals 
observed in previous monitors, which has been between three and five 
percentage points.  
 
The labour force activity rate is calculated as the proportion of working age adults 
in the population who are in the labour force, which consists of the number of 
people employed and unemployed. The activity rate followed the trend in 
employment, albeit more sluggishly: it increased marginally (by half a percentage 
point) among Irish nationals between 2016 and 2017, and by even less than that 
among the non-Irish. In 2017 the activity rate was almost four percentage points 
higher for non-Irish nationals than for Irish nationals.  
 
                                                          
 
25  The QNHS classifies as unemployed persons who, in the week before the survey, were without work and were 
available for work within the next two weeks, and had taken specific steps, in the preceding four weeks, to find work.  
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24  It should be noted that the differences observed between population sub-groups refer only to the Quarter 1 data, 
and would not necessarily represent differences in the other quarters of 2016 and 2017. However, despite variation 
between quarters over the year, these analyses can provide useful insights into ongoing differences by nationality.  
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Table 2.1 shows that there are important differences in employment and 
economic activity between immigrant groups. The classification of nationalities is 
based on the country codification in the EU Labour Force Survey from 2011 
onwards.26 In the 2016 Integration Monitor we introduced a distinction between 
Irish-born and foreign-born Irish nationals. In 2017 there were almost 212,000 
foreign-born Irish nationals resident in Ireland. They accounted for about 8 per 
cent of all Irish nationals and 6.8 per cent of the total population aged 15-64 
years. Foreign-born Irish nationals are a diverse group that includes the 
descendants of Irish emigrants, mainly from the UK now resident in Ireland, as 
well as foreign-born immigrants, who acquired Irish citizenship by naturalisation.  
 
The distinction between Irish-born and foreign-born Irish nationals was included 
the previous Monitor because we hypothesised that the labour market 
experiences of naturalised citizens would be different both to those of Irish-born 
citizens and to non-naturalised immigrants. We might expect that naturalised 
citizens, with a greater stake in the host society, and a larger bundle of rights, 
might expect to fare better in the labour market than non-naturalised immigrants, 
although perhaps not as well as Irish-born natives. However, a paper by Kelly et al. 
(2015) shows that naturalised immigrants from certain regions, particularly Africa, 
had exceptionally unfavourable employment and unemployment outcomes in 
Ireland in 2012 and 2014.  
 
Table 2.1 shows that foreign-born Irish tended to have slightly lower employment 
rates in both 2016 and 2017 though these are not significantly different. Their 
employment rates were also lower than the average non-Irish employment rates 
in both years. They also had higher unemployment rates than the native-born 
Irish, and these were statistically significant. In 2017 the foreign-born Irish 
unemployment rate, at just over 10 per cent, was significantly higher than the 
native-born Irish rate of 7 per cent, and also higher than the average 
unemployment rate among non-Irish nationals.  
 
 
                                                          
 
26  The ‘EU-West’ category comprises the older EU15 Member States excluding the UK and Ireland, i.e. Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. EU-East 
comprises the EU Member States that acceded between 2004 and 2013, i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. ‘North America and 
Oceania’ includes the Canada, United States of America, Australia and New Zealand. ‘Asia’ comprises South and 
South-East Asia and East Asia. ‘Rest of Europe and World’ includes comprises Candidate, European Free Tarde 
Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) and other European countries, Central America and 
Caribbean, South America and Near and Middle East. 
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TABLE 2.1  KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS BY NATIONAL GROUP Q1 2016 AND 2017 
 Employment rate (%) 
Unemployment rate 
(%) Activity rate (%) 
Total Population 
(‘000) 
 2016 2017 2016 2017 2016 2017 2016 2017 
Irish 64.7 66.4 8.8 7.1 71.0 71.5 2,643.5 2,661.3 
Irish-born 64.8 66.6 8.6 6.9 70.9 71.5 2,439.7 2,449.4 
Foreign-born 64.2 64.8 11.1 10.1 72.1 72.1 203.8 212.0 
Of which:         
Non-Irish 67.5 69.6 9.8 7.5 74.9* 75.2* 453.6 467.9 
UK 62.7 66.4 10.8 7.2 70.4 71.6 78.7 78.3 
EU-West 75.4* 76.0* 4.5* 3.9* 78.9* 79.1* 56.8 60.8 
EU-East 72.1* 74.2* 11.0* 8.0 81.0* 80.6* 208.8 210.0 
Africa 52.1* 44.7* 14.2 16.2* 60.7* 53.3* 18.9 16.5 
North America, 
Oceania 61.7 63.6 3.5 8.6 63.9 69.5 11.8 14.7 
Asia 67.3 63.5 5.9 8.7 71.5 69.5 37.2 45.5 
Rest of the 
World 52.0 61.6 12.6 7.0 59.5* 66.3* 41.4 42.2 
Total 65.1 66.9 8.9 7.2 71.5 72.1 3,097.1 3,129.3 
 
Source:  Special analysis of the LFS microdata for Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (15-64 years age group). 
Note:  Bold denotes statistically significant differences from Irish-born at P ≤ .05. * denotes statistical significance from Irish nationals 
at P ≤ .05. 
 
In general, nationals of other EU Member States have higher employment rates 
than Irish nationals and those from outside the EU: nationals of the pre-
enlargement ‘old’ EU Member States (EU-West) had the highest employment rate 
at 76 per cent. Nationals of the ‘new’ EU15-28 Member States (EU-East) also 
reported a high employment rate (74 per cent), and the highest activity rate (81 
per cent), so there are less economically inactive people in this group. These were 
significantly higher than the rates for Irish nationals. However, the unemployment 
rate among EU-East nationals is high compared to other Europeans, and is not 
significantly different to the unemployment rate among Irish nationals.  
 
African nationals reported the highest unemployment rate (14 per cent) of any 
group in 2016, and the lowest employment (52 per cent) and activity rates (61 per 
cent). These rates actually declined between 2016 and 2017, when most labour 
market outcomes for nearly every other nationality group improved. In 2017 less 
than 45 per cent of Africans in the 15-64 year age group were employed only 53 
per cent of them were economically active. Unemployment among Africans 
increased from about 14 per cent in 2016 to 16 per cent in 2017, a worrying 
departure from the general trend towards declining unemployment. 
 
Previous research on immigrants in the Irish labour market suggests that the main 
concentration of labour market disadvantage occurs among the Black African 
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Table 2.1 shows that there are important differences in employment and 
economic activity between immigrant groups. The classification of nationalities is 
based on the country codification in the EU Labour Force Survey from 2011 
onwards.26 In the 2016 Integration Monitor we introduced a distinction between 
Irish-born and foreign-born Irish nationals. In 2017 there were almost 212,000 
foreign-born Irish nationals resident in Ireland. They accounted for about 8 per 
cent of all Irish nationals and 6.8 per cent of the total population aged 15-64 
years. Foreign-born Irish nationals are a diverse group that includes the 
descendants of Irish emigrants, mainly from the UK now resident in Ireland, as 
well as foreign-born immigrants, who acquired Irish citizenship by naturalisation.  
 
The distinction between Irish-born and foreign-born Irish nationals was included 
the previous Monitor because we hypothesised that the labour market 
experiences of naturalised citizens would be different both to those of Irish-born 
citizens and to non-naturalised immigrants. We might expect that naturalised 
citizens, with a greater stake in the host society, and a larger bundle of rights, 
might expect to fare better in the labour market than non-naturalised immigrants, 
although perhaps not as well as Irish-born natives. However, a paper by Kelly et al. 
(2015) shows that naturalised immigrants from certain regions, particularly Africa, 
had exceptionally unfavourable employment and unemployment outcomes in 
Ireland in 2012 and 2014.  
 
Table 2.1 shows that foreign-born Irish tended to have slightly lower employment 
rates in both 2016 and 2017 though these are not significantly different. Their 
employment rates were also lower than the average non-Irish employment rates 
in both years. They also had higher unemployment rates than the native-born 
Irish, and these were statistically significant. In 2017 the foreign-born Irish 
unemployment rate, at just over 10 per cent, was significantly higher than the 
native-born Irish rate of 7 per cent, and also higher than the average 
unemployment rate among non-Irish nationals.  
 
 
                                                          
 
26  The ‘EU-West’ category comprises the older EU15 Member States excluding the UK and Ireland, i.e. Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. EU-East 
comprises the EU Member States that acceded between 2004 and 2013, i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. ‘North America and 
Oceania’ includes the Canada, United States of America, Australia and New Zealand. ‘Asia’ comprises South and 
South-East Asia and East Asia. ‘Rest of Europe and World’ includes comprises Candidate, European Free Tarde 
Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) and other European countries, Central America and 
Caribbean, South America and Near and Middle East. 
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ethnic group and this group was also much more likely than either Irish natives or 
other immigrant groups to have experienced discrimination while looking for work 
(Kingston et al., 2013; McGinnity et al., 2017).27  
 
Racism and discrimination may be major causes of African labour market 
disadvantage in Ireland. Michael (2016) details instances of workplace racism 
against Africans reported to ENAR Ireland’s iReport online reporting system.28 
These racist incidents are perpetrated by both customers and colleagues, and are 
identified by the victims as significant barriers to employment and career 
progression (Michael, 2016). This analysis of Afrophobia points to broader 
problems of hostility and antipathy directed specifically at people who belong to 
the African diaspora in Ireland.  
 
However, it is also necessary to consider the low labour force participation rates 
among Africans. Additional analysis of the 2016 and 2017 LFS (not shown) finds 
that the gender divide in activity rates for African nationals is particularly stark, 
and is even greater than the difference found among all immigrant groups 
combined, which is shown in Table 2.3. Analysis for the 2016 Integration Monitor 
showed that African families tend to have more children. Data from the Growing 
Up in Ireland survey showed that African mothers have low rates of employment 
and less favourable educational qualifications (McGinnity et al., 2014). Thus, it 
was suggested that the low employment rates among African women may be 
partly due to the high costs of childcare in Ireland, which may be unaffordable for 
African mothers with relatively large families, relatively low earning potential, 
and, because of their immigrant status, less recourse to relatives to provide 
childcare (O’Connell and Kenny, 2017). In addition to these compositional factors, 
Kingston et al. (2013) also suggested that the severe disadvantages suffered by 
Black African individuals may be due in part to the fact that many Black Africans in 
Ireland are refugees. This means they would have spent an extended period of 
time excluded from the labour market, and from participation in Irish society, as 
asylum seekers in the direct provision system, leading to a scarring effect on their 
future employment prospects. International research has shown the damaging 
effect of unemployment periods on subsequent labour market outcomes (Gangl, 
2006). Analysis of data from the 2011 Census (O’Connell, forthcoming), which 
indicates that immigrants from countries with relatively large numbers of asylum 
seekers in Ireland tend to have lower employment rates, and higher 
unemployment rates, lends support to the contention that the exclusion of 
asylum seekers from the Irish labour market had lasting negative effects on the 
 
                                                          
 
27  The CSO gathers information on Africans in two ways. In the Census, there is a question on ethnic and cultural 
background. One of the options the respondent can tick in response to this question is ‘Black or Black Irish – African’. 
Alternatively, African nationality can be captured in both the Census and the Labour Force Survey by aggregating the 
write-in responses to the question ‘What is your nationality?’ We count nationals of all countries on the continent of 
Africa, including countries in North Africa, as African. 
28  ENAR Ireland is the European Network Against Racism, Ireland. 
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employment prospects of asylum seekers. However, that analysis also concludes 
that the African disadvantage is likely due to the combination of restrictive 
policies regarding the right to work on the part of the State, as well as 
discriminatory practices on the part of employers, based on statistical models that 
take account of both educational attainment and language ability (O’Connell, 
forthcoming). 
 
Non-EU nationals in general show lower employment and activity levels: just over 
63 per cent of those from North America and Asia were employed in 2017, as 
were about 62 per cent of those from the Rest of the World. This may reflect the 
fact that non-EU nationals require employment permits in order to participate in 
the Irish labour market. However, further analysis of the LFS microdata indicates 
that a greater proportion of non-EU nationals in Ireland are students than is the 
case for the EU groups. Nevertheless, it should be noted that employment rates of 
non-EU nationals have increased in recent years, suggesting that these also have 
participated in the more general improvement in the labour market. This is not 
however, the case among the Asian group, which saw a decline in employment 
and an increase in unemployment between 2016 and 2017, though these changes 
are not statistically significant.  
 
TABLE 2.2 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS BY AGE GROUP Q1 2016 AND Q1 2017 
Age 
band Nationality 
Employment rate 
(%) 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
Activity rate  
(%) 
Total Population 
(‘000) 
  2016 2017 2016 2017 2016 2017 2016 2017 
15-24 
Irish 36.5 39.1 16.6 13.2 43.7 45.1 507.9 523.0 
Non-Irish 43.7* 43.3 16.3 11.8 52.1* 49.0 66.1 60.4 
25-44 
Irish 76.4 78.8 8.7 6.7 83.6 84.5 1,107.4 1,096.5 
Non-Irish 73.5* 75.7* 8.4 6.4 80.3* 80.8* 293.9 304.0 
45-64 
Irish 66.2 67.1 6.5 5.7 70.8 71.1 1,028.1 1,041.8 
Non-Irish 65.6 67.0 11.2* 9.4* 73.9 74.0 93.6 103.5 
 
Source:  Special analysis of the LFS microdata for Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (15-64 years age group). 
Note:  * denotes statistical significance from Irish nationals at P ≤ .05. 
 
Table 2.2 shows the main employment indicators by age group. Employment and 
activity rates among young people are substantially lower than among older age 
groups, irrespective of nationality. Low activity rates among younger Irish 
nationals reflect the fact that many are still in the educational system and are 
therefore neither working nor looking for a job (so they are not part of the labour 
force). The employment and activity rates among non-Irish nationals were higher 
than among natives in 2016; but not significantly so in 2017 as the Irish rates 
increased, perhaps due to a general improvement in the labour market for young 
people. 
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problems of hostility and antipathy directed specifically at people who belong to 
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among Africans. Additional analysis of the 2016 and 2017 LFS (not shown) finds 
that the gender divide in activity rates for African nationals is particularly stark, 
and is even greater than the difference found among all immigrant groups 
combined, which is shown in Table 2.3. Analysis for the 2016 Integration Monitor 
showed that African families tend to have more children. Data from the Growing 
Up in Ireland survey showed that African mothers have low rates of employment 
and less favourable educational qualifications (McGinnity et al., 2014). Thus, it 
was suggested that the low employment rates among African women may be 
partly due to the high costs of childcare in Ireland, which may be unaffordable for 
African mothers with relatively large families, relatively low earning potential, 
and, because of their immigrant status, less recourse to relatives to provide 
childcare (O’Connell and Kenny, 2017). In addition to these compositional factors, 
Kingston et al. (2013) also suggested that the severe disadvantages suffered by 
Black African individuals may be due in part to the fact that many Black Africans in 
Ireland are refugees. This means they would have spent an extended period of 
time excluded from the labour market, and from participation in Irish society, as 
asylum seekers in the direct provision system, leading to a scarring effect on their 
future employment prospects. International research has shown the damaging 
effect of unemployment periods on subsequent labour market outcomes (Gangl, 
2006). Analysis of data from the 2011 Census (O’Connell, forthcoming), which 
indicates that immigrants from countries with relatively large numbers of asylum 
seekers in Ireland tend to have lower employment rates, and higher 
unemployment rates, lends support to the contention that the exclusion of 
asylum seekers from the Irish labour market had lasting negative effects on the 
 
                                                          
 
27  The CSO gathers information on Africans in two ways. In the Census, there is a question on ethnic and cultural 
background. One of the options the respondent can tick in response to this question is ‘Black or Black Irish – African’. 
Alternatively, African nationality can be captured in both the Census and the Labour Force Survey by aggregating the 
write-in responses to the question ‘What is your nationality?’ We count nationals of all countries on the continent of 
Africa, including countries in North Africa, as African. 
28  ENAR Ireland is the European Network Against Racism, Ireland. 
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Many young non-Irish nationals are also engaged in education, but a significant 
proportion come to Ireland to work. Between 2016 and 2017, employment and 
activity rates increased for both Irish and non-Irish nationals aged between 25 and 
44, who might be considered the prime working age group. However the non-Irish 
rates were significantly lower than the corresponding rates of the Irish in both 
years. Lower activity rates in the older cohort (aged 45-64) may be explained by 
people who took early retirement, or people engaged with home duties, who are 
not part of the labour force; and there are no significant differences between Irish 
and non-Irish with respect to either their employment or activity rates. However, 
unemployment rates are substantially and significantly higher among the non-
Irish than the Irish in the older age group: over 9 per cent of non-Irish in the older 
age group were unemployed in 2017, compared to less than 6 per cent of Irish.  
 
TABLE 2.3 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS BY GENDER Q1 2016 AND Q1 2017 
 
Employment rate 
(%) 
Unemployment 
rate (%) Activity rate (%) Total (‘000) 
2016 2017 2016 2017 2016 2017 2016 2017 
Male 
Irish 69.2 71.1 10.2 7.7 77.0 77.0 1,309.8 1,316.8 
Non-Irish 76.3* 78.8* 9.6 6.6 84.4* 84.3* 225.5 233.6 
Female 
Irish 60.4 61.8 7.2 6.5 65.0 66.1 1,333.7 1,344.6 
Non-Irish 58.9 60.4 10.0* 8.7* 65.5 66.2 228.1 234.3 
 
Source:  Special analysis of the LFS microdata for Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (15-64 years age group). 
Note:  * denotes statistical significance from Irish nationals at P ≤ .05. 
 
Table 2.3 presents the key employment indicators by gender and nationality. The 
employment rate was higher among non-Irish males than among Irish males in 
both years, and employment rates increased for both groups between 2016 and 
2017. There was no difference in employment rates of Irish versus non-Irish 
women, but the latter showed significantly higher unemployment rates: almost 9 
per cent of non-Irish women were unemployed in 2017, compared to 6.5 per cent 
of Irish women.  
2.2  SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
In some countries, self-employment represents an important source of 
employment for immigrants, partly because it may afford access to employment 
in a manner less susceptible to discrimination and other barriers than might be 
the case in dependent forms of employment. However, this does not appear to be 
the case in Ireland. In general, the level of self-employment is lower among 
foreign nationals in Ireland than among comparable groups in other OECD 
countries. This may be due to the stringent immigration requirements faced by 
migrant entrepreneurs wishing to move to Ireland, or to barriers to migrant self-
employment such as language barriers, access to local business networks, and 
difficulties in accessing finance and lack of previous financial history in the 
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country. All of these may be related to the relatively recent nature of Irish 
migration, and lack of established ethnic networks. In an effort to stimulate 
investment and self-employment among immigrants to Ireland, the Immigrant 
Investor Programme was established by the Irish Government in 2012. This 
programme provides a mechanism by which non-EEA nationals and their families 
who commit to an approved investment in Ireland, may acquire residency status 
in Ireland.  
 
The self-employment rate of Irish nationals was 15 per cent in 2016, substantially 
higher than that of non-Irish nationals (10 per cent) in general. However, between 
2016 and 2017 the self-employment rate decreased slightly among both groups. 
The gap in self-employment rates, although still significantly different, is smaller in 
the non-agricultural sector which may be a reflection of the inheritance tradition 
in Irish farm self-employment. The self-employment rate among foreign-born Irish 
at 14 per cent in 2016 was almost as high as that among Irish-born Irish (15 per 
cent), and well ahead of the non-Irish rate (10 per cent).  
 
TABLE 2.4 SELF-EMPLOYMENT RATES BY NATIONAL GROUP Q1 2016 AND Q1 2017 
 
Self-employment Rate Overall (%) Self-employment Rate Excluding Agriculture (%) 
2016 2017 2016 2017 
Irish 15.0 14.2 12.3 11.6 
 Irish-born 15.1 14.3 12.2 11.5 
 Foreign-born 14.0 13.3 13.7 12.8 
Non-Irish 10.1* 8.1* 10.1* 8.1* 
 UK 21.7* 19.0* 21.3* 18.1* 
 EU-West 11.0 6.6 10.9 6.7 
 EU-East 6.5* 5.9* 6.7* 6.0* 
 Non-EU 8.8* 5.9* 8.6* 6.0* 
All 14.3 13.2 12.0 11.0 
 
Source:  Special analysis of the LFS microdata for Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (15-64 years age group). 
Note:  * denotes statistical significance from Irish nationals at P ≤ .05. 
 
Notwithstanding the overall difference between Irish and non-Irish nationals, UK 
nationals showed the highest rate of self-employment – almost 22 per cent 
overall in 2016, substantially higher than the native Irish rates of self-
employment. Nationals of the post-enlargement EU-East states, as well as those 
from outside the EU, show much lower rates of self-employment, and both rates 
declined between 2016 and 2017.  
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age group were unemployed in 2017, compared to less than 6 per cent of Irish.  
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Table 2.3 presents the key employment indicators by gender and nationality. The 
employment rate was higher among non-Irish males than among Irish males in 
both years, and employment rates increased for both groups between 2016 and 
2017. There was no difference in employment rates of Irish versus non-Irish 
women, but the latter showed significantly higher unemployment rates: almost 9 
per cent of non-Irish women were unemployed in 2017, compared to 6.5 per cent 
of Irish women.  
2.2  SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
In some countries, self-employment represents an important source of 
employment for immigrants, partly because it may afford access to employment 
in a manner less susceptible to discrimination and other barriers than might be 
the case in dependent forms of employment. However, this does not appear to be 
the case in Ireland. In general, the level of self-employment is lower among 
foreign nationals in Ireland than among comparable groups in other OECD 
countries. This may be due to the stringent immigration requirements faced by 
migrant entrepreneurs wishing to move to Ireland, or to barriers to migrant self-
employment such as language barriers, access to local business networks, and 
difficulties in accessing finance and lack of previous financial history in the 
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2.3  INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
To place the Irish indicators in comparative perspective, Table 2.5 shows 
employment, unemployment and activity rates for Ireland, the UK (where labour 
market conditions and institutions are similar to Ireland), and average rates for 
the EU28 countries in 2017. These are presented separately by nationality so that 
rates are shown for natives, for foreign nationals and for non-EU nationals. Note 
that the figures for Ireland presented here are slightly different to those shown in 
Table 2.1 because they relate to the entire year, rather than just the first quarter 
of 2017. 
 
The employment rate among natives in Ireland (67 per cent in 2017) was just 
below the EU average, and both were substantially lower than the equivalent rate 
in the UK, which has achieved higher overall employment rates in recent years. 
The employment rate of all foreign residents in Ireland, at 70.4 per cent, was 
higher than the average rates of foreign residents elsewhere in the EU. However, 
these Irish and EU rates fell below the employment rate of 72.5 per cent among 
foreign residents in the UK. In general, the employment rates of those from non-
EU countries were lower than the average for all foreign residents throughout 
Europe, including both Ireland and the UK. The employment rate among non-EU 
nationals in Ireland and the UK are similar (61 per cent) and both are a good deal 
higher than the EU average (54.6 per cent).  
 
TABLE 2.5 COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITY RATES FOR 
IRELAND, UK AND EU, 2017 
Reporting 
country Nationality 
Employment 
Rate 
Unemployment 
Rate Activity Rate 
Ireland 
Native 67.1   72 
Foreign national 70.4 7.6 76.2 
Non-EU national 61.0 8.9 66.9 
UK 
Native 74.4 4.3 77.7 
Foreign national 72.5 5.3 76.5 
Non-EU national 61.1 7.7 66.3 
EU28 
Native 68.1 7.3 73.5 
Foreign national 62.5 12.5 71.4 
Non-EU national 54.6 16.6 65.5 
 
Source:  Eurostat, Employment, unemployment and activity rates by sex, age and country of birth (per cent). Tables lfsa_ergan, 
lfsa_urgan and lfsa_argan. 
Notes:  Analysis is restricted to the working age population (15-64) in all cases. ‘Reporting country’ refers to the country or countries 
for which figures are shown; this has been broken down by ‘citizenship’ which refers the respondent’s relationship to the 
reporting country. The data in Table 2.5 refer to annual averages for 2017, which may lead to discrepancies between these 
data and indicators reported in Table 2.1, which refer to Quarter1. 
 
In general, unemployment rates are higher among non-nationals than natives. 
Ireland follows this pattern, though the gap is small and is likely not statistically 
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significant: the average unemployment rate among all non-nationals in Ireland in 
2016 was 7.6 per cent, compared to 6.8 per cent among natives. However, the 
unemployment gap between immigrants and natives was lower in Ireland and the 
UK than is found, on average, in the EU. The unemployment rate among non-EU 
nationals was higher than the average for all non-Irish nationals, and among this 
group the unemployment rate in Ireland, at just under 9 per cent in 2017, was 
substantially lower than the EU average of 16.6 per cent, though substantially 
higher than the rate in the UK.  
 
The activity rate reflects patterns of both employment and unemployment. The 
activity rate of Irish natives, 72 per cent, was similar to the corresponding EU 
average and nearly six percentage points lower than that for natives in the UK. 
However, overall activity rates of immigrants in Ireland (76 per cent) were 
somewhat higher than among Irish natives, while activity rates among immigrants 
were comparable with natives, on average, in the UK and on average across the 
EU. The lowest activity rates were to be found among immigrants from non-EU 
countries – 67 per cent in Ireland, and marginally lower than that, on average, in 
the EU and the UK. 
2.4  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Ireland has emerged from a deep and prolonged recession, which entailed a sharp 
contraction in employment and a dramatic rise in unemployment. Previous 
Integration Monitors showed that non-Irish nationals were hit harder by the 
recession than Irish nationals, in terms of both employment and unemployment 
rates. In general, the current report presents a rather more optimistic picture. In 
the context of improving labour market conditions, the gaps between Irish and 
non-Irish residents have receded to the point where they are no longer 
statistically significant. Indeed, the average employment rate among non-Irish 
nationals was just under 70 per cent in 2017, compared to less than 66 per cent 
among Irish, and the unemployment rates among both groups were similar, at 
just over 7 per cent.  
 
Notwithstanding these general trends, there are important differences in the 
labour market outcomes for different groups of non-Irish nationals. In general, 
non-EU nationals tend to have lower employment rates and higher 
unemployment rates than Irish nationals. As in previous Integration Monitors, the 
most disadvantaged group is African nationals, who have much lower 
employment and activity rates, and higher unemployment, than any other group 
of immigrants. In a worrying trend, their labour market situation deteriorated 
between 2016 and 2017.  
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In general, unemployment rates are higher among non-nationals than natives. 
Ireland follows this pattern, though the gap is small and is likely not statistically 
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Employment rates of immigrants in Ireland are somewhat higher than the EU 
average rates, though they fall well below employment rates of immigrants in the 
UK, which reflects the higher overall employment rate in the UK. Unemployment 
is higher among immigrants than among natives in Ireland compared to elsewhere 
in Europe, although the unemployment gap between immigrants and natives is 
substantially less pronounced in Ireland than the European average.  
 
BOX 2.1  ACCESS TO EMPLOYMENT 
All nationals of the European Economic Area (EEA) may migrate to Ireland to take up employment 
without restriction. Barrett et al., 2017 outline the different means of access to employment 
applicable to non-EEA nationals.29 Labour migration policy is developed and administered by the 
Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation in co-operation with the Department of 
Justice and Equality.  
Most newly arrived non-EEA workers hold a Stamp 1 registration certificate and an employment 
permit. The nine main types of employment permit are: critical skills employment permit holders; 
general employment permit holders; dependant/partner/spousal employment permit holders; 
intra-company transfers; contract for services employment permit holders; reactivation 
employment permit holders; internship employment permit holders; sport and cultural 
employment permit holders; and exchange agreement employment permit holders.30  
The Critical Skills Employment Permit is designed to attract highly skilled non-EEA persons to the 
Irish labour market for occupations deemed critically important to the Irish economy or which are 
experiencing skills shortages. Critical Skills permits are issued to non-EEA workers earning a 
minimum of €60,000 per year. Additionally, a restricted number of permits to workers earning a 
minimum of €30,000 per year will be issued. General Employment Permits are available for 
occupations with an annual salary of €30,000 or more and for a restricted number of occupations 
with salaries below €27,000. The various permit types are discussed in detail in Barrett et al., 
2017. 
In general, holders of employment permits may only change employers after 12 months and must 
apply for a new permit to do so. The Atypical Working Scheme administered by the Department of 
Justice and Equality provides for short-term employment contracts in the State, which are not 
facilitated by the employment permit system. A total of 2,781 applications were approved under 
this scheme in 2017. 
In May 2018 the Minister of Business, Enterprise and Innovation announced the introduction of a 
new pilot scheme for low skilled workers from outside the EEA. The scheme is limited in numbers, 
is conditional on a salary of at least €22,000 per year, and is restricted to certain industries 
experiencing labour market shortages. The scheme was extended in August 2018. 
 
                                                          
 
29  See Box 1.1 for changes regarding access to the labour market for asylum applicants introduced in 2018.  
30  See https://dbei.gov.ie/en.  
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In 2017, 11,361 employment permits were issued, an increase of 57 per cent compared to 2015. 
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31  Investment terms range from a minimum investment of €450,000 to €2 million, See: www.inis.gov.ie/en. 
32  RISE, the Refugee Interactive Skills for Employment project, https://rise-project.eu and the Immigrant Integration 
Initiative, run by NASC, are two others.  
33  www.qqi.ie. 
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Employment rates of immigrants in Ireland are somewhat higher than the EU 
average rates, though they fall well below employment rates of immigrants in the 
UK, which reflects the higher overall employment rate in the UK. Unemployment 
is higher among immigrants than among natives in Ireland compared to elsewhere 
in Europe, although the unemployment gap between immigrants and natives is 
substantially less pronounced in Ireland than the European average.  
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intra-company transfers; contract for services employment permit holders; reactivation 
employment permit holders; internship employment permit holders; sport and cultural 
employment permit holders; and exchange agreement employment permit holders.30  
The Critical Skills Employment Permit is designed to attract highly skilled non-EEA persons to the 
Irish labour market for occupations deemed critically important to the Irish economy or which are 
experiencing skills shortages. Critical Skills permits are issued to non-EEA workers earning a 
minimum of €60,000 per year. Additionally, a restricted number of permits to workers earning a 
minimum of €30,000 per year will be issued. General Employment Permits are available for 
occupations with an annual salary of €30,000 or more and for a restricted number of occupations 
with salaries below €27,000. The various permit types are discussed in detail in Barrett et al., 
2017. 
In general, holders of employment permits may only change employers after 12 months and must 
apply for a new permit to do so. The Atypical Working Scheme administered by the Department of 
Justice and Equality provides for short-term employment contracts in the State, which are not 
facilitated by the employment permit system. A total of 2,781 applications were approved under 
this scheme in 2017. 
In May 2018 the Minister of Business, Enterprise and Innovation announced the introduction of a 
new pilot scheme for low skilled workers from outside the EEA. The scheme is limited in numbers, 
is conditional on a salary of at least €22,000 per year, and is restricted to certain industries 
experiencing labour market shortages. The scheme was extended in August 2018. 
 
                                                          
 
29  See Box 1.1 for changes regarding access to the labour market for asylum applicants introduced in 2018.  
30  See https://dbei.gov.ie/en.  
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CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX 
 
The new Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the old Quarterly National 
Household Survey (QNHS) 
 
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) replaced the Quarterly National Household (QNHS) 
from Quarter 3, 2017. Similar to the QNHS, the LFS is a large-scale, nationwide 
survey of households in Ireland. It is designed to produce quarterly labour force 
estimates that include the official measure of employment and unemployment in 
the State in accordance with the International Labour Organisation classification. 
The survey collects information from 27,000 households every quarter. 
 
The release of the first LFS in Q3 2017 also incorporated adjustments to the 
historic QNHS data series to take account of revisions to population estimates 
arising from the 2016 Census of Population, as well as to ensure comparability of 
the older QNHS series with the new LFS headline indicators. The Census count of 
resident population in April 2016 indicated a total of 4,739,597 persons, just over 
65,900 or 1.4 per cent greater than the previous estimate.  
 
The revised population estimates varied by population sub-group. Table A2.1 
compares the data published in the QNHS release for Q2, 2016 with the revised 
data for the LFS for the same quarter, which coincides in time with the 2016 
Census. 
 
TABLE A2.1  ESTIMATES OF TOTAL POPULATION AGED 15 YEARS AND OVER FROM QNHS AND 
LFS BY NATIONALITY 
 
QNHS Q2 2016 
(‘000) 
LFS Q2 2016 
(‘000) 
Difference 
(‘000) 
Irish 3,132.3 3250.8 118.5 
Non-Irish 505.4 483.4 -22.0 
UK 108.9 99.2 -9.7 
EU-West 27.5 59.4 31.9 
EU-East 196.3 211.0 14.7 
Other 172.7 113.8 -58.9 
Total 3,637.7 3734.2 96.5 
 
Sources:  QNHS: CSO statistical release, 22 September 2017, Quarterly National Household Survey Quarter 2 2017. LFS:  
www.cso.ie/en/statistics/labourmarket/labourforcesurveytimeseries.  
 
 
The revised population total from the LFS, 3,734,200 persons, is 96,500 greater 
than the QNHS estimate. The revisions result in an increase in Irish nationals 
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(+118,500) but a decrease in the estimated number of non-Irish nationals. The 
revised estimates suggest that there were almost 60,000 persons from the older 
EU Member States, over twice the previous estimate, and almost 69,000 fewer 
persons from outside the EU, an overestimate of about 65 per cent.  
 
These revised estimates on the LFS have implications for labour market outcomes 
estimated in previous versions of the Integration Monitor. Table A2.2 shows the 
effects of the revisions for labour market outcomes in 2014 and 2015 (published 
in the 2016 Integration Monitor, see Barrett et al., 2017) relating to the headline 
comparison between employment, unemployment and activity rates for Irish and 
non-Irish nationals. 
 
TABLE A2.2  ESTIMATES OF EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITY RATES, AND TOTAL 
POPULATION AGED 15-64 YEARS, IRISH AND NON-IRISH NATIONALS 
  Irish Non-Irish All 
 QNHS LFS QNHS LFS QNHS LFS 
Employment      
2014 60.8% 61.8% 60.7% 63.4% 60.8% 62.0% 
2015 62.6% 63.7% 60.0% 63.3% 62.2% 63.6% 
Unemployment      
2014 11.7% 12.4% 15.5% 15.8% 12.3% 12.9% 
2015 9.6% 10.3% 13.1% 13.0% 10.2% 10.7% 
Activity       
2014 68.8% 70.5% 71.9% 75.3% 69.3% 71.2% 
2015 69.3% 71.0% 69.0% 72.7% 69.2% 71.3% 
Population      
2014 2,558,000 2,620,025 455,800 436,468 3,013,800 3,056,493 
2015 2,539,900 2,630,397 464,700 440,960 3,004,600 3,071,357 
Difference 
Employment      
2014  1.0%  2.7%  1.2% 
2015  1.1%  3.3%  1.4% 
Unemployment      
2014  0.7%  0.3%  0.6% 
2015  0.7%  -0.1%  0.5% 
Activity       
2014  1.7%  3.4%  1.9% 
2015  1.7%  3.7%  2.1% 
Population      
2014  62,025  -19,332  42,693 
2015  90,497  -23,740  66,757 
 
Sources:  QNHS: Barrett et al. (2017). LFS: Authors’ analysis of the LFS microdata for Q1 2014 and 2015 (15-64 years age group). 
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The revised population total from the LFS, 3,734,200 persons, is 96,500 greater 
than the QNHS estimate. The revisions result in an increase in Irish nationals 
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In general, the revised LFS data show higher employment and activity rates than 
the QNHS for both Irish and non-Irish nationals. The greatest discrepancies occur 
in respect of activity rates among non-Irish nationals: the revised estimates for 
2015 are 3.7 percentage points higher.  
 
Another effect of the revisions is to alter aspects of the comparison between Irish 
and non-Irish labour market outcomes. The 2016 Integration Monitor indicated 
that employment rates of Irish and non-Irish nationals were about equal at just 
over 60 per cent of the population aged 15-64 years of age: the revised estimates 
from the LFS would suggest that the non-Irish employment rate (63.4 per cent) 
was 1.6 percentage points higher than the Irish rate (61.8 per cent).  
 
The LFS data indicate higher unemployment rates than the QNHS data, 
particularly among Irish nationals. As a result, the revised data indicate a smaller 
unemployment gap between Irish and non-Irish, suggesting that the impact of the 
recession on unemployment among immigrants may not have been quite as 
severe as the QNHS data had led us to believe.  
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CHAPTER 3  
 
Education and Integration 
By Éamonn Fahey and Frances McGinnity  
 
Education is a key factor in the integration process for immigrant adults and 
children as it can play a crucial role in improving economic and social outcomes 
(OECD, 2017). Higher levels of education are related to improved labour market 
outcomes, including higher earnings and employment rates. For example, in 
Ireland in 2016 among Irish and non-Irish 25-34-year-olds, the unemployment 
rate was 27 per cent for those with lower secondary qualifications, compared to 6 
per cent of those with a third-level degree. Among those in employment, those 
educated to degree level earn more than twice the income of those with upper 
secondary education in Ireland (OECD, 2017). Across OECD countries, those with 
higher educational attainment have better physical health, improved socio-
emotional wellbeing and participate more actively in their societies (OECD, 2017).  
 
Because inward migration is a relatively new phenomenon in Ireland, many non-
Irish nationals are first generation immigrants that arrived in adulthood. Unlike in 
most other European countries the number of second generation immigrants, 
that is, the children of immigrants born in Ireland, is significantly lower. This has 
important consequences for any assessment of educational outcomes as it implies 
that the majority of migrants will have completed their education in their country 
of origin, though this is changing.  
 
Section 3.1 of this chapter compares the educational outcomes of Irish and non-
Irish adults. The outcomes for immigrant children who have received (at least 
some of) their education through the Irish educational system are examined in 
Section 3.2. Box 3.1 outlines details of policy, and in particular changes in policy, 
since the previous Integration Monitor regarding access and supports to 
education for migrant adults and children. 
3.1  EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES FOR ADULTS IN IRELAND 
3.1.1  Highest educational attainment 
Table 3.1 uses Labour Force Survey (LFS) data to present a comparison of 
educational attainment between working age Irish and non-Irish nationals. In line 
with previous issues of the Integration Monitor, the data pertain to the first 
quarter of the last two years for which data are available at the time of writing; 
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In general, the revised LFS data show higher employment and activity rates than 
the QNHS for both Irish and non-Irish nationals. The greatest discrepancies occur 
in respect of activity rates among non-Irish nationals: the revised estimates for 
2015 are 3.7 percentage points higher.  
 
Another effect of the revisions is to alter aspects of the comparison between Irish 
and non-Irish labour market outcomes. The 2016 Integration Monitor indicated 
that employment rates of Irish and non-Irish nationals were about equal at just 
over 60 per cent of the population aged 15-64 years of age: the revised estimates 
from the LFS would suggest that the non-Irish employment rate (63.4 per cent) 
was 1.6 percentage points higher than the Irish rate (61.8 per cent).  
 
The LFS data indicate higher unemployment rates than the QNHS data, 
particularly among Irish nationals. As a result, the revised data indicate a smaller 
unemployment gap between Irish and non-Irish, suggesting that the impact of the 
recession on unemployment among immigrants may not have been quite as 
severe as the QNHS data had led us to believe.  
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2016 and 2017. However, unlike in previous editions, here we have pooled the 
two years together, to boost sample size and allow for more reliable analysis of 
small migrant groups. The measure of educational attainment used here is a 
recoded version of the standard ISCED variable. There are four categories 
available: a group with no education beyond lower-secondary level (including 
people with no formal education); respondents with upper secondary (Leaving 
Certificate or equivalent) only; people with Post-Leaving Cert qualifications,34 and 
people with third-level qualifications. Note that the ‘Post-Leaving Certificate’ 
group is relatively small, making up only 12 per cent of the population, meaning 
that estimates are unreliable for some groups. The analysis is restricted to the 
working-age population, between the ages of 15 and 64. Note there have been 
some minor changes to the data source since the 2016 Integration Monitor (see 
Chapter 2 Appendix). 
 
TABLE 3.1  HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY NATIONALITY, Q1 2016 AND Q1 2017 
(POOLED), FOR THOSE AGED 15-64 
 
No formal to 
lower 
secondary (%) 
Upper 
secondary (%) 
Post-Leaving 
Certificate (%) Third level (%) Total (‘000) 
Irish  25.5 26.0 11.9 36.6 5,209.8 
Non-Irish 11.1* 28.4* 10.7* 49.7* 822.1 
Of which      
UK 18.8* 20.0* 10.2 51.0* 147.6 
EU-West 3.9* 17.2* 5.1* 73.7* 106.9 
EU-East 12.1* 37.3* 15.6* 34.9 362.5 
Africa 13.3* 27.7 10.3 48.7* 32.1 
North America, 
Australia and Oceania 4.1* 16.6* 5.1* 74.1* 24.2 
Asia 7.3* 20.0* 4.3* 68.4* 74.0 
Rest of the World 6.9* 30.0 * 4.3* 58.8* 74.8 
All 23.6 26.4 11.7 38.4 6,031.9 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (pooled). Working age respondents (15-64). 
Notes:  Proportions exclude ‘other/not stated’ which is negligible for Irish nationals but higher for non-Irish nationals. ‘Third level’ 
includes non-honours degrees and honours degrees or above; *denotes that the indicator for this group is significantly different 
from Irish nationals at p ≤ 0.05.  
 
 
As in the previous Integration Monitor, we see that the non-Irish population 
enjoys a large and statistically significant advantage in educational attainment 
over the Irish population of working age. The chance of being in the lowest 
attainment category is over twice as high for the Irish as for the non-Irish 
population. Just under half of the non-Irish population has a third-level 
qualification, compared to 36.6 per cent of Irish people.  
 
                                                          
 
34  A Post-Leaving Certificate course is taken after a student has passed their Leaving Certificate, and is generally a one- 
or two-year course. PLC courses are aimed primarily at students who would like to develop vocational or 
technological skills in order to enter an occupation, or go on to higher education. 
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However, this comparison masks considerable variation within the non-Irish 
population. The most advantaged immigrants are those from the industrialised 
economies of Western Europe, North America and Australia/Oceania. Almost 
three-quarters of respondents from these countries have tertiary education, and 
fewer than one-in-twenty were in the lowest category. As in previous years, 
Eastern European immigrants, who constitute the largest immigrant group, are 
disproportionately concentrated in the middle two categories. Post-Leaving 
Certificate qualifications were held by 15.6 per cent, and 37.3 per cent had full 
secondary education as their highest attainment. The high rate of Post-Leaving 
Certificates in this group may reflect the vocational nature of the education 
systems in East European countries like Poland (Baranowska, 2011). In most 
categories, UK nationals are slightly more advantaged than the Irish population, 
with 51 per cent holding a third-level qualification and only 18.8 per cent with the 
equivalent of a Junior Certificate or less. However, the differences in their values 
for technical/vocational qualifications to the corresponding Irish values are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
 
In general, African immigrants can be said to be doing well relative to the Irish, 
but not so well relative to other immigrant groups. This is true both for the lowest 
and highest categories of educational attainment. Third-level qualifications are 
held by 48.7 per cent of Africans; significantly higher than the Irish population, but 
well below the overall non-EU average of 62.5 per cent. African nationals are also 
unusual in the extent to which they exhibit change over time. Additional analysis 
(not shown) finds that the percentage of African migrants with third-level 
education is up over 14 percentage points from the previous period (2014-
2015).35 This increase is statistically significant, though the magnitude of the 
change may be a result of the relatively small numbers surveyed.  
 
Compared to the total non-EU population, Asian nationals have higher 
attainment, and nationals of the ‘Rest of the World’ have slightly lower 
attainment. This is particularly the case in tertiary education, where the average 
for non-EU nationals (62.5 per cent), bisects the figures for Asians (68.4 per cent) 
and nationals of Rest of the World (58.8 per cent). 
 
Part of the educational advantage enjoyed by immigrant groups can be explained 
by the age profile of each group. In both the Irish and non-Irish adult population, 
younger people are more likely to have third-level education. With the exception 
of the UK, all immigrant groups are younger than the Irish population. This is 
particularly true of the Eastern European and non-EU population which have 
median age of 32 and 31 respectively, compared to 37 for Irish nationals. 
 
                                                          
 
35  Results are available from the authors on request.  
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2016 and 2017. However, unlike in previous editions, here we have pooled the 
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Chapter 2 Appendix). 
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Notes:  Proportions exclude ‘other/not stated’ which is negligible for Irish nationals but higher for non-Irish nationals. ‘Third level’ 
includes non-honours degrees and honours degrees or above; *denotes that the indicator for this group is significantly different 
from Irish nationals at p ≤ 0.05.  
 
 
As in the previous Integration Monitor, we see that the non-Irish population 
enjoys a large and statistically significant advantage in educational attainment 
over the Irish population of working age. The chance of being in the lowest 
attainment category is over twice as high for the Irish as for the non-Irish 
population. Just under half of the non-Irish population has a third-level 
qualification, compared to 36.6 per cent of Irish people.  
 
                                                          
 
34  A Post-Leaving Certificate course is taken after a student has passed their Leaving Certificate, and is generally a one- 
or two-year course. PLC courses are aimed primarily at students who would like to develop vocational or 
technological skills in order to enter an occupation, or go on to higher education. 
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Therefore, it is likely that some of the relationship between nationality and 
educational attainment is due to the age of the immigrant groups. To investigate 
this, we compare educational qualifications restricting the analysis to people aged 
25-34 (see Figure 3.1).  
 
As expected, the share of the Irish population with tertiary education rises 
substantially, to 51 per cent, when the analysis is restricted to young adults. The 
non-Irish population also shows an increase in qualification levels, but the 
increase is smaller, meaning that the groups converge. However, the difference of 
five percentage points remains statistically significant.  
 
FIGURE 3.1  SHARE OF 25-34 YEAR AGE GROUP WITH TERTIARY EDUCATION, Q1 2016 AND Q1 
2017 (POOLED) 
 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (pooled). Age 25-34 years.  
 
The UK nationals are an interesting group, because they stand out against the 
pattern of all of the other immigrant groups in two ways. First, their median age in 
the years 2016 and 2017, at 48, was eleven years older than the Irish population 
(and 18 years older than Eastern European immigrants). Second, the age gradient 
on educational attainment is much less steep than for both Irish nationals and 
other immigrant groups. For instance, attainment of tertiary education among UK 
nationals aged 45-54 is 57.3 per cent – five and a half percentage points higher 
than UK nationals aged 25-34. By contrast, Irish and non-EU nationals aged 45-54 
are much less likely to have third-level qualifications than their younger 
counterparts, by approximately 11-13 percentage points. Because many UK 
nationals are older and well-educated, their rate of tertiary education remains 
virtually unchanged and becomes statistically indistinguishable from the Irish rate 
when the sample is restricted to people aged 25-34. 
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As expected, we find that the advantage in tertiary attainment between Western 
Europeans (81 per cent) and non-Europeans (73 per cent) on one hand, and Irish 
nationals on the other, is reduced when we consider young adults only. But even 
among 25-34-year-olds, with 81 per cent of young West Europeans and 73 per 
cent of non-EU nationals having third-level qualifications compared to 51 per cent 
of Irish, these differences remain statistically significant. The level of qualifications 
among non-EU nationals is partly a result of recent immigration policy in Ireland, 
which has largely restricted non-EU immigration to highly skilled occupations (see 
Box 2.1). When looking at the entire working age population (aged 15-64, see 
Table 3.1) we find Eastern Europeans to be at a disadvantage relative to Irish 
nationals, but this difference is not statistically significant. However, in Figure 3.1 
this gap increases substantially, and becomes significant at the 0.1 per cent level.  
3.1.2  Early school leaving among young adult immigrants  
In Table 3.2, we turn our attention to the other end of the educational attainment 
spectrum by analysing rates of early school leaving among 20-24-year-olds by 
nationality. Early school leaving in Ireland is associated not only with poorer 
labour market outcomes such as unemployment, lower job quality and lower pay 
levels, but also poorer social outcomes such as lone parenthood and 
imprisonment (Smyth and McCoy, 2009).  
 
Early school leaving is defined as the proportion of young adults with lower 
secondary education or less who are not currently in the education system.36 As in 
the previous Integration Monitor, there is no statistically significant difference 
between the Irish and non-Irish population in the proportion of early school 
leavers. Note the rate of dropout among young adults in Ireland is very low – less 
than 5 per cent for both Irish and non-Irish – partly as a result of sustained policy 
effort in combating educational disadvantage in Ireland (Smyth et al., 2015). 
Looking in greater detail at the non-Irish population, we see that young East 
Europeans have substantially higher rates of dropout than Irish nationals, and this 
difference is statistically significant. However, at 8.8 per cent, this is still relatively 
low in a cross-national perspective. In 2017, 10.6 per cent of 18-24 year olds in the 
EU were defined as early school leavers.37 The non-EU population aged 20-24 has 
substantially lower rates of early school leaving. 
 
 
                                                          
 
36  The Eurostat definition specifies an age range of 18-24, here we are constrained by the LFS to use the age range 20-
24. 
37  See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Early_leavers_from_education_and_training. Note 
that the European definition is the same but the age range is slightly different.  
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Therefore, it is likely that some of the relationship between nationality and 
educational attainment is due to the age of the immigrant groups. To investigate 
this, we compare educational qualifications restricting the analysis to people aged 
25-34 (see Figure 3.1).  
 
As expected, the share of the Irish population with tertiary education rises 
substantially, to 51 per cent, when the analysis is restricted to young adults. The 
non-Irish population also shows an increase in qualification levels, but the 
increase is smaller, meaning that the groups converge. However, the difference of 
five percentage points remains statistically significant.  
 
FIGURE 3.1  SHARE OF 25-34 YEAR AGE GROUP WITH TERTIARY EDUCATION, Q1 2016 AND Q1 
2017 (POOLED) 
 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (pooled). Age 25-34 years.  
 
The UK nationals are an interesting group, because they stand out against the 
pattern of all of the other immigrant groups in two ways. First, their median age in 
the years 2016 and 2017, at 48, was eleven years older than the Irish population 
(and 18 years older than Eastern European immigrants). Second, the age gradient 
on educational attainment is much less steep than for both Irish nationals and 
other immigrant groups. For instance, attainment of tertiary education among UK 
nationals aged 45-54 is 57.3 per cent – five and a half percentage points higher 
than UK nationals aged 25-34. By contrast, Irish and non-EU nationals aged 45-54 
are much less likely to have third-level qualifications than their younger 
counterparts, by approximately 11-13 percentage points. Because many UK 
nationals are older and well-educated, their rate of tertiary education remains 
virtually unchanged and becomes statistically indistinguishable from the Irish rate 
when the sample is restricted to people aged 25-34. 
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TABLE 3.2  SHARE OF NATIONALITY GROUPS DEFINED AS EARLY SCHOOL LEAVERS, Q1 2016 
AND Q1 2017 (POOLED) 
 
Share of early school leavers N. Early Leavers (weighted) 
Irish 4.9 22,735 
Non-Irish 4.8 3,446 
UK 5.2 478 
EU-West 2.1 277 
EU-East 8.8* 2,508 
Non-EU 0.9* 183 
Total 4.9 26,182 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (pooled). Eurostat indicator of early school leaving.  
Note:  * significantly different from Irish nationals at the p < .05 level.  
3.2 IMMIGRANT CHILDREN IN IRISH SCHOOLS 
Section 3.1 presented differences in the educational qualifications of Irish and 
non-Irish adults. This section focuses on differences in achievement for those still 
in the education system. The education of the children of immigrants, raised and 
educated in the host country, is considered a benchmark for integration (OECD, 
2015). Students who succeed in school are more likely to improve their skills and 
access better jobs: schools are also arenas for social integration, given that 
children and young people spend much of their time in school (McGinnity and 
Darmody, forthcoming).  
 
A body of international research has investigated the educational outcomes of 
immigrant students, typically finding some educational disadvantage for 
immigrant students compared to native peers, though this varies across 
immigrant groups and across countries (Heath et al., 2008; Volante et al., 2018). 
This section draws on published data from the OECD’s PISA study, an international 
survey of 15-year-olds that takes place every three years. It is the recommended 
data source for assessing student achievement because of its international 
comparability (see Appendix 2).  
 
PISA assesses students’ literacy in reading, Mathematics and Science at age 15. 
‘Literacy’ is used to stress the ability to apply knowledge, rather than reproduce 
facts from the school curriculum.38 Fifteen is the target age because this 
represents the end of compulsory schooling in many countries. Science was the 
main focus of the 2015 assessment, though the discussion here focuses on results 
for English reading and Mathematics, as well as Science, for consistency with 
previous Integration Monitors and as these are core skills.  
 
 
                                                          
 
38  For examples of questions, see Shiel et al., 2016, Appendix B.  
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In Ireland 167 secondary schools took part in PISA 2015, with 5,741 students 
completing the assessment. PISA categorises a student as having an ‘immigrant’ 
background if the student was born in the test country and both parents were 
born elsewhere, or if the student and parents were born outside the test country 
(OECD, 2016). Students are considered ‘native’ if they, and at least one parent, 
were born in the test country. Using this classification, 14.4 per cent of students 
have an immigrant background, a slightly higher proportion than the average 
across OECD countries (12.5 per cent) (Shiel et al., 2016). The proportion with an 
immigrant background in the PISA study in Ireland has also risen significantly since 
2003 (3.4 per cent), and even since 2012 (9.6 per cent), the last PISA survey. 
Previous studies have highlighted how important language spoken in the home is 
for academic achievement (Barrett et al., 2017; Darmody and Smyth, 2018), so 
these tables also distinguish immigrant students by language background. Doing 
so, 85.6 per cent of students are classified as native Irish; 7.3 per cent immigrant 
with English or Irish spoken at home and 7.1 per cent as immigrant with another 
language spoken at home. Table 3.3 presents mean achievement scores in English 
reading, Mathematics and Science for these groups.  
 
Mean English reading scores do not differ between Irish 15-year-olds (525) and 
immigrant students from an English speaking background (523), but immigrants 
from a non-English speaking background have significantly lower scores on English 
reading (500) (Table 3.3). For Mathematics, immigrants from a non-English 
speaking background also have lower scores (494) than Irish students (506) but 
the gap is smaller than for English reading and not statistically significant (see 
Table 3.3). For Science scores, immigrants from English speaking backgrounds 
actually have higher mean scores than Irish students, though the difference is not 
significant. Immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds have lower mean 
scores in Science than their Irish counterparts but the difference is not significant, 
as with Mathematics (see Table 3.3).  
  
TABLE 3.3  MEAN SCORES IN ENGLISH READING, MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE BY STUDENTS’ 
IMMIGRANT AND LANGUAGE BACKGROUND IN IRELAND, PISA 2015 
 Reading score Mathematics score Science score % of students 
Irish 524.7 506.2 505.1 85.6 
Immigrant, English 
speaking background 522.8 503.4 507.9 7.3 
Immigrant, other 
language background 499.7* 493.6 492.9 7.1 
 
Source:  Shiel et al. (2016). See Appendix Table A6.6.  
Note:  * significantly different from Irish nationals at the p < .05 level.  
 
42 | Monitor in g report  on integrat ion 2018  
TABLE 3.2  SHARE OF NATIONALITY GROUPS DEFINED AS EARLY SCHOOL LEAVERS, Q1 2016 
AND Q1 2017 (POOLED) 
 
Share of early school leavers N. Early Leavers (weighted) 
Irish 4.9 22,735 
Non-Irish 4.8 3,446 
UK 5.2 478 
EU-West 2.1 277 
EU-East 8.8* 2,508 
Non-EU 0.9* 183 
Total 4.9 26,182 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey Q1 2016 and Q1 2017 (pooled). Eurostat indicator of early school leaving.  
Note:  * significantly different from Irish nationals at the p < .05 level.  
3.2 IMMIGRANT CHILDREN IN IRISH SCHOOLS 
Section 3.1 presented differences in the educational qualifications of Irish and 
non-Irish adults. This section focuses on differences in achievement for those still 
in the education system. The education of the children of immigrants, raised and 
educated in the host country, is considered a benchmark for integration (OECD, 
2015). Students who succeed in school are more likely to improve their skills and 
access better jobs: schools are also arenas for social integration, given that 
children and young people spend much of their time in school (McGinnity and 
Darmody, forthcoming).  
 
A body of international research has investigated the educational outcomes of 
immigrant students, typically finding some educational disadvantage for 
immigrant students compared to native peers, though this varies across 
immigrant groups and across countries (Heath et al., 2008; Volante et al., 2018). 
This section draws on published data from the OECD’s PISA study, an international 
survey of 15-year-olds that takes place every three years. It is the recommended 
data source for assessing student achievement because of its international 
comparability (see Appendix 2).  
 
PISA assesses students’ literacy in reading, Mathematics and Science at age 15. 
‘Literacy’ is used to stress the ability to apply knowledge, rather than reproduce 
facts from the school curriculum.38 Fifteen is the target age because this 
represents the end of compulsory schooling in many countries. Science was the 
main focus of the 2015 assessment, though the discussion here focuses on results 
for English reading and Mathematics, as well as Science, for consistency with 
previous Integration Monitors and as these are core skills.  
 
 
                                                          
 
38  For examples of questions, see Shiel et al., 2016, Appendix B.  
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These findings replicate a pattern found in earlier PISA studies for English and 
Mathematics (McGinnity et al., 2014). It is also consistent with comparisons of 
verbal and numerical ability from the Growing Up in Ireland study at age 13 
(Darmody and Smyth, 2018). Here the authors found significant differences 
between immigrant origin students and Irish students in English reading but not in 
Mathematics. Distinguishing by linguistic background, Darmody and Smyth found 
that students from a non-English speaking background had significantly lower 
scores than students from an English speaking background, but for Mathematics 
the pattern is reversed, with slightly but significantly higher scores among non-
English speakers (ibid).  
 
Analysing national assessments at primary level, Kavanagh et al. (2016) find mean 
English reading scores significantly lower for children born outside Ireland, and 
particularly for those who spoke a language other than English at home. The same 
is true for Mathematics, though the gap in scores is smaller than for English 
reading and not statistically significant in sixth class (Kavanagh et al., 2016).  
 
In summary, these data indicate that immigrant students from non-English 
language backgrounds have lower PISA scores in the core skill of reading at age 15 
than their Irish counterparts, and this difference is statistically significant. No 
significant differences between immigrant and Irish students were found for 
Mathematics or for Science. It is worth noting that the gap between immigrants 
with different levels of language is greater than the immigrant/non-immigrant 
gap. This indicates the importance of language competency in shaping educational 
outcomes. Given the importance of English language fluency for a range of 
secondary school subjects in Ireland, poor proficiency in English may weaken 
performance in other subjects too. And as Darmody et al. (2011) point out, overall 
differences may lead to cumulative disadvantage as students move through the 
education system.  
 
While achievement scores in standardised tests such as PISA are useful broad 
indicators, they provide limited information. Performance by students in state 
examinations is very important given the role of Leaving Certificate exam grades 
in securing access to higher education and good quality employment. There is 
currently no information on State examination grades for Irish and immigrant 
students. Another significant information gap is on the post-school transitions of 
Irish and immigrant students (Darmody and Smyth, 2018).  
3.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
This chapter compared the educational attainment of Irish and non-Irish adults, as 
well as achievement indicators at age 15. Among the working age population, a 
higher proportion of non-Irish adults have third-level education (almost half of 
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them) compared to 37 per cent of Irish adults. Part of this is due to the fact that 
non-Irish nationals are younger, on average, than Irish nationals. Comparing 
younger adults (aged 25-34), we find non-Irish nationals are still more likely to 
have third-level qualifications (56 per cent of them) compared to 51 per cent of 
Irish nationals, though the gap is much smaller. There is no difference overall in 
rates of early school leaving between Irish and non-Irish nationals; the rate for 
both groups (around 5 per cent of 20-24-year-olds) is low. 
 
There is considerable variation between different national groups in terms of 
educational attainment. West Europeans, North Americans and Asians are the 
most highly educated, with around 70 per cent of working age adults with third-
level education. Around half of working age Africans have third-level education, 
but only one-third of East Europeans (see Table 3.1). East Europeans also have 
higher levels of early school leaving than Irish young people, or other migrant 
groups (see Table 3.2).  
 
While the majority of non-Irish nationals received their education outside Ireland, 
there is an increasing population of non-Irish students passing through the Irish 
school system. Among 15-year-olds the salient difference for achievement is 
language spoken at home. Evidence from the PISA 2015 test indicates that mean 
scores for English reading do not differ between Irish students and migrants from 
an English-speaking background. Reading scores are significantly lower for 
migrants from a non-English-speaking background (see Table 3.3). Mathematics 
and Science scores are somewhat lower for students from a non-English-speaking 
background, but the difference is not statistically significant. These findings echo 
those of previous Integration Monitors, and the findings for English reading 
suggest that monitoring the spending on English language tuition (see Box 3.1) 
and its effectiveness is one important element in facilitating the integration of 
migrant children into Irish schools.  
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outcomes. Given the importance of English language fluency for a range of 
secondary school subjects in Ireland, poor proficiency in English may weaken 
performance in other subjects too. And as Darmody et al. (2011) point out, overall 
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examinations is very important given the role of Leaving Certificate exam grades 
in securing access to higher education and good quality employment. There is 
currently no information on State examination grades for Irish and immigrant 
students. Another significant information gap is on the post-school transitions of 
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3.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
This chapter compared the educational attainment of Irish and non-Irish adults, as 
well as achievement indicators at age 15. Among the working age population, a 
higher proportion of non-Irish adults have third-level education (almost half of 
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BOX 3.1  ACCESS TO EDUCATION  
Access to Education 
The Irish education system is made up of primary, second-level, further and third-level education. 
State-funded education is available to Irish citizens at all levels and to non-Irish citizens at primary 
and secondary levels, or until aged 18. The situation of access to third-level education is different. 
Third-level tuition costs vary considerably depending on the institution, course of study, and most 
critically, the residency status of the student. Most undergraduate students attending publicly 
funded third-level courses in Ireland do not have to pay tuition fees, though do pay registration 
fees. To qualify for ‘free fees’, a student must have been living in an EEA39 Member State or 
Switzerland for at least three of the five years before starting the course.40 Fees for non-EEA 
nationals, most of whom do not qualify for free fees, can be substantial, though they vary 
between colleges.  
Given the dominance of the Catholic Church in school patronage in Ireland, school patronage is 
relevant to migrant students, many of whom are not from a Catholic background. Around 90 per 
cent of primary schools and 50 per cent of secondary schools are under Catholic patronage. Policy 
on school patronage has been changing in recent years. In 2011 a Forum on Patronage and 
Pluralism in the Primary Sector was set up to inform policy change in this area. The Forum report 
in 2014 was not prescriptive, but outlined good practice in terms of how best to accommodate 
students of various belief systems in schools (Coolahan et al., 2012). The Forum pointed to the 
potential for the divestment of Catholic schools to other patron bodies in areas with several 
Catholic schools. However, progress to date has been slow, with a small number of existing 
schools divested.41 The Department of Education and Skills also seeks to enhance the diversity of 
the education system by running a separate patronage process for new schools. This process is 
open to all patrons and is based on parental preferences in the area. Between 2011 and 2017, 25 
new primary schools (all multi-denominational) and 28 post-primary schools (23 multi-
denominational and five denominational) have been established. There were around 3,111 
primary schools (excluding special schools) and 715 post-primary schools in Ireland in 2017.  
Previous studies have highlighted difficulties in gaining access to schools for some migrant families 
because of the use of waiting lists and policies favouring children whose parents had attended the 
school (see Smyth et al., 2009). In July 2016 Minister Bruton introduced the Education (Admission  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
39  The members of the EEA (the European Economic Area) are the Member States of the EU, along with Iceland, 
Norway and Liechtenstein. 
40  The student must also fulfil one of the following six criteria as regards nationality and immigration status in Ireland: 
be a citizen of EEA Member State or Switzerland; or have an official refugee status; or be a family member of a 
refugee and have been granted permission to live in Ireland; or be a family member of an EU national with 
permission to stay in the State with residence Stamp 4EUFAM; or have been granted humanitarian leave to stay in 
the country; or been granted permission to remain in the State by the Minister for Justice and Equality, following a 
determination by the Minister not to make a deportation order under Section 3 of the Immigration Act 1999. 
41  10 schools were divested between 2013 and 2017. In early 2017 Minister for Education Richard Bruton announced an 
intention to accelerate the process: www.education.ie/en/Press-Events/Press-Releases/2017-Press-Releases/PR17-
01-30.html. 
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to Schools) Bill. Key features of the Bill include: a ban on waiting lists aimed at ensuring children 
who move to a new area are not disadvantaged;42 a 25 per cent limit on the number of school 
places that can be set aside for children of past-pupils and an obligation on the 80 per cent of all 
schools which are not over-subscribed to admit all students who apply. Under changes announced 
in May 2018, all Catholic primary schools (around 90 per cent of schools) will be prohibited from 
giving enrolment priority to baptised children in cases where they are over-subscribed.43 It is 
envisaged this policy change will come into force by September 2019.  
Teachers play a crucial role in the educational experience of students. While the student body has 
become considerably more diverse over time, this is not reflected in the profile of teachers, who 
are largely White, Irish and middle class (Keane and Heinz, 2015). Being seen as different by 
teachers may reinforce negative attitudes towards migrants (Devine, 2013). Action 27 of the 
Migrant Integration Strategy is that ‘proactive efforts will be made to attract migrants into 
teaching positions’. A recent initiative in Maynooth University called ‘turn to teaching’ aims to 
promote diversity among teachers in Ireland, including migrant teachers.44 
Supports for Immigrants in Schools 
In order to support immigrant children in Irish schools, in September 2010 the Intercultural 
Education Strategy 2010-2015 (IES) was launched, addressing all levels of education (Department 
of Education and Skills, 2010). However, the Strategy ended in 2015 and has not been renewed. 
The monitoring of the implementation of the IES was impacted by austerity measures. A key 
support for migrant children in Irish schools is the provision of English language tuition delivered 
mainly through specialised ‘English as an Additional Language’ (EAL) teachers. Since the 
2012/2013 academic year, assignment of teachers for special needs education and language 
support has been combined through the General Allocation Model (GAM). Thus, it is no longer 
possible to monitor spending on English language tuition in schools. 
Language support is assigned based on the number of pupils requiring support: additional 
language support hours have been provided in schools with a high concentration of students 
requiring English language support and this alleviation measure is continuing for the 2018/2019 
school year. Other language supports include the distribution of language assessment kits to 
primary and post-primary schools, in-service provision for language support teachers, and 
guidelines on EAL for all teachers.  
International Students (Third Level) 
The number of ‘live’ residence permissions issued for education reasons overall has decreased 
since 2015 by 19 per cent (from around 43,540 to 35,323).  
Students are eligible to work 20 hours per week during term and 40 hours per week during 
holidays (May, June, July and August and 15 December to 15 January).  
 
 
                                                          
 
42  There is due to be a five-year phasing-in period for this provision once the legislation is enacted. 
43  www.education.ie/en/Press-Events/Press-Releases/2018-press-releases/PR18-05-09.html. 
44  https://www.maynoothuniversity.ie/turntoteaching. 
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BOX 3.1  ACCESS TO EDUCATION  
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Pluralism in the Primary Sector was set up to inform policy change in this area. The Forum report 
in 2014 was not prescriptive, but outlined good practice in terms of how best to accommodate 
students of various belief systems in schools (Coolahan et al., 2012). The Forum pointed to the 
potential for the divestment of Catholic schools to other patron bodies in areas with several 
Catholic schools. However, progress to date has been slow, with a small number of existing 
schools divested.41 The Department of Education and Skills also seeks to enhance the diversity of 
the education system by running a separate patronage process for new schools. This process is 
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39  The members of the EEA (the European Economic Area) are the Member States of the EU, along with Iceland, 
Norway and Liechtenstein. 
40  The student must also fulfil one of the following six criteria as regards nationality and immigration status in Ireland: 
be a citizen of EEA Member State or Switzerland; or have an official refugee status; or be a family member of a 
refugee and have been granted permission to live in Ireland; or be a family member of an EU national with 
permission to stay in the State with residence Stamp 4EUFAM; or have been granted humanitarian leave to stay in 
the country; or been granted permission to remain in the State by the Minister for Justice and Equality, following a 
determination by the Minister not to make a deportation order under Section 3 of the Immigration Act 1999. 
41  10 schools were divested between 2013 and 2017. In early 2017 Minister for Education Richard Bruton announced an 
intention to accelerate the process: www.education.ie/en/Press-Events/Press-Releases/2017-Press-Releases/PR17-
01-30.html. 
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A revised Third Level Graduate Programme was announced in 2017 in an effort to incentivise high 
performing students to come to Ireland to study and remain in Ireland to meet skills gaps in the 
economy. Graduates at Level 8 and Level 9 from 2017 onwards can avail of a period of residence 
in the State of up to 12 months or 24 months, respectively. They may work full time for the 
duration of their Stamp 1G residence permission. Stamp 1G is not reckonable as residence when 
applying for citizenship.  
English Language Provision for Adults 
Publicly funded English language provision for adult migrants in Ireland has developed in the 
absence of any overall national strategy or policy initiative (ETBI/SOLAS, 2018). McGinnity et al. 
(2014) outline the several initiatives set up to provide English language support for adults 
including English Language Programmes for migrant workers, the unemployed and asylum seekers 
provided by the 16 Education and Training Boards (ETBs). The courses are funded by the 
Department of Education and Skills, but exact spending figures are not available. ESOL (English for 
Speakers of Other Languages) classes are provided by ETBs nationally to meet the needs of 
learners who may be highly educated with professional and skilled backgrounds who are 
attending classes to learn English. Solas’ Further Education and Training Strategy 2014-201945 calls 
for the provision of clear policy for ESOL provision with priority to low-skilled and unemployed 
migrants, and a recent report (ETBI/SOLAS, 2018) outlines a series of recommendations for good 
practice in this area, building on existing provision. This report also recommends that a national 
framework for publicly funded ESOL be devised, within the broader context of the Further 
Education and Training Strategy (ETBI/SOLAS, 2018). Other groups that provide educational 
supports for immigrant adults include the Fáilte Isteach project, SPIRASI and Doras Luimní.46 
Language provision for adults is the aim of a number of actions in the Migrant Integration Strategy 
(Actions 32, 35, 37).  
 
 
                                                          
 
45  See www.education.ie/en/Publications/Policy-Reports/Further-Education-and-Training-Strategy-2014-2019.pdf. 
46  Details of a number of educational supports funded by the OPMI for immigrant adults can be found at the following 
link: http://integration.ie/en/isec/pages/opmi%20funding.  
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CHAPTER 4  
 
Social Inclusion and Integration 
By Bertrand Maître and Éamonn Fahey 
 
After a period of severe economic recession from 2008 to 2012 in which the level 
of unemployment rose from 5 per cent to 16 per cent and median annual 
disposable household income fell by 19 per cent from €51,020 to €41,392, the 
downward trend in the Irish economy has finally been reversed in recent years. 
Indeed, median annual disposable income increased from €40,974 in 2014, the 
year on which the Social Inclusion chapter of the last Integration Monitor was 
based, to €47,739 in 2016 – an increase of 17 per cent. This early recovery has 
started to have a small positive impact in terms of poverty and social exclusion as 
measured by falling levels of some of the key poverty indicators described in this 
chapter. We therefore examine the social inclusion of the migrant population and 
the total population in 2016 and investigate whether both groups have benefited 
from the early recovery to the same extent.  
 
Social inclusion is the capacity for an individual to fully participate in the life of a 
society. While there are a wide range of indicators that can be used to measure 
social inclusion, our focus here is on poverty. However, we understand that a lack 
of financial resources is just one of many dimensions of social exclusion. A number 
of poverty indicators are used in poverty research, but in this chapter we focus on 
those that are widely used at national (NAP Inclusion, 2007) and European level 
(Europe 2020 poverty target), which are income poverty and material deprivation 
measures. We also use other core Zaragoza indicators for social inclusion (as 
described in Chapter 1) relating to health status and homeownership. Indeed, 
notwithstanding the fact that the relationship between health and social inclusion 
is complex and the causality between the two is difficult to establish, health is 
arguably as important as income in determining people’s ability to participate 
fully in society. Finally, provided that homeownership is a widespread feature of 
the host country (as it is in Ireland), it can be seen as a useful measure of social 
integration of migrants, in part because it signals an intention to remain. 
 
The results presented in this chapter are based on statistical analysis of the Survey 
on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) for the year 2016, the most recent source 
of information on incomes at the time of writing. The SILC survey is the national 
source of information on the income and living conditions of households and 
individuals in Ireland. The survey has been collected annually by the Central 
Statistics Office (CSO) since 2003, and 5,219 households were interviewed in 
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A revised Third Level Graduate Programme was announced in 2017 in an effort to incentivise high 
performing students to come to Ireland to study and remain in Ireland to meet skills gaps in the 
economy. Graduates at Level 8 and Level 9 from 2017 onwards can avail of a period of residence 
in the State of up to 12 months or 24 months, respectively. They may work full time for the 
duration of their Stamp 1G residence permission. Stamp 1G is not reckonable as residence when 
applying for citizenship.  
English Language Provision for Adults 
Publicly funded English language provision for adult migrants in Ireland has developed in the 
absence of any overall national strategy or policy initiative (ETBI/SOLAS, 2018). McGinnity et al. 
(2014) outline the several initiatives set up to provide English language support for adults 
including English Language Programmes for migrant workers, the unemployed and asylum seekers 
provided by the 16 Education and Training Boards (ETBs). The courses are funded by the 
Department of Education and Skills, but exact spending figures are not available. ESOL (English for 
Speakers of Other Languages) classes are provided by ETBs nationally to meet the needs of 
learners who may be highly educated with professional and skilled backgrounds who are 
attending classes to learn English. Solas’ Further Education and Training Strategy 2014-201945 calls 
for the provision of clear policy for ESOL provision with priority to low-skilled and unemployed 
migrants, and a recent report (ETBI/SOLAS, 2018) outlines a series of recommendations for good 
practice in this area, building on existing provision. This report also recommends that a national 
framework for publicly funded ESOL be devised, within the broader context of the Further 
Education and Training Strategy (ETBI/SOLAS, 2018). Other groups that provide educational 
supports for immigrant adults include the Fáilte Isteach project, SPIRASI and Doras Luimní.46 
Language provision for adults is the aim of a number of actions in the Migrant Integration Strategy 
(Actions 32, 35, 37).  
 
 
                                                          
 
45  See www.education.ie/en/Publications/Policy-Reports/Further-Education-and-Training-Strategy-2014-2019.pdf. 
46  Details of a number of educational supports funded by the OPMI for immigrant adults can be found at the following 
link: http://integration.ie/en/isec/pages/opmi%20funding.  
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2016, resulting in an achieved sample of 13,186 individuals. The survey is cross-
sectional but also includes a longitudinal component where individuals are 
interviewed repeatedly for up to four consecutive years. The SILC survey is the 
primary data source to measure and monitor poverty and social exclusion in 
Ireland with indicators such as income poverty and material deprivation. It is also 
the Irish component for the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC), the European comparative data source which is used to 
monitor poverty and social exclusion within the framework of the Europe 2020 
strategy.  
 
In order to be consistent both with other chapters of this volume and with the 
previous Integration Monitor publications, we use the SILC nationality variable to 
identify the migrant population.47 This means that migrants who have moved to 
Ireland and have since naturalised as Irish citizens are identified as Irish nationals.  
4.1  INCOME AND POVERTY 
4.1.1  Household income 
In the SILC survey, households were interviewed throughout the year on a weekly 
basis. The income reference period is the 12 months prior the date of the 
interview. The total annual disposable household income is the sum of all sources 
of income (employment, private pensions, rental income, interests, savings, social 
transfers) of the individuals living in the household, less their total tax and social 
insurance contributions. Economic theories make the assumption that household 
income is equally shared between all the household members. Therefore, in order 
to allow comparison between households of different sizes and compositions, we 
adjust household income according to these differences. These adjustments are 
made using an equivalence scale. We use the national scale that gives a weight of 
1 to the first adult (aged 14+) and a weight of 0.66 to each additional adult and a 
weight of 0.33 to each child (aged less than 14). We then sum the weights within 
each household to obtain an equivalence scale. Equivalised disposable income is 
calculated by dividing disposable household income by the equivalence scale, and 
this income is attributed to each individual in the household. Equivalised 
disposable income is one of the income measures used by CSO to look at trends in 
household income over time. It is also one of the social inclusion indicators used 
by the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection, as reported in 
the Social Inclusion Monitors (Department of Employment Affairs and Social 
Protection, 2018).  
 
 
                                                          
 
47  The SILC data also include information on country of birth so a similar analysis based on this criterion could be 
conducted and compared to the present results. However, we would not expect the results to differ by much 
because the overlap between country of birth and nationality tends to be large overall. 
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In February 2017 the CSO published a note advising that there was an inaccuracy 
in the SILC income variables in 2012, 2013 and 2014. The error, which was due to 
a miscalculation of the Universal Social Charge and Pay Related Social Insurance, 
resulted in individual and household income being marginally underestimated. For 
instance, the initial estimate of real median household disposable income was 
revised from €17,977 to €18,078, and the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate was changed 
from 16.3 per cent to 17.2 per cent. 
 
The CSO’s note contains updated headline figures for the income based measures 
for these years, allowing us to accurately analyse change over time. However, the 
note does not disaggregate these new results by nationality, meaning that we 
cannot comment on trends over time for individual groups. The findings 
presented in the previous Integration Monitor are based on the inaccurate data, 
and are therefore not comparable to the income-based results shown in this 
chapter. Note, however, that the non-income based measures, relating to 
material deprivation, housing and health, are unaffected by this issue. 
 
In Table 4.1 we report one of the Zaragoza indicators, namely the median annual 
disposable household income and median annual equivalised disposable 
household income across the various nationality groupings.48 The median 
disposable household income for non-Irish nationals, at €42,150, is just 86 per 
cent of the figure for Irish-nationals, which stands at €48,666. This difference is 
statistically significant.  
 
Turning to the detail in the table, we find that UK nationals, at €35,644, report the 
lowest median income of all groups, followed by the non-EU group at €37,600 and 
the EU-East group at €42,018. EU-West migrants have the highest household 
income at €51,413, and this is significantly higher than the Irish value. While we 
cannot be fully certain of this because of the changes to the data mentioned 
above, the ranking pattern of the various migrant groups is identical to the one 
observed in 2014 figures (Barrett et al., 2017). 
 
Once we take account of household size and composition, the median equivalised 
income for Irish nationals (€20,890) is still significantly higher than for non-Irish 
nationals (€17,804), and the income gap between the two groups remains 
unchanged at 85 per cent. Unlike for non-equivalised income, the non-EU group 
now has the lowest median equivalised income at €15,382. This is due to them 
having the largest average household size (4.1 or an equivalence scale of 2.68) of 
all groups, which considerably reduces their median income. On the contrary, the 
 
                                                          
 
48  The median income is the mid-point of the income distribution once incomes have been sorted by from lowest to 
highest. 
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2016, resulting in an achieved sample of 13,186 individuals. The survey is cross-
sectional but also includes a longitudinal component where individuals are 
interviewed repeatedly for up to four consecutive years. The SILC survey is the 
primary data source to measure and monitor poverty and social exclusion in 
Ireland with indicators such as income poverty and material deprivation. It is also 
the Irish component for the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC), the European comparative data source which is used to 
monitor poverty and social exclusion within the framework of the Europe 2020 
strategy.  
 
In order to be consistent both with other chapters of this volume and with the 
previous Integration Monitor publications, we use the SILC nationality variable to 
identify the migrant population.47 This means that migrants who have moved to 
Ireland and have since naturalised as Irish citizens are identified as Irish nationals.  
4.1  INCOME AND POVERTY 
4.1.1  Household income 
In the SILC survey, households were interviewed throughout the year on a weekly 
basis. The income reference period is the 12 months prior the date of the 
interview. The total annual disposable household income is the sum of all sources 
of income (employment, private pensions, rental income, interests, savings, social 
transfers) of the individuals living in the household, less their total tax and social 
insurance contributions. Economic theories make the assumption that household 
income is equally shared between all the household members. Therefore, in order 
to allow comparison between households of different sizes and compositions, we 
adjust household income according to these differences. These adjustments are 
made using an equivalence scale. We use the national scale that gives a weight of 
1 to the first adult (aged 14+) and a weight of 0.66 to each additional adult and a 
weight of 0.33 to each child (aged less than 14). We then sum the weights within 
each household to obtain an equivalence scale. Equivalised disposable income is 
calculated by dividing disposable household income by the equivalence scale, and 
this income is attributed to each individual in the household. Equivalised 
disposable income is one of the income measures used by CSO to look at trends in 
household income over time. It is also one of the social inclusion indicators used 
by the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection, as reported in 
the Social Inclusion Monitors (Department of Employment Affairs and Social 
Protection, 2018).  
 
 
                                                          
 
47  The SILC data also include information on country of birth so a similar analysis based on this criterion could be 
conducted and compared to the present results. However, we would not expect the results to differ by much 
because the overlap between country of birth and nationality tends to be large overall. 
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UK migrant group has the smallest average household size (3.1 or an equivalence 
scale of 2.13) which brings their median equivalised income to €17,361. This is 
similar to the value for all non-Irish nationals. EU-East nationals register a slightly 
higher value of €17,876 and the largest median is found for EU-West nationals at 
€23,137 which is significantly higher than the Irish value.  
 
TABLE 4.1  YEARLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD EQUIVALISED INCOME, 2016 
 
Disposable Household 
Income (Median) 
€ 
Equivalised (needs 
adjusted) Income (Median) 
€ 
No of individuals in each 
group 
(unweighted) 
Irish 48,666 20,890 12,012 
Non-Irish 42,150* 17,804* 1,172 
Of which:    
UK 35,644* 17,361* 263 
EU-West 51,413* 23,137* 170 
EU-East 42,018* 17,876* 519 
Non-EU 37,600* 15,382* 220 
All 47,739 20,597 13,184 
 
Source:  Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2016, weighted.  
Notes:  Equivalised income is income adjusted for the size and composition of the household, see text for further details. * signals 
that the group median is significantly different from the Irish median at p ≤ 0.05. 
4.1.2  Poverty rates 
National and European social policies use a wide range of indicators to monitor 
poverty and social exclusion. In Table 4.2 we report some of the indicators used in 
Ireland. While there is no perfect single indicator of poverty, the at risk of poverty 
measure is widely used in poverty research and it is one of the official Irish 
indicators of poverty (NAPS, Social Inclusion Monitor). The at risk of poverty rate 
is a relative poverty measure. It identifies individuals that are living below a 
certain percentage of the median (or sometimes mean) household income of the 
total population. The most common poverty threshold used is 60 per cent of the 
median. This is also the official poverty line used in Ireland and the EU.  
 
In addition to the ‘at risk of poverty’ measure, Ireland also uses a measure of 
material deprivation designed by the ESRI (Nolan et al., 2002; Whelan et al., 
2003). This measure of deprivation allows us to capture an absolute standard of 
living and to remedy some of the limitations that hamper all relative income 
poverty measures. Indeed, because the at risk of poverty measure is a relative 
measure with a threshold that changes as the economy fluctuates over time, any 
marked economic change such as a period of boom or recession is likely to impact 
on the at risk of poverty level without necessarily capturing any change in the 
standard of living of the population. To illustrate, consider a hypothetical example 
where a household has income just above 60 per cent of the median, and their 
income rises over the course of the following year. If the median income increases 
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at a faster rate in the same time period, the household may paradoxically fall into 
poverty, despite experiencing an absolute improvement in living standards. The 
official deprivation measure includes 11 items that are considered basic to 
maintain a minimum standard of living and to participate in society as normal 
(shoes, clothes, heating etc.). A household is considered to be materially deprived 
if its members lack at least two of these eleven items due to insufficient 
resources.49  
 
The final and official indicator used is the consistent poverty measure. It combines 
the two previous measures and deems a household to be consistently poor when 
they are both at risk of poverty and materially deprived. We report in Table 4.2 
the prevalence of each of these poverty indicators by groups of the population. 
 
Between 2014 and 2016 the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate for the total population fell 
from 17.2 per cent to 16.5 per cent. Overall, at 15.7 per cent, Irish nationals have 
a significantly lower at risk of poverty rate than the non-Irish at 22.6 per cent, but 
large variation within this latter group exists. Among the non-Irish, the poverty 
rate for the EU-West is very low at 11 per cent, but this group is not significantly 
different to the Irish. There is also no significant difference between the Irish rate 
and the EU-East migrant group at 15.8 per cent. However, the poverty rates for 
UK migrants at 31 per cent, and for non-EU nationals at 42 per cent, are 2 and 2.7 
times the Irish rate respectively.50  
 
While the reduction in the overall at risk of poverty rate over time was modest, 
the level of deprivation fell more sharply between 2014 and 2016 – from 29 per 
cent to 21 per cent respectively. All groups experienced this improvement, with 
the exception of the non-EU group, whose deprivation rate actually increased 
from 27.8 per cent to 34.9 per cent. The pattern of deprivation is very different to 
what we find for the at risk of poverty rates across migrant groups. Overall, the 
range on the deprivation measure is narrower, and there are no significant 
differences in deprivation between the Irish (21 per cent) and non-Irish groups (24 
per cent) as well as for the EU-East (22 per cent). The non-EU and UK groups are 
the two most deprived. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the EU-West 
nationals, at 8.8 per cent, are the least deprived. 
 
 
                                                          
 
49  A household is materially deprived if they can’t afford the following items: two pairs of strong shoes; a warm 
waterproof overcoat; to buy new (not second-hand) clothes; to eat a meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian 
equivalent) every second day; to have a roast joint or its equivalent once a week; to have had to go without heating 
during the last year through lack of money; to keep the home adequately warm; to buy presents for family or friends 
at least once a year; to replace any worn out furniture; to have family or friends over for a drink or meal once a 
month; and to have a morning, afternoon or evening out in the last fortnight for entertainment. 
50  Additional analysis using pooled 2015 and 2016 data (not shown), suggests that the high poverty rates among the 
non-EU group is being driven by people from African countries. 
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UK migrant group has the smallest average household size (3.1 or an equivalence 
scale of 2.13) which brings their median equivalised income to €17,361. This is 
similar to the value for all non-Irish nationals. EU-East nationals register a slightly 
higher value of €17,876 and the largest median is found for EU-West nationals at 
€23,137 which is significantly higher than the Irish value.  
 
TABLE 4.1  YEARLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD EQUIVALISED INCOME, 2016 
 
Disposable Household 
Income (Median) 
€ 
Equivalised (needs 
adjusted) Income (Median) 
€ 
No of individuals in each 
group 
(unweighted) 
Irish 48,666 20,890 12,012 
Non-Irish 42,150* 17,804* 1,172 
Of which:    
UK 35,644* 17,361* 263 
EU-West 51,413* 23,137* 170 
EU-East 42,018* 17,876* 519 
Non-EU 37,600* 15,382* 220 
All 47,739 20,597 13,184 
 
Source:  Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2016, weighted.  
Notes:  Equivalised income is income adjusted for the size and composition of the household, see text for further details. * signals 
that the group median is significantly different from the Irish median at p ≤ 0.05. 
4.1.2  Poverty rates 
National and European social policies use a wide range of indicators to monitor 
poverty and social exclusion. In Table 4.2 we report some of the indicators used in 
Ireland. While there is no perfect single indicator of poverty, the at risk of poverty 
measure is widely used in poverty research and it is one of the official Irish 
indicators of poverty (NAPS, Social Inclusion Monitor). The at risk of poverty rate 
is a relative poverty measure. It identifies individuals that are living below a 
certain percentage of the median (or sometimes mean) household income of the 
total population. The most common poverty threshold used is 60 per cent of the 
median. This is also the official poverty line used in Ireland and the EU.  
 
In addition to the ‘at risk of poverty’ measure, Ireland also uses a measure of 
material deprivation designed by the ESRI (Nolan et al., 2002; Whelan et al., 
2003). This measure of deprivation allows us to capture an absolute standard of 
living and to remedy some of the limitations that hamper all relative income 
poverty measures. Indeed, because the at risk of poverty measure is a relative 
measure with a threshold that changes as the economy fluctuates over time, any 
marked economic change such as a period of boom or recession is likely to impact 
on the at risk of poverty level without necessarily capturing any change in the 
standard of living of the population. To illustrate, consider a hypothetical example 
where a household has income just above 60 per cent of the median, and their 
income rises over the course of the following year. If the median income increases 
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Compared to the two previous poverty measures, the combined measure of 
consistent poverty produces much lower levels of poverty across all the groups. 
Overall, there was no significant change in the level of consistent poverty 
between 2014 and 2016, with respective values of 8.8 per cent and 8.3 per cent. 
The consistent poverty rate for the non-Irish, at 12.7 per cent, is over one and half 
that of natives at 7.9 per cent. There is large variation in consistent poverty rates 
across the groups. At less than half the Irish rate, it is lowest for the EU-West (3.2 
per cent). Relative to the deprivation measure, it is also relatively low for the EU-
East group (8.2 per cent) even if it is not significantly different to the Irish 
nationals. Again, the most vulnerable groups are the UK and the non-EU nationals. 
The UK group’s consistent poverty rate is twice the level of the Irish rate (16.4 per 
cent), and the non-EU’s is over three and half times the Irish rate (29 per cent).  
 
TABLE 4.2  AT RISK OF POVERTY, DEPRIVATION AND CONSISTENT POVERTY RATES, 2016 
 
At Risk of Poverty 
(under the 60 median 
poverty line) (% ) 
Deprivation 
(enforced lack of 2 
or more items) (%) 
Consistent Poverty 
(At Risk and 
Deprived) (%) 
No. of individuals 
(unweighted) 
Irish 15.7 20.7 7.9 12,012 
Non-Irish 22.5* 23.7* 12.7 1,172 
Of which:     
UK 31.0* 29.2* 16.4* 263 
EU-West 10.6 8.8* 3.2* 170 
EU-East 15.8 22.1 8.2 519 
Non-EU 42.0* 34.9* 29.0* 220 
All 16.5 21.0 8.4 13,184 
 
Source:  Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2016, weighted.  
Notes:  * signals that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p ≤ 0.05. See text for further details. 
4.2  HEALTH STATUS 
There is a strong body of evidence that links health outcomes to the experience of 
poverty and quality of life in general (Watson et al., 2016). Good general health is 
a key factor in promoting the inclusion of migrants into society, which is why such 
a measure is included in the Zaragoza indicators. This section explores the general 
health status of migrants in comparison with the Irish population. The SILC survey 
asks all individuals aged 16 and over about their self-assessed health condition. 
The format of the question was ‘How is your health in general?’ with five possible 
answers from ‘very good’ to ‘very bad’. In Table 4.3 we report the percentage of 
people reporting having ‘very good’ or ‘good’ health. The percentage of the 
population reporting very good or good health, at 83 per cent, has not changed 
since SILC 2014. The pattern across migrant groups is very similar too. Only the 
EU-West has experienced a significant change since 2014 as their assessment 
went from 98 per cent in 2014 to 91 per cent in 2016, a level more similar to most 
other migrant groups. The non-Irish report better general health (88.5 per cent) 
than Irish nationals (82.1 per cent). This finding holds across all groups, except the 
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UK group which is very similar to Irish nationals. The level of good health between 
the other groups ranges from 90 per cent for the EU-East migrants to 93 per cent 
for the non-EU migrants. The overall better health status of the migrant 
population compared to the natives, known as the ‘healthy immigrant effect’, has 
been found in many other countries such as in North America and Australia but 
also in Ireland to a lesser extent (Nolan, 2012). While this effect was not as strong 
in Ireland, Nolan (2012) still found some contributing factors to better health such 
as education, household income and age. 
 
The middle column of Table 4.3 shows that the non-Irish are indeed on average 
much younger (39 years old) than Irish nationals (47 years old).51 This is true 
across all migrant groups, except for UK migrants who have an average age of 52, 
a feature which could partially explain their relatively worse health outcomes. 
 
TABLE 4.3  SELF-ASSESSED HEALTH STATUS BY NATIONALITY, 2016 
 Very Good or Good health ( % ) 
Mean Age 
(rounded) 
No of individuals 
(16 and over) 
Irish 82.1 47 9,152 
Non-Irish 88.1* 39 1,028 
Of which: 
 UK 80.1 52 249 
 EU-West 91.5* 38 151 
 EU-East 89.7* 36 436 
 Non-EU 89.3* 35 192 
All 82.8 46 10,180 
 
Source: Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2016, percentages weighted; N unweighted.  
Notes:  * signals that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p ≤ 0.05.  
4.3  HOUSING TENURE AND CONDITIONS 
The final Zaragoza social inclusion indicator relates to homeownership among 
migrant groups and, as before, we compare this outcome to the native 
population. Homeownership is often perceived as the gold standard of economic 
success and social integration in the host country. Over the last ten years the Irish 
property market was characterised by a period of acute turmoil during the 
economic boom and the recession, resulting in the bursting of the property 
bubble with collapsing supply and demand and falling prices. During the economic 
boom (1995 to 2007), housing prices rose by 474 per cent before falling by 53 per 
cent between 2007 and 2013 (McQuinn, 2017). As the overall economy started to 
recover from 2013 onwards, so too did the housing market, with prices rising by 
52 per cent between 2013 and 2017 (McQuinn, 2017). The rental market followed 
 
                                                          
 
51  Note that the mean age reported in the column is based on people aged 16 or older. This explains why the figures are 
considerably different to the values reported using the Labour Force Survey in Chapter 3. 
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Compared to the two previous poverty measures, the combined measure of 
consistent poverty produces much lower levels of poverty across all the groups. 
Overall, there was no significant change in the level of consistent poverty 
between 2014 and 2016, with respective values of 8.8 per cent and 8.3 per cent. 
The consistent poverty rate for the non-Irish, at 12.7 per cent, is over one and half 
that of natives at 7.9 per cent. There is large variation in consistent poverty rates 
across the groups. At less than half the Irish rate, it is lowest for the EU-West (3.2 
per cent). Relative to the deprivation measure, it is also relatively low for the EU-
East group (8.2 per cent) even if it is not significantly different to the Irish 
nationals. Again, the most vulnerable groups are the UK and the non-EU nationals. 
The UK group’s consistent poverty rate is twice the level of the Irish rate (16.4 per 
cent), and the non-EU’s is over three and half times the Irish rate (29 per cent).  
 
TABLE 4.2  AT RISK OF POVERTY, DEPRIVATION AND CONSISTENT POVERTY RATES, 2016 
 
At Risk of Poverty 
(under the 60 median 
poverty line) (% ) 
Deprivation 
(enforced lack of 2 
or more items) (%) 
Consistent Poverty 
(At Risk and 
Deprived) (%) 
No. of individuals 
(unweighted) 
Irish 15.7 20.7 7.9 12,012 
Non-Irish 22.5* 23.7* 12.7 1,172 
Of which:     
UK 31.0* 29.2* 16.4* 263 
EU-West 10.6 8.8* 3.2* 170 
EU-East 15.8 22.1 8.2 519 
Non-EU 42.0* 34.9* 29.0* 220 
All 16.5 21.0 8.4 13,184 
 
Source:  Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2016, weighted.  
Notes:  * signals that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p ≤ 0.05. See text for further details. 
4.2  HEALTH STATUS 
There is a strong body of evidence that links health outcomes to the experience of 
poverty and quality of life in general (Watson et al., 2016). Good general health is 
a key factor in promoting the inclusion of migrants into society, which is why such 
a measure is included in the Zaragoza indicators. This section explores the general 
health status of migrants in comparison with the Irish population. The SILC survey 
asks all individuals aged 16 and over about their self-assessed health condition. 
The format of the question was ‘How is your health in general?’ with five possible 
answers from ‘very good’ to ‘very bad’. In Table 4.3 we report the percentage of 
people reporting having ‘very good’ or ‘good’ health. The percentage of the 
population reporting very good or good health, at 83 per cent, has not changed 
since SILC 2014. The pattern across migrant groups is very similar too. Only the 
EU-West has experienced a significant change since 2014 as their assessment 
went from 98 per cent in 2014 to 91 per cent in 2016, a level more similar to most 
other migrant groups. The non-Irish report better general health (88.5 per cent) 
than Irish nationals (82.1 per cent). This finding holds across all groups, except the 
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a similar pattern of rise and fall as the economy boomed and struggled. However, 
since 2013 rental prices have risen by 29 per cent (Lawless et al., 2018). In both 
the housing and rental market, the recent price inflation was caused by the 
combined effects of a recovering economy, rising demand for property and a 
shortage of supply. 
 
Previous international research has identified several factors that impact 
negatively on homeownership among immigrants, such as low household income 
and savings and income requirements to secure credit. Migrants’ location in the 
host country, household size, length of stay and expected mobility in the host 
country also have an impact (Mundra and Uwaifo Oyelere, 2017; Amuedo-
Dorantes and Mundra 2012; Gobillon and Solignac, 2015). 
 
The results reported in Table 4.4 are based on the responses from the person 
answering the household questionnaire (generally the head of household) during 
the survey interviews. The analysis is therefore done at household level rather 
than the individual level as in the previous tables. Almost 80 per cent of Irish 
nationals own their home (with or without a mortgage) compared to 34 per cent 
of non-Irish nationals. Compared to the 2014 SILC figures (published in the 2016 
Integration Monitor, see Barrett et al., 2017), the 2016 figures for the Irish 
nationals have been stable, but increased by 9 percentage points for the non-Irish, 
and most migrant groups have experienced this increase. With the exception of 
the UK, at 74 per cent, all migrant groups have significantly lower levels of 
homeownership. Almost half of EU-West migrants own their home and this 
represents an increase of 15 percentage points since the 2014 SILC. The EU-East 
group also experienced a large increase in homeownership in this period. Indeed, 
the EU-East rate, while still modest, increased two-fold since SILC 2014 – from 7 
per cent to 13 per cent. This is the largest relative increase of homeownership 
across all non-Irish groups. However, the trend for the non-EU homeownership 
rate stands out, as it recorded a fall of two percentage points over the two-year 
period. 
 
Less than one-in-fourteen Irish nationals rent their home on the private market. 
By contrast, half of the non-Irish population are private renters, but there is a 
diverse pattern across the migrant groups. Similar to Irish nationals, 10 per cent of 
UK nationals live in private rented accommodation. Private renting is more 
common among EU-West nationals (39 per cent), and even more so among the 
non-EU group (62 per cent). Almost three-quarters of EU-East nationals are in this 
tenure category.  
 
Finally, the percentage of Irish and non-Irish nationals living in Local Authority 
rented accommodation is very similar at 14 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. 
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This represents a slight increase for the Irish since 2014, but a three-fold increase 
for the non-Irish. As with other forms of tenure, however, there is some variation 
in this pattern across groups. The percentages of the UK and EU-East groups in 
Local Authority housing, at 16 per cent and 14 per cent respectively, are quite 
similar to Irish nationals. The figure for EU-West nationals is slightly lower but it is 
considerably higher for the non-EU group, at 22 per cent.  
 
Looking at other changes over time, there has been a reduction in private rented 
accommodation in favour of Local Authority housing for Irish nationals. Among UK 
nationals, we observe an increase in homeownership and Local Authority housing, 
and a fall in private rented accommodation, a pattern which is repeated by EU-
West and EU-East migrants. The pattern for the non-EU group is more similar to 
what we find with Irish nationals, with no change in homeownership, a reduction 
in private renting, and increased housing in local authority properties.52  
 
TABLE 4.4  HOUSING TENURE BY NATIONALITY, 2016 
Nationality Home Owners (%) 
Private rented 
(%) LA Rented (%) 
No of 
households 
(unweighted) 
Sig. (chi Sq) 
Irish 78.7 7.1 14.2 4,644  
Non-Irish 34.2 50.9 14.9 456 * 
Of which:      
UK 74.0 10.3 15.7 133 n.s. 
EU-West 51.8 39.1 9.1 68 * 
EU-East 13.4 72.5 14.1 185 * 
Non-EU 16.2 61.6 22.2 70 * 
All 74.0 11.7 14.3 5,100  
 
Source:  Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2016, percentages weighted; N unweighted. A small number of households living rent-free 
have been excluded from the analysis. 
Notes:  The questions on homeownership were answered by the person who answered the household questionnaire, and their 
nationality is used. *signals that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p ≤ 0.05; n.s. indicates that the 
difference is not statistically significant. 
 
While the concept of the ‘quality of life’ is multidimensional and complex, there is 
no doubt that the quality of people’s accommodation and living environment 
contributes to overall wellbeing, as is highlighted by a number of studies 
(Eurofound, 2003; Clarke et al., 2008; OECD, 2013). The EU-SILC collects a range of 
information about both the respondent’s basic housing facilities and their 
surrounding neighbourhoods. Based on work by Maître et al. (2006), we use these 
 
                                                          
 
52  Under the Housing Assistance Payment (HAP), rent is paid directly from the Local Authority to a private landlord. In 
these cases, it is possible that some respondents consider their dwelling to be rented from the Local Authority rather 
than on the private market. This could partially explain the increase in the percentage of Local Authority rented 
dwellings.  
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a similar pattern of rise and fall as the economy boomed and struggled. However, 
since 2013 rental prices have risen by 29 per cent (Lawless et al., 2018). In both 
the housing and rental market, the recent price inflation was caused by the 
combined effects of a recovering economy, rising demand for property and a 
shortage of supply. 
 
Previous international research has identified several factors that impact 
negatively on homeownership among immigrants, such as low household income 
and savings and income requirements to secure credit. Migrants’ location in the 
host country, household size, length of stay and expected mobility in the host 
country also have an impact (Mundra and Uwaifo Oyelere, 2017; Amuedo-
Dorantes and Mundra 2012; Gobillon and Solignac, 2015). 
 
The results reported in Table 4.4 are based on the responses from the person 
answering the household questionnaire (generally the head of household) during 
the survey interviews. The analysis is therefore done at household level rather 
than the individual level as in the previous tables. Almost 80 per cent of Irish 
nationals own their home (with or without a mortgage) compared to 34 per cent 
of non-Irish nationals. Compared to the 2014 SILC figures (published in the 2016 
Integration Monitor, see Barrett et al., 2017), the 2016 figures for the Irish 
nationals have been stable, but increased by 9 percentage points for the non-Irish, 
and most migrant groups have experienced this increase. With the exception of 
the UK, at 74 per cent, all migrant groups have significantly lower levels of 
homeownership. Almost half of EU-West migrants own their home and this 
represents an increase of 15 percentage points since the 2014 SILC. The EU-East 
group also experienced a large increase in homeownership in this period. Indeed, 
the EU-East rate, while still modest, increased two-fold since SILC 2014 – from 7 
per cent to 13 per cent. This is the largest relative increase of homeownership 
across all non-Irish groups. However, the trend for the non-EU homeownership 
rate stands out, as it recorded a fall of two percentage points over the two-year 
period. 
 
Less than one-in-fourteen Irish nationals rent their home on the private market. 
By contrast, half of the non-Irish population are private renters, but there is a 
diverse pattern across the migrant groups. Similar to Irish nationals, 10 per cent of 
UK nationals live in private rented accommodation. Private renting is more 
common among EU-West nationals (39 per cent), and even more so among the 
non-EU group (62 per cent). Almost three-quarters of EU-East nationals are in this 
tenure category.  
 
Finally, the percentage of Irish and non-Irish nationals living in Local Authority 
rented accommodation is very similar at 14 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. 
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data to construct two distinct dimensions of deprivation, relating to housing and 
the neighbourhood’s environment.  
 
The housing deprivation dimension is a four-item scale capturing the lack of 
facilities in the accommodation for hot water, a bath or a shower, indoor toilets 
and central heating. A household is deprived on this dimension if they lack any of 
these four items. The neighbourhood environment dimension is based on a five-
item scale about the area where households live as well as poor housing 
conditions. The items are noise, pollution, crime, leaks in the accommodation and 
inadequate light. A household is deprived if they lack any of these five items. 
 
In Table 4.5 we report the percentage of households experiencing any of these 
housing and environmental issues. Overall, while the figures show that non-Irish 
households are more likely than Irish households to experience either type of 
deprivation, the difference between the two groups is not significant. This was 
also the case in 2014 (Barrett et al., 2017) but the gap between Irish and non-Irish 
households was much smaller. Since then Irish and non-Irish households’ housing 
deprivation has worsened but their environmental conditions have improved. 
 
There is very little difference in the rates of either housing or neighbourhood 
deprivation between households in private rented accommodation and 
households in other tenure types. This finding holds for both Irish and non-Irish 
households.  
 
TABLE 4.5 HOUSING CONDITIONS BY NATIONALITY, 2016 
 All Households Private Rented 
 
% deprived on 
housing 
% deprived on 
environ. 
% deprived 
on housing 
% deprived on 
environ. 
Irish 10.9 26.4 11.6 29.8 
Non-Irish 13.4 30.9 12.5 30.3 
 
Source:  Own calculations from the EU-SILC, 2016, weighted percentages.  
4.4  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Since the 2014 SILC, analysed in the last Integration Monitor, households in 
Ireland have benefited from the consolidation of the Irish economic recovery, as 
the median annual disposable household income increased by 17 per cent 
between 2014 and 2016. While we cannot explore the extent of the increase 
across the various migrant groups due to data issues as explained at the beginning 
of this chapter, there is strong evidence to suggest that all migrant groups 
experienced this increase to varying degrees.  
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Overall, we found Irish households’ disposable income in 2016 to be higher than 
non-Irish households, with the exception of migrants from the EU-West countries. 
As was the case in previous Integration Monitors, UK nationals and non-EU 
migrants report the lowest disposable household income. 
 
The recent improvement in the Irish economy had a modest but positive impact 
on the at risk of poverty rate as it fell from 17.2 per cent in 2014 to 16.5 per cent 
in 2016. Again, for the same data reasons as described above, we cannot 
comment on the poverty trends across the various groups and we can only 
describe the 2016 figures. Overall, the at risk of poverty rate is higher for the non-
Irish than the Irish, with a seven percentage point gap between the groups. 
However, these figures conceal considerable variation between migrant groups. 
The EU-West group has the lowest at risk of poverty rate, well below the Irish and 
the EU-East rates. By contrast, the at risk of poverty rate for migrants from the UK 
and from outside the EU is extremely high, between two and 2.7 times the Irish 
rate. 
 
Over the period 2014 to 2016, more progress was made on reducing material 
deprivation than the at risk of poverty rate. With the exception of non-EU 
migrants, all groups shared in this improvement in material deprivation. The 
sharpest reduction in deprivation was enjoyed by the EU-West group while non-
EU migrants actually experienced an increase in deprivation. The results for 
consistent poverty, which show higher risks for UK nationals and non-EU 
nationals, and lower risks for the Irish and EU-West migrants, mirror the results 
for the at risk of poverty and deprivation measures.  
 
This chapter has highlighted some of the limits of aggregating nationality 
categories into broad groupings, particularly the non-EU group. Non-EU nationals 
are a heterogeneous group, comprising both migrants from the developing 
nations of South and East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa; and from the developed 
economies of North America and Oceania. It is therefore likely that they also have 
markedly varying experiences of poverty and social exclusion. However, due to 
the size of the SILC sample, it was not possible to carry out the analysis separately 
for these narrower nationality groupings with a satisfactory level of confidence. A 
larger sample of migrants in a data source with income and social inclusion 
measures would allow us to distinguish regional groupings and considerably 
enhance our understanding of social inclusion among migrants in Ireland.  
 
Over time there was very little change in the distribution and the pattern of health 
status of migrants compared to the Irish nationals. It is still the case that overall 
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deprivation, the difference between the two groups is not significant. This was 
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deprivation has worsened but their environmental conditions have improved. 
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4.4  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Since the 2014 SILC, analysed in the last Integration Monitor, households in 
Ireland have benefited from the consolidation of the Irish economic recovery, as 
the median annual disposable household income increased by 17 per cent 
between 2014 and 2016. While we cannot explore the extent of the increase 
across the various migrant groups due to data issues as explained at the beginning 
of this chapter, there is strong evidence to suggest that all migrant groups 
experienced this increase to varying degrees.  
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non-Irish individuals report better health outcomes than Irish nationals, with the 
notable exception of UK migrants. 
 
There was more change over time in relation to housing tenure across these 
groups. While homeownership has remained lower among the non-Irish than the 
Irish (but not so much among UK migrants), there has been a large increase in 
homeownership across all migrant groups (except for the non-EU), which could 
indicate an intention to settle in Ireland for a long period of time. There was also a 
large reduction in the percentage of households living in privately rented 
accommodation and a large increase in Local Authority rented accommodation, to 
the point that there is no longer any difference between Irish and non-Irish 
nationals in Local Authority accommodation. The results regarding housing and 
environment deprivation were mixed. In general, non-Irish nationals seem to be 
more at risk of experiencing housing and neighbourhood deprivation, but the 
differences are not statistically significant. Since 2014, we find that rates of 
housing deprivation have increased, while neighbourhood deprivation decreased 
over the same period.  
 
BOX 4.1  ACCESS TO SOCIAL SERVICES 
Social Welfare  
The social welfare system is administered by the Department of Employment Affairs and Social 
Protection. It is divided into the following main types of payments:  
• Social insurance payments; 
• Social assistance or means tested payments; 
• Universal payments. 
To qualify for social insurance payments an individual must have made the necessary number of 
social insurance (PRSI) payments for the scheme in question and satisfy certain conditions. Social 
assistance payments are made to those who do not have enough PRSI contributions to qualify for 
the equivalent social insurance-based payments.  
EU law requires that EU nationals are treated equally to Member State nationals in regard to 
accessing social welfare. In practice, national administrative rules lead to differing levels of access. 
This is evidenced in Ireland by the application of a Habitual Residence Condition (HRC) to social 
assistance payments and to child benefit, which means that applicants must show they are both 
resident in, and have a proven close link to Ireland.  
Currently the Department of Social Protection assesses the following:  
• Length and continuity of residence in Ireland; 
• Length and purpose of any absence from Ireland; 
• Nature and pattern of employment; 
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• Applicant’s main centre of interest; 
• Applicant’s intention to live in Ireland as it appears from the evidence 
     (Department of Social Protection, 2013). 
The evidence used for each factor depends on the facts of the individual case and the final 
decision reached is to some extent subjective. There have been some criticisms of the subjectivity 
of the decision-making process (FLAC, 2012). 
Health Services  
In Ireland there is universal access to public healthcare, though costs may apply, for example for 
GP services. Medical Card holders may access certain public health services free of charge and 
entitlement is means tested regardless of nationality. Subject to a means test, refugees and those 
with leave to remain are entitled to a Medical Card. Asylum applicants living in direct provision are 
also entitled to a means tested Medical Card. 
Housing Services  
Local authorities in Ireland are the main provider of social housing for people who need housing 
and cannot afford to buy their own homes. Local authority housing is allocated according to 
housing need, and rents are based on ability to pay. Rent supplement is a payment made by the 
Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection for those in private rented 
accommodation who cannot afford to meet their housing costs. The Housing Assistance Payment 
is an equivalent payment made by Local Authorities directly to landlords on behalf of tenants. 
The Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government reviewed access to social housing for 
immigrants, and in 2012 issued revised guidelines in access to social housing supports for non-
Irish nationals. Generally speaking, all EEA nationals may be considered for assessment for social 
housing support from housing authorities if;  
1)  They are in employment/self-employed in the State; or 
2)  Where they are not currently working/employed it is because: they are temporarily 
unable to work because of illness/accident; they are recorded as involuntarily 
unemployed after having been employed for longer than a year; and they are 
registered as a jobseeker with Department of Social Protection and Intreo. 
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non-Irish individuals report better health outcomes than Irish nationals, with the 
notable exception of UK migrants. 
 
There was more change over time in relation to housing tenure across these 
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nationals in Local Authority accommodation. The results regarding housing and 
environment deprivation were mixed. In general, non-Irish nationals seem to be 
more at risk of experiencing housing and neighbourhood deprivation, but the 
differences are not statistically significant. Since 2014, we find that rates of 
housing deprivation have increased, while neighbourhood deprivation decreased 
over the same period.  
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CHAPTER 5  
 
Active Citizenship 
By Emma Quinn 
 
The indicators presented in this chapter describe the context and the 
opportunities for integration in the domain of active citizenship, specifically in 
relation to naturalisation, long-term residence and political participation. The 
term ‘active citizenship’ is used here as a broad concept embracing formal and 
non-formal, political, cultural, inter-personal and caring activities (Taskforce on 
Active Citizenship, 2007) and as such is not limited to the activities of Irish citizens. 
The indicators used here differ from the other indicators presented within the 
Monitoring Report on Integration because they do not draw direct comparisons of 
outcomes between Irish and non-Irish nationals. The Zaragoza Declaration53 
included three indicators designed to measure integration in the active citizenship 
domain. Firstly, the naturalisation rate, measured as the ratio of resident 
immigrants to those who acquired citizenship; secondly the share of immigrants 
holding permanent or long-term residence permits; and thirdly the share of 
immigrants among elected representatives. This chapter presents the calculation 
of these indicators based on the best available national data, together with 
available supplementary information and data.  
5.1  NATURALISATION 
Almost 140,000 non-Irish nationals acquired Irish citizenship through 
naturalisation between 2005 and 2017.54 Naturalised migrants may participate 
fully in the democratic process and are entitled to equal access to the institutions, 
goods and services of the State. Ireland has entered a new phase regarding the 
naturalisation of new Irish citizens. Applications and approvals have fallen from a 
peak in 2012 to much lower levels in recent years. With the publication of a new 
Migrant Integration Strategy in 2017, a new focus is being placed on the 
integration of these and other migrants (Department of Justice and Equality, 
2017). 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that the number of naturalisation certificates issued annually 
accelerated rapidly from 2010. This was due in part to processing improvements 
and the resolution of a large backlog of cases (see Barrett et al., 2017) as well as 
 
                                                          
 
53  Adopted in April 2010 by EU Ministers responsible for integration, and approved at the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council in June 2010. 
54  Exact figure 139,355 includes an estimation of 20,000 certificates issued between 2005 and 2009 plus precise annual 
figures between 2010 and 2017. Source: Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service. 
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the nature of immigration flows, which increased rapidly from a relatively low 
base during the 2000s.  
 
According to the 2002 Census, 6 per cent of the usually resident population was 
non-Irish. This proportion doubled in just nine years to reach 12 per cent in 2011 
(see Chapter 1). Therefore towards the latter half of the decade 2000-2010, a 
large group of non-Irish nationals who wished to become citizens began to meet 
the minimum residence criterion – five years living in Ireland. The subsequent 
decline in naturalisation certificates issued in more recent years may reflect a 
decrease in the number of non-EEA migrant workers resident in Ireland during the 
2008-2012 recession (see Section 5.1.1.1).  
 
The number of certificates issued has fallen steadily since 2012 when a total of 
25,109 were awarded to new Irish citizens. In 2016, 10,036 certificates were 
issued, falling again to 8,196 in 2017. The number of naturalisation certificates 
issued in 2017 was less than one-third of the figure seen in 2012.  
 
FIGURE 5.1  NATURALISATION CERTIFICATE APPLICATIONS, REJECTIONS AND CERTIFICATES 
ISSUED, 2010-2017 
 
 
Source:  Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April and July 2018.  
 
 
Recent years have seen the number of applications stabilising: naturalisation 
applications numbered 12,651 in 2015, 13,018 in 2016 and 11,770 in 2017. 
Refusals were also stable in the period, numbering 482 in 2016 and 531 in 2017. 
As noted in the previous Monitoring Report on Integration, the ratio of 
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applications rejected to certificates issued has decreased significantly in recent 
years, from 20 per cent in 2010 to 5 per cent in 2016 and 6 per cent in 2017. 
Figure 5.1 also shows that a significant proportion of naturalisation certificates 
issued each year are to the spouses of Irish nationals. In 2017, 1,456 or 17.8 per 
cent of certificates issued were on the basis of marriage to an Irish national. In 
2016 the number was 2,005 or 20.0 per cent.55 
 
Processing times for naturalisation applications increased slightly from an average 
of three months in 2014 and 2015, to four months in 2016 and five months in 
2017.56 Processing time is defined to run from the date the Irish Naturalisation 
and Immigration Service (INIS) deems an application complete, up to the date the 
decision is made. 
5.1.1 Profile of naturalised Irish citizens57 
Table 5.1 shows that since 2012, the number of certificates issued to non-EEA 
nationals has fallen steadily from a peak of 23,659 to 4,474 in 2017. The number 
of EEA nationals naturalising has increased from 1,450 in 2012 to 3,722 in 2017. 
The overall decrease in the number of naturalisations since 2012 reflects both 
reductions in the issuance of non-EEA residence permits during the recession and 
the introduction of processing improvements in 2011 which cleared a large 
backlog of applications.58  
 
TABLE 5.1  PERSONS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP THROUGH NATURALISATION BY FORMER 
NATIONALITY GROUP (EEA AND NON-EEA): 2010-2017 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
EEA 477  453  1,450  1,788  2,949  3,144  3,327  3,722  
Non EEA 5,835  10,336  23,659  22,456  18,155  10,421  6,709  4,474  
Total 6,312  10,789  25,109  24,244  21,104  13,565  10,036  8,196  
% EEA 7.6% 4.2% 5.8% 7.4% 14.0% 23.2% 33.2% 45.4% 
 
Source:  Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April, 2018.  
Notes:  Where relevant individuals recorded as ‘stateless’ are shown in the non-EEA category as follows: 2011, three stateless persons; 
2013, one stateless person; 2014, two stateless persons; 2015, six stateless persons; 2016, zero stateless persons; 2017, zero 
stateless persons.   
 Non-EEA data include certificates issued to persons in respect of whom nationality information is ‘not readily available’ as 
follows: 2011, 78 persons; 2013, one person; 2014, 15 persons; 2015, 22 persons; 2016, one person; 2017, zero persons. 
 
 
                                                          
 
55  Data on the numbers of persons who naturalised on the grounds of marriage to Irish national: 1,456 (2017); 2,005 
(2016); 2,642 (2015); 3,157 (2014); 3,060 (2013); 1,679 (2012); 1,659 (2011); 422 (2010). Data received from Irish 
Naturalisation and Immigration Service, September 2016. 
56  Average time taken to process all applications processed to a decision during the reference year. Source: Data 
received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April 2018. 
57  Statistics on applications for citizenship disaggregated by age, gender and nationality are now published annually in 
line with Action 9 under the Migrant Integration Strategy (Department of Justice and Equality, 2018a). 
58  Approximately 22,000 applications were awaiting decision in March 2011 and this number had fallen to 
approximately 8,500 applications pending decision in December 2013 (Barrett et al., 2017). 
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5.1.1.1 Profile of naturalised Irish citizens: non-EEA 
Table 5.2 shows the top ten nationalities among non-EEA nationals who 
naturalised between 2013 and 2017. Declines were seen across all non-EEA 
national groups listed in the 2015 Top 10. Some national groups saw particularly 
steep drops: naturalisation certificates issued to nationals of the Philippines fell by 
69 per cent between 2015 and 2017 from 1,167 to 362; certificates issued to 
Nigerian nationals decreased by 63 per cent from 1,360 to 509. Indian nationals 
saw a 59 per cent drop in the period, from 1,611 to 666, while Pakistani nationals 
saw a 53 per cent drop, from 733 to 341.  
 
In order to interpret naturalisation trends it is helpful to look at data on the 
relevant population at least five years prior to the year in question, as this is the 
minimum period a non-EEA national may be in the State before applying to 
naturalise. Figure 1.5 in Chapter 1 shows that in the period 2008 to 2012 (during 
the Great Recession), the total number of non-EEA nationals granted residence 
permits declined substantially – from over 140,000 to 120,000. This reduction in 
the ‘stock’ of non-EEA residents is likely having a knock-on effect on the 
naturalisation rate in the years 2013 to 2017. During the recession, the number of 
residence permits issued for education reasons remained relatively constant, 
meaning that the relative drop among non-education related permits was even 
starker. This is consequential for the naturalisation statistics because time spent in 
Ireland on education residence permits is not reckonable for the purposes of 
acquiring citizenship. In fact, we see that almost all of the reduction is 
concentrated in work residence permits, which fell by almost 60 per cent from 
2008 to 2012. This reduction is indicative of the labour market conditions of the 
time.  
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TABLE 5.2  TOTAL NON-EEA NATIONALS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALISATION BY 
NATIONALITY 2013-2017 (TOP 10) 
Acquired Citizenship 
2013 
Acquired Citizenship 
2014 
Acquired Citizenship 
2015 
Acquired Citizenship 
2016 
Acquired Citizenship 
2017 
Former 
Nationality N 
Former 
Nationality N 
Former 
Nationality N 
Former 
Nationality N 
Former 
Nationality N 
Nigeria 5,783 Nigeria 3,286 India 1,611 India 1,028 India 666 
India 3,011 India 2,939 Nigeria 1,360 Nigeria 776 Nigeria 509 
Philippines 2,485 Philippines 2,184 Philippines 1,167 Philippines 730 Philippines 362 
Pakistan 1,805 Pakistan 1,244 Pakistan 733 Pakistan 419 Pakistan 341 
Ukraine 694 China 576 China 473 Brazil 304 Brazil 264 
China 656 South Africa 563 Brazil 393 China  304 China  225 
Moldova 552 Ukraine 536 South Africa 369 US 233 US 177 
South Africa 488 Brazil 459 Ukraine 323 South Africa 214 South Africa 140 
Iraq 417 DR Congo 421 US 246 Ukraine 200 Ukraine 130 
Bangladesh 403 Moldova 356 DR Congo 245 Thailand 173 Thailand 108 
Other 6,162  Other 5,591  Other 3,501 Other 2,328 Other 1,552 
Total 22,456 Total 18,155 Total 10,421 Total 6,709 Total 4,474 
 
Source:  Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April, 2018.  
 
5.1.1.2 Profile of naturalised Irish citizens: EEA nationals 
As noted above, Table 5.1 shows an increase in EEA nationals naturalising. While 
EEA nationals accounted for just 6 per cent of certificates issued in 2012, this 
increased to almost half of recipients (45 per cent) in 2017. Table 5.3 shows that 
several EEA groups listed in the top five in 2015 saw increases in the number of 
naturalisation certificates issued in 2017. Certificates issued to Polish and 
Romanian nationals in 2017 outnumber any of the non-EEA national groups. 
Polish nationals naturalising increased by 17 per cent in the period from 1,161 to 
1,358. Polish nationals represented the largest overall national group among 
recipients in 2017. Census data show that the Polish population in Ireland has 
grown particularly rapidly in recent years, from just over 2,000 in 2002, to 63,276 
in 2006, to 122,585 in 2011 and 122,515 in 2016 (CSO, 2012; 2017).59 Also of 
interest is the increase in UK nationals acquiring Irish citizenship. In 2015 just 54 
UK citizens naturalised in Ireland, increasing to 98 in 2016 and to 529 in 2017.60 
This increase is likely to be related to the vote by the UK to leave the EU in mid-
2016 (see Section 5.1.3). 
 
Certificates issued to Latvian and Lithuanian nationals also increased in the 
period, while the number of Romanian nationals who took Irish citizenship by 
naturalisation in 2017 (763) was 15 per cent lower than in 2015 (902).  
 
                                                          
 
59  Central Statistics Office (2012). Census 2011 Profile 6 Migration and Diversity. www.cso.ie. Central Statistics Office 
(2017). Census 2016 Profile 7 Migration and Diversity. www.cso.ie. 
60  Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, June 2018. 
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5.1.1.1 Profile of naturalised Irish citizens: non-EEA 
Table 5.2 shows the top ten nationalities among non-EEA nationals who 
naturalised between 2013 and 2017. Declines were seen across all non-EEA 
national groups listed in the 2015 Top 10. Some national groups saw particularly 
steep drops: naturalisation certificates issued to nationals of the Philippines fell by 
69 per cent between 2015 and 2017 from 1,167 to 362; certificates issued to 
Nigerian nationals decreased by 63 per cent from 1,360 to 509. Indian nationals 
saw a 59 per cent drop in the period, from 1,611 to 666, while Pakistani nationals 
saw a 53 per cent drop, from 733 to 341.  
 
In order to interpret naturalisation trends it is helpful to look at data on the 
relevant population at least five years prior to the year in question, as this is the 
minimum period a non-EEA national may be in the State before applying to 
naturalise. Figure 1.5 in Chapter 1 shows that in the period 2008 to 2012 (during 
the Great Recession), the total number of non-EEA nationals granted residence 
permits declined substantially – from over 140,000 to 120,000. This reduction in 
the ‘stock’ of non-EEA residents is likely having a knock-on effect on the 
naturalisation rate in the years 2013 to 2017. During the recession, the number of 
residence permits issued for education reasons remained relatively constant, 
meaning that the relative drop among non-education related permits was even 
starker. This is consequential for the naturalisation statistics because time spent in 
Ireland on education residence permits is not reckonable for the purposes of 
acquiring citizenship. In fact, we see that almost all of the reduction is 
concentrated in work residence permits, which fell by almost 60 per cent from 
2008 to 2012. This reduction is indicative of the labour market conditions of the 
time.  
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TABLE 5.3  TOTAL EEA NATIONALS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALISATION BY 
NATIONALITY 2013-2017 (TOP FIVE) 
Acquired Citizenship 
2013 
Acquired Citizenship 
2014 
Acquired Citizenship 
2015 
Acquired Citizenship 
2016 
Acquired Citizenship 
2017 
Former 
Nationality N 
Former 
Nationality N 
Former 
Nationality N 
Former 
Nationality N 
Former 
Nationality N 
Romania 564 Romania 1,029 Poland 1,161 Poland 1,326 Poland 1,358 
Poland 507 Poland 939 Romania 901 Romania 756 Romania 763 
Latvia 150 Latvia 225 Latvia 327 Latvia 379 UK 529 
Bulgaria 83 Hungary 137 Hungary 172 Hungary 216 Latvia 392 
Lithuania 80 Lithuania 103 Lithuania 126 Lithuania 168 Lithuania 166 
Other 404 Other 516 Other 457 Other 482 Other 514 
Total 1,788 Total 2,949 Total 3,144 Total 3,327 Total 3,722 
 
Source:  Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April, 2018.  
 
 
As noted in the 2016 Monitoring Report on Integration (Barrett et al., 2017), 
despite the upward trend of EEA nationals naturalising, the proportion of the 
resident EEA population choosing to naturalise annually remains very low. This is 
not unusual in an international context: Vink et al. (2013) showed that the level of 
economic development61 of migrants’ country of origin is important in 
understanding the likelihood to naturalise, with immigrants from highly 
developed countries much less likely to make this choice. Intra-EU migration may 
also be more flexible, and less permanent, than non-EU immigration (Favell, 
2008). There are clearly greater incentives for non-EEA nationals to naturalise in 
Ireland. Non-EEA nationals often lack security of residence and are more 
constrained in terms of movements in and out of the State when compared to 
EEA migrants. Resident EEA nationals have rights and entitlements that are very 
similar to those held by Irish citizens, the main exception being that only Irish 
citizens have the rights to stand and vote in all national elections and referenda.  
5.1.1.3 Profile of naturalised Irish Citizens: Age and gender 
Some 16.8 per cent of non-EEA nationals who naturalised in 2017 were children 
aged under 16 years. In the EEA group this figure was substantially lower (9.8 per 
cent in 2017) (see Table 5.4). Table 5.5 shows that the non-EEA group was almost 
evenly split between males and females in both 2016 (49.5 per cent) and 2017 
(49.1 per cent). A slightly higher proportion of the newly naturalised EEA 
population were female the same period (52.2 per cent in 2016 and 2017).  
 
 
                                                          
 
61  Using data from the Human Development Index, a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education, and 
standard of living. 
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TABLE 5.4  PERSONS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP THROUGH NATURALISATION BY AGE 
GROUP, 2015-2017 
Nationality 2015 2016 2017 
EEA aged under 16  342   402   363  
EEA aged 16+  2,802   2,925   3,359  
% of EEA nationals aged under 16 10.9% 12.0% 9.8% 
    
Non EEA aged under 16  1,824   1,305   753  
Non EEA aged 16+  8,597   5,404   3,721  
% of Non EEA nationals aged under 16 17.5% 19.5% 16.8% 
 
Source:  Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April, 2018.  
 
TABLE 5.5  PERSONS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP THROUGH NATURALISATION BY GENDER, 
2015-2017 
Nationality 2015 2016 2017 
EEA 
Male  1,587   1,589   1,778  
Female  1,557   1,738   1,944  
% of EEA nationals female 49.5% 52.2% 52.2% 
Non-EEA 
Male  5,376   3,387   2,277  
Female  5,042   3,322   2,197  
% of Non EEA nationals female 48.4% 49.5% 49.1% 
 
Source:  Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April, 2018.  
Note: 2015 non-EEA total reported in Table 5.5 includes three persons with non-specified gender. 
 
5.1.2  Citizenship indicators 
The naturalisation rate, measured as the ratio of resident immigrants to those 
who acquired citizenship, captures information on the opportunities to naturalise 
(policies) as well as on a range of other contextual factors such as such as 
immigrants’ motivation to naturalise, duration of residence, and settlement in the 
country (European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 2013). 
 
This section presents an annual naturalisation rate for non-EEA nationals, which is 
derived using administrative data (residence permits) in order to produce the 
most up-to-date and precise indicator possible.  
 
A similar rate is provided for EU nationals, and because administrative data are 
not available for this group we report an indicator compiled by Eurostat. Eurostat 
data are then also used to place Ireland’s citizenship indicators in an EU context.  
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despite the upward trend of EEA nationals naturalising, the proportion of the 
resident EEA population choosing to naturalise annually remains very low. This is 
not unusual in an international context: Vink et al. (2013) showed that the level of 
economic development61 of migrants’ country of origin is important in 
understanding the likelihood to naturalise, with immigrants from highly 
developed countries much less likely to make this choice. Intra-EU migration may 
also be more flexible, and less permanent, than non-EU immigration (Favell, 
2008). There are clearly greater incentives for non-EEA nationals to naturalise in 
Ireland. Non-EEA nationals often lack security of residence and are more 
constrained in terms of movements in and out of the State when compared to 
EEA migrants. Resident EEA nationals have rights and entitlements that are very 
similar to those held by Irish citizens, the main exception being that only Irish 
citizens have the rights to stand and vote in all national elections and referenda.  
5.1.1.3 Profile of naturalised Irish Citizens: Age and gender 
Some 16.8 per cent of non-EEA nationals who naturalised in 2017 were children 
aged under 16 years. In the EEA group this figure was substantially lower (9.8 per 
cent in 2017) (see Table 5.4). Table 5.5 shows that the non-EEA group was almost 
evenly split between males and females in both 2016 (49.5 per cent) and 2017 
(49.1 per cent). A slightly higher proportion of the newly naturalised EEA 
population were female the same period (52.2 per cent in 2016 and 2017).  
 
 
                                                          
 
61  Using data from the Human Development Index, a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education, and 
standard of living. 
70 | Monitor in g report  on integrat ion 2018  
Citizenship Indicator for non-EEA Nationals 
The annual naturalisation rate for non-EEA nationals i.e. the ratio of the number 
of non-EEA population holding ‘live’ immigration permissions, to the number who 
acquired citizenship through naturalisation in the reference year, is shown in 
Table 5.6. The similar indicator produced by Eurostat62 draws on survey-based 
estimates of the non-citizen resident population. Here we use administrative data 
obtained directly from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service. As only 
non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over are required to register with the Irish 
Naturalisation and Immigration Service/Garda National Immigration Bureau the 
indicator in Table 5.6 refers to the age group 16 and over.  
 
The annual citizenship acquisition rate for non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over 
was stable in 2012-2013 at around 16 per cent, before falling rapidly to 12.8 per 
cent in 2014, 7.5 per cent in 2015, 4.8 per cent in 2016 and 2.9 per cent in 2017. 
As noted in Section 5.1.1.1, part of the reason for the steep decline may be the 
processing of the backlog along with the fall in the number of non-EEA migrant 
workers. 
 
TABLE 5.6  CITIZENSHIP INDICATOR NON-EEA NATIONALS AGED 16 AND OVER 2009-2017 
Annual Naturalisation Rate 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Non-EEA nationals aged 16 
and over acquired 
citizenship in reference year 
NA 4,782 9,706 19,707 17,357 13,461 8,597 5,404 3,721 
Number of non-EEA 
nationals aged 16 and over 
holding immigration 
permissions 
134,549 133,232 128,104 120,281 107,435 105,569 113,914 110,927 128,066 
Share of total number of 
non-EEA nationals holding 
permissions in ref. year 
(aged 16 and over) who 
acquired citizenship in ref. 
year (%) 
NA 3.6 7.6 16.4 16.2 12.8 7.5 4.8 2.9 
 
Source:  Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April 2018. Eurostat (migr_resvalid), August 2018: all valid 
residence permits on 31 December on reference year. 
Note:  Non-EEA data include persons recorded as ‘as Stateless, Unknown or Recognised non-citizen’: 2011, three persons; 2012, six 
persons; 2013, one person; 2014, two persons; 2015, six persons. Certificates were also issued to persons whose nationality was 
not readily available and these are included in the non-EEA data: 2011, 78 persons; 2013, one person; 2014, 15 persons; 2015, 
22 persons. Table contains updates to previously published 2010-2012 data. 
 
A total of 102,73563 non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over naturalised between 
2005 and 2017 (see McGinnity et al., 2014, and Table 5.6). If we make the 
(significant) assumptions that there were no outflows/deaths among those 
 
                                                          
 
62  See table migr_acqs at http://ec.europa.eu. 
63  Includes an estimation of 20,000 certificates issued between 2005 and 2009. 
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naturalised, it is possible to estimate that approximately 45 per cent of the 
population aged 16 and over of non-EEA origin has acquired Irish citizenship 
through naturalisation since 2005;64 the population being defined as the currently 
registered non-EEA population aged 16 and over, plus those ‘ever’ naturalised. 
Given the fact that some non-EEA citizens who naturalised are likely to have left 
the State, or died in this period, this is likely to be the upper limit of the estimate. 
It does indicate that a substantial proportion of non-EEA migrants have acquired 
Irish citizenship.  
 
Citizenship Indicator for EU Nationals 
In Table 5.7 we report the Eurostat estimates of the percentage of non-Irish EU 
nationals who acquired citizenship in the reference year. It is estimated that less 
than one per cent of the resident non-Irish EU population in Ireland acquired 
citizenship each year between 2009 and 2016, although the rate has increased 
significantly in the period from 0.06 per cent to 0.76 per cent in 2015 and 0.80 per 
cent in 2016.  
 
TABLE 5.7  CITIZENSHIP INDICATOR FOR EU NATIONALS IN IRELAND 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
EU residents who acquired citizenship as a 
share of EU residents (%) 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.33 0.45 0.72 0.76 0.80 
 
Source:  Eurostat (migr_acqs), extracted August 2018. 2013 and 2015 data are provisional. 
 
Figure 5.2 shows Ireland in an EU context using Eurostat indicators on the share of 
EU citizens and non-EU citizens who acquired citizenship in different countries in 
2014. The rate of naturalisation of EU citizens is calculated by Eurostat as the total 
number of persons of EU origin granted citizenship through naturalisation in the 
reference year, divided by the total estimated resident population of EU nationals. 
A similar method is used to calculate the non-EU rate.  
 
Unlike in 2014, when Ireland recorded the highest rate of naturalisation of non-EU 
nationals (see Barrett et al., 2017), the naturalisation rate for both non-EU 
nationals and EU nationals in 2016 was much more in line with other EU Member 
States.  
 
 
                                                          
 
64  Using this method of calculation the estimated population of migrant origin in 2017 is 230,801. Note that given our 
assumptions this figure will always increase. The stock figure used includes certain groups of non-EEA nationals, such 
as students, Intra-Company Transfers and trainees, whose residence in Ireland does not count as ‘reckonable 
residence’ when applying for naturalisation. Such groups are included in the estimate because it is a matter of 
national policy whether or not their residence counts towards eligibility for naturalisation. To exclude them would 
conflate the ‘policy outcome’ with ‘policy output’ within the indicator. 
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A total of 102,73563 non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over naturalised between 
2005 and 2017 (see McGinnity et al., 2014, and Table 5.6). If we make the 
(significant) assumptions that there were no outflows/deaths among those 
 
                                                          
 
62  See table migr_acqs at http://ec.europa.eu. 
63  Includes an estimation of 20,000 certificates issued between 2005 and 2009. 
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Regarding the naturalisation of EU nationals, Ireland’s 2016 rate of 0.80 per cent 
was in the middle of the states ranked.  
 
FIGURE 5.2  RESIDENTS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP AS A SHARE OF RESIDENT NON-CITIZENS 
BY FORMER CITIZENSHIP (%), 2016, IN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES PLUS 
NORWAY 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat, Residents who acquired citizenship as a share of resident non-citizens by former citizenship and sex [migr_acqs]. 
 
5.1.3  Policy issues related to naturalisation 
The Migrant Integration Strategy contains four actions related to naturalisation. 
The Strategy makes specific reference to naturalisation processing fees, 
undertaking to ensure that costs are reasonable and do not deter applicants who 
are qualified. The high cost attached to applying for citizenship in Ireland is 
discussed in Barrett et al. (2017). The Strategy also foresees researching the 
potential introduction of civics/language tests for those seeking citizenship, and 
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statistics on applications are now published (Department of Justice and Equality, 
2017).  
 
In addition the Strategy undertakes to finalise arrangements to enable 
registration of non-EEA migrants aged under 16 years ‘as a matter of urgency’. 
Previous Monitoring Reports have highlighted the problems faced by non-EEA 
children in proving sufficient reckonable residence for the purpose of making a 
naturalisation application. Research by the Immigrant Council of Ireland (2016) 
found inconsistencies in the treatment of non-EEA children in immigration 
matters and emphasised the need for an independent status, especially for the 
children in care. The action under the Strategy, which falls to INIS to implement, 
has not yet been achieved. In response to an INIS stakeholder consultation in 
Spring 2018, the Immigrant Council of Ireland stressed that a child-sensitive 
approach should be taken to introducing the registration of children (Immigrant 
Council of Ireland, 2018).  
 
On 23 June 2016 the UK voted in a referendum to leave the EU, a development 
commonly referred to as ‘Brexit’. The Irish Times reported in October 2016 that 
there had been a surge in citizenship applications, foreign birth registrations and 
passport applications since the June result (Sheridan, 2017). In December 2017 
the Department of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the highest number of Irish 
passports ever issued in one year had been issued in 2017. Some 779,000 
passports were issued, up over 15 per cent since 2015. Almost 20 per cent of the 
total applications received by the Passport Service in 2017 were from Irish citizens 
in Northern Ireland or Great Britain (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
2017). As noted above some 529 UK nationals also naturalised in 2017.  
 
The absence of an appeals procedure in Ireland for rejected applicants for 
naturalisation was highlighted in MIPEX 2015 as uncommon in an international 
context. Insecurity of status among applicants is also highlighted as a 
consequence of the Minister for Justice and Equality’s ‘absolute’ discretion to 
interpret naturalisation eligibility requirements (Huddleston et al., 2015). In 
January 2018 The Irish Times reported that absences from the State during the 
year prior to application had been increasingly identified as the reason for refusal 
of citizenship applications (The Irish Times, 27 January 2018). INIS stated that 
current policy is to allow up to six weeks absence from the State for normal 
holidays and other short-term absences (such as for business meetings, family 
weddings etc.) and that such absences do not impact on the statutory residence 
requirement.65 
 
                                                          
 
65  Some further flexibility may also be allowed in exceptional circumstances. Comments received from the Irish 
Naturalisation and Immigration Service, June 2016. 
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Nine citizenship ceremonies took place in 2016 (Sheridan, 2017) and 16 in 2017 
(Department of Justice and Equality, 2018a). 
5.2  LONG-TERM RESIDENCE 
Long-term residence is a permanent residence status for migrants who have been 
resident in the host country for a period of time (often five years), which offers 
the same basic socio-economic rights as citizens of the host country. As such, it is 
a central element of integration policy offering the migrant almost full inclusion in 
the host society. Such a status is provided for in the majority of EU Member 
States, under Directives 2003/109/EC and 2011/51/EU.66 Ireland has not opted in 
to either Directive and resident non-EEA nationals have much more limited access 
to permanent residence than elsewhere in the EU.67 In Ireland an administrative 
long-term residence is open to employment permit holders (and their dependent 
spouses) and scientific researchers only. MIPEX (2015) ranks Ireland 35th out of 38 
countries on access to permanent residence. Furthermore, the existing 
administrative scheme is identified as ‘the most unclear and discretionary 
procedure of all 38 countries’ (Huddleston et al., 2015). 
 
The provision of a statutory long-term residence status with ‘transparent rules, 
clearly articulated expectations and predictable benefits for law-abiding 
immigrants’ (Council of the European Union, 2004) has been foreseen by Irish 
policymakers since 2008.68 The Migrant Integration Strategy contains an action to 
introduce a statutory scheme for Long-Term Residence, but this has not been 
progressed to date.  
 
The number of non-EEA nationals holding long-term residence continued to 
decline between 2015 and 2017, falling by 26 per cent to reach 1,484, and 
accounting for just 1.2 per cent of non-EEA nationals with live residence 
permissions. The steep decline between 2010 and 2014 coincided with a huge 
number of naturalisation certificates being issued (see Table 5.1). New 
applications increased between 2015 and 2017 (from 69 to 107), but remain very 
low. Statistics on applications for long-term residence are now published annually 
in line with Action 13 under the Migrant Integration Strategy (Department of 
Justice and Equality, 2018a). 
 
                                                          
 
66  Directive 2011/51/EU of 11 May 2011 amends Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents to extend its scope to beneficiaries of international protection. Only Ireland, 
UK and Denmark do not participate in the Directives. 
67  Under the terms of the protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European Union and 
to the Treaty establishing the European Community by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Ireland does not take part in the 
adoption by the Council of proposed measures pursuant to Title IV of the EC Treaty unless Ireland opts in to the 
measure. 
68  Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill, 2008. 
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TABLE 5.8  APPLICATIONS FOR LONG-TERM RESIDENCE (LTR), 2010-2017 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
New applications for LTR  2,415 1,812 705 288 164 69 100 107 
Non-EEA nationals 
holding LTR 8,367 7,721 5,771 3,392 2,309 2,019 1,473 1,484 
Number of non-EEA 
nationals aged 16 and 
over holding live 
immigration permissions  
133,232 128,104 120,281 107,435 105,569 113,914 110,927 128,066 
Share of the total 
number of non-EEA 
nationals holding ‘live’ 
permission in reference 
year (aged 16 and over) 
who held long-term 
residence in reference 
year 
6.3% 6.0% 4.8% 3.2% 2.2% 1.8% 1.3% 1.2% 
 
Source:  Data received from the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, April 2018. Data for total non-EEA nationals with live 
residence permission taken from Eurostat (migr_resvalid), extracted August 2018: all valid residence permits on 31 December 
of reference year. 
5.3 CIVIC AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Ireland’s political system offers relatively positive opportunities for migrant 
integration compared to most EU countries69 (Huddleston et al., 2015). Irish or UK 
citizenship is required in order to stand or vote in general elections, but all 
residents in Ireland, regardless of nationality, may stand and vote in local 
elections. The UNHCR RICE report notes that Ireland is unusual in having easy 
access to politicians, representatives and institutions in general (UNHCR, 2014).  
5.3.1 Political participation indicators 
There have been no elections since the publication of the last Monitoring Report 
on Integration in early 2017, and only minor changes to the indicators. June 2017 
saw the appointment of Leo Varadkar, who has a migrant background, as 
Taoiseach. 
Non-Irish candidates 
Local and European elections took place in Ireland on 23 May 2014 and an Irish 
general election took place on 26 February 2016. A total of 31 New Irish/non-
Irish/UK nationals contested the 2014 local elections (Kavanagh, 2014).70 Polish 
and Nigerian were the most common nationalities among candidates.71  
 
                                                          
 
69  www.mipex.eu/political-participation. 
70  Provisional data contained in the article were confirmed by the author in November 2016. 
71  This group included eight female and 23 male candidates. As in 2009, most of the candidates ran as independent 
candidates (21), with two candidates running for Fine Gael, two candidates running for Labour, one candidate 
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Nine citizenship ceremonies took place in 2016 (Sheridan, 2017) and 16 in 2017 
(Department of Justice and Equality, 2018a). 
5.2  LONG-TERM RESIDENCE 
Long-term residence is a permanent residence status for migrants who have been 
resident in the host country for a period of time (often five years), which offers 
the same basic socio-economic rights as citizens of the host country. As such, it is 
a central element of integration policy offering the migrant almost full inclusion in 
the host society. Such a status is provided for in the majority of EU Member 
States, under Directives 2003/109/EC and 2011/51/EU.66 Ireland has not opted in 
to either Directive and resident non-EEA nationals have much more limited access 
to permanent residence than elsewhere in the EU.67 In Ireland an administrative 
long-term residence is open to employment permit holders (and their dependent 
spouses) and scientific researchers only. MIPEX (2015) ranks Ireland 35th out of 38 
countries on access to permanent residence. Furthermore, the existing 
administrative scheme is identified as ‘the most unclear and discretionary 
procedure of all 38 countries’ (Huddleston et al., 2015). 
 
The provision of a statutory long-term residence status with ‘transparent rules, 
clearly articulated expectations and predictable benefits for law-abiding 
immigrants’ (Council of the European Union, 2004) has been foreseen by Irish 
policymakers since 2008.68 The Migrant Integration Strategy contains an action to 
introduce a statutory scheme for Long-Term Residence, but this has not been 
progressed to date.  
 
The number of non-EEA nationals holding long-term residence continued to 
decline between 2015 and 2017, falling by 26 per cent to reach 1,484, and 
accounting for just 1.2 per cent of non-EEA nationals with live residence 
permissions. The steep decline between 2010 and 2014 coincided with a huge 
number of naturalisation certificates being issued (see Table 5.1). New 
applications increased between 2015 and 2017 (from 69 to 107), but remain very 
low. Statistics on applications for long-term residence are now published annually 
in line with Action 13 under the Migrant Integration Strategy (Department of 
Justice and Equality, 2018a). 
 
                                                          
 
66  Directive 2011/51/EU of 11 May 2011 amends Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents to extend its scope to beneficiaries of international protection. Only Ireland, 
UK and Denmark do not participate in the Directives. 
67  Under the terms of the protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European Union and 
to the Treaty establishing the European Community by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Ireland does not take part in the 
adoption by the Council of proposed measures pursuant to Title IV of the EC Treaty unless Ireland opts in to the 
measure. 
68  Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill, 2008. 
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Non-Irish elected representatives 
The recommended indicator of integration in this domain is the share of 
immigrants among elected representatives. The 2014 Local Elections resulted in 
the election of 949 City and County Councillors. Out of this number just two non-
Irish nationals were elected. In addition, following the 2016 General Election a 
Swedish national was co-opted onto South Dublin County Council.72 Three 
migrants among 949 elected representatives gives an indicator of 0.32 per cent. 
 
The 2016 general election, in which only Irish and UK citizens had a vote, took 
place in February 2016. Out of 166 members of the Dáil73 just one member is a 
naturalised Irish national74 giving an indicator of 0.6 per cent.  
Non-Irish voter participation 
Table 5.9 updates Table 5.8 in the previous Monitoring Report on Integration with 
2016 Census data. The percentage of non-Irish nationals who are listed on the 
electoral register (2016/2017) is supplied. Naturalised Irish nationals are included 
within the category of Irish nationals and cannot be separately identified. The 
percentage of non-Irish nationals who were resident in local authorities at the 
time of Census 2016 is also provided and the local authorities are sorted by the 
ratio of the second column to the first.  
 
Table 5.9 shows that county Kildare, Dublin City and county Galway have the 
greatest relative mismatch between the percentage of non-Irish nationals who are 
listed on the electoral register and the percentage resident non-Irish. Data on the 
number of Irish, EU and non-EU national registered on the electoral register were 
supplied in the previous Monitoring Report on Integration (Barrett et al., 2017). 
 
                                                          
 
running for Sinn Féin, three candidates running for the Green Party and two candidates running for the People Before 
Profit Alliance. 
72  Comments received from the Immigrant Council of Ireland, June 2018. 
73  www.oireachtas.ie. 
74 Comments received from Immigrant Council of Ireland, September 2016.  
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TABLE 5.9 PERCENTAGE OF NON-IRISH REGISTERED TO VOTE (2016/2017) COMPARED TO 
PERCENTAGE OF NON-IRISH IN USUALLY RESIDENT POPULATION AGED 18 YEARS 
AND OVER IN LOCAL AUTHORITIES (CENSUS 2016) 
  
% Non-Irish on voting 
register (A) 
% 
% Non-Irish resident 
population aged 18+ 
based on Census 2016 (B) 
% 
Difference  
(Ratio of B to A) 
Kildare 3.3  12.2  3.71 
Dublin City 5.7  19.2  3.37 
Galway 2.9  9.6  3.32 
Cork City 4.8  15.5  3.22 
Cavan 4.1  12.9  3.15 
Carlow 3.9  11.7  2.99 
Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown 4.4  12.6  2.86 
Meath 4.1  11.7  2.85 
Donegal 3.0  8.4  2.81 
Kilkenny 3.4  9.5  2.79 
Waterford City & County  4.0  11.0  2.75 
Limerick City & County 4.0  10.6  2.65 
Westmeath 4.9  12.6  2.56 
State 5.1  13.0  2.55 
Wexford 4.0  10.1  2.52 
Wicklow 4.3  10.8  2.51 
South Dublin 5.4  12.9  2.38 
Sligo 4.5  10.3  2.28 
Galway City 9.0  19.7  2.18 
Mayo 5.1  11.1  2.18 
Offaly 4.4  9.5  2.16 
Fingal 8.7  18.8  2.16 
Clare 5.3  11.0  2.08 
Louth 5.5  11.4  2.06 
Laois 5.5  11.3  2.06 
Longford 8.0  16.4  2.05 
Cork 5.8  11.7  2.02 
Tipperary 5.0  10.0  2.00 
Roscommon 5.8  11.5  1.98 
Kerry 6.2  12.1  1.95 
Monaghan 6.3  12.2  1.94 
Leitrim 7.3  12.6  1.73 
 
Sources:  Electoral register data from Department of Housing, Planning, Community and Local Government. Population data: CSO, Special 
tabulation, Census 2016. 
 
Issues related to political participation 
As noted in previous Monitoring Reports, ethnic minorities are less likely to 
register to vote than the majority population (Heath et al., 2013) and less likely to 
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running for Sinn Féin, three candidates running for the Green Party and two candidates running for the People Before 
Profit Alliance. 
72  Comments received from the Immigrant Council of Ireland, June 2018. 
73  www.oireachtas.ie. 
74 Comments received from Immigrant Council of Ireland, September 2016.  
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stand as candidates (Fanning and O’Boyle 2010; O’Boyle et al., 2016). Irish NGOs 
have been actively seeking to increase the proportion of non-Irish nationals 
registered to vote and become more informed about Irish politics, often via 
government-funded programmes.75  
 
The Migration Integration Strategy contains a number of actions to promote 
better political participation of migrants: migrants will be encouraged to 
participate in local and national politics; they will be supported to register to vote, 
and multi-lingual materials will be made accessible and available (Department of 
Justice and Equality, 2017).  
 
International research indicates that the acquisition of citizenship can improve 
political integration, with immigrants becoming more knowledgeable on political 
matters and more likely to vote (Hainmueller et al., 2015). The Immigrant Council 
of Ireland has expressed particular concern about the large number of EEA 
nationals resident in Ireland who do not apply for citizenship and therefore 
cannot vote in general elections.76  
 
The UNHCR (2014) highlighted the importance of volunteering to refugees as a 
platform for creating and sustaining social and ethnic-community bridges, as a 
tool to improve English language skills, and as a space for learning skills which 
could then be transferable to other spheres of life. McGinnity et al. (2018) showed 
that social contact generally promotes less negative attitudes to immigration and 
immigrants, and suggest that enhancing opportunities for meaningful and positive 
interactions will reduce anti-migrant sentiment. The Migration Integration 
Strategy also includes actions intended to promote better representation of 
migrants in volunteering77 (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017). It is a 
continued problem that national level data on volunteering and other civic 
activities are not available in Ireland disaggregated by nationality.  
5.4 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP 
Almost 140,000 non-Irish nationals acquired Irish citizenship through 
naturalisation between 2005 and 2017. Naturalised Irish nationals now represent 
a very significant cohort of the population. With the publication of a new Migrant 
Integration Strategy in 2017, a new focus is being placed on the integration of 
 
                                                          
 
75  For example: ‘Participate’, which seeks to promote the political and civic participation of migrants in Ireland is part of 
a joint EU project, which includes several partners including the Immigrant Council of Ireland, Migration Policy Group 
and NASC. AkiDwA runs a programme which aims to engage migrant women and promote their active civic 
engagement in their communities and at society level. A political internship programme is also run by the Immigrant 
Council of Ireland which enables migrants to shadow participating local councillors for one day a week over a four-
month period.  
76  Comments received from the Immigrant Council of Ireland, June 2018. 
77  See Action 72 and 73. 
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‘new Irish’ citizens and other migrants (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017). 
If we assume no outflows/deaths among those naturalised it is possible to 
estimate that approximately 45 per cent of the population aged 16 and over of 
non-EEA origin acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation between 2005 and 
2017. This raises important issues for future monitoring as almost half of migrants 
have ‘disappeared’ from key datasets that use nationality as identifier (see 
Chapter 7). 
 
Access to long-term residence continues to be a challenge in Ireland as does the 
lack of transparency regarding the rules and entitlements attached. These 
problems are reflected in the very low proportion of resident migrants holding the 
status. The Integration Strategy contains a commitment to a statutory scheme, 
but this has not yet been achieved.  
 
The annual citizenship acquisition rate for non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over has 
fallen rapidly from 16 per cent in 2012 to 2.9 per cent in 2017. The number of 
naturalisation certificates issued in 2017 (11,770) was less than one-third of the 
figure seen in 2012.  
 
Declines were seen across all non-EEA national groups listed in the 2015 Top ten. 
Some national groups saw particularly steep drops including the top three 
nationalities: India, Nigeria and Philippines. The overall decrease in the number of 
naturalisations since 2012 reflects reductions in the stock of non-EEA workers 
during the recession and processing improvements introduced in 2011 which 
allowed a large backlog to be cleared.  
 
Despite an upward trend in EEA nationals choosing to naturalise, the proportion 
of the resident EEA population naturalising annually remains very low – just 5 per 
cent of certificates issued in 2012 were to EEA nationals, increasing to 45 per cent 
in 2017. Holding Irish citizenship allows migrants full participation in society, 
including the right to vote and stand in national elections and referenda. The fact 
that less than one per cent of the resident non-Irish EU population in Ireland 
acquired citizenship each year between 2009 and 2016 means that the large 
majority of this group may not avail of such opportunities.  
 
Research indicates that naturalised immigrants have been shown to have better 
socio-economic outcomes than immigrants who do not take on the host country 
citizenship (Liebig and Von Haaren, 2011). Bauböck et al., (2013) argue that the 
naturalisation of immigrants not only secures equal rights for the individual 
concerned, but when citizens of immigrant origin can exercise equal power in 
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activities are not available in Ireland disaggregated by nationality.  
5.4 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP 
Almost 140,000 non-Irish nationals acquired Irish citizenship through 
naturalisation between 2005 and 2017. Naturalised Irish nationals now represent 
a very significant cohort of the population. With the publication of a new Migrant 
Integration Strategy in 2017, a new focus is being placed on the integration of 
 
                                                          
 
75  For example: ‘Participate’, which seeks to promote the political and civic participation of migrants in Ireland is part of 
a joint EU project, which includes several partners including the Immigrant Council of Ireland, Migration Policy Group 
and NASC. AkiDwA runs a programme which aims to engage migrant women and promote their active civic 
engagement in their communities and at society level. A political internship programme is also run by the Immigrant 
Council of Ireland which enables migrants to shadow participating local councillors for one day a week over a four-
month period.  
76  Comments received from the Immigrant Council of Ireland, June 2018. 
77  See Action 72 and 73. 
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elections and politics at national level where the rights of foreigners are 
regulated, this benefits the wider migrant group.  
 
Citizenship does not equate to full inclusion. Naturalisation policy often 
complements and is at the heart of wider integration policy (Huddleston and Vink, 
2015). The publication and active implementation of the Migrant Integration 
Strategy is an important step towards the meaningful extension of equal rights 
and opportunities to migrants in Ireland.  
 
There have been no national elections since the publication of the last Monitoring 
Report on Integration in early 2017. However a Swedish national was co-opted 
onto South Dublin County Council in 2016.78 Three migrants among local elected 
representatives gives an indicator of just 0.32 per cent. One member of the 166 
seat Dáil (0.6 per cent) is a naturalised citizen. June 2017 saw the appointment of 
Leo Varadkar, who has an immigrant background, as Taoiseach. The proportion of 
non-Irish on the electoral register is also considerably lower than the proportion 
of non-Irish in the population.  
 
McGinnity et al. (2018) showed that social contact generally promotes less 
negative attitudes to immigration and immigrants, and suggest that enhancing 
opportunities for meaningful and positive interactions may help to reduce anti-
migrant sentiment. Volunteering represents one avenue to such interaction but 
unfortunately national level data on volunteering disaggregated by nationality 
remain unavailable. Studies have indicated however that the migration ‘crisis’ 
(approximately 2014-2016) led to increased engagement and volunteering within 
the host community (Arnold et al., 2018; European Migration Network, 
forthcoming).79 The Migration Integration Strategy contains a number of actions 
to promote better representation of migrants in volunteering.  
  
 
                                                          
 
78  Comments received from the Immigrant Council of Ireland, June 2018. 
79  Indicators on a broader range of forms of civic participation of migrants are recommended in the evaluation report 
on the Zaragoza indicators, including on: participation in voluntary organisations; membership of trade unions; 
membership of political parties; political activity (European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 2013). 
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BOX 5.1  ACCESS TO CITIZENSHIP 
 
Defining Nationality and Citizenship 
Citizenship describes the particular legal bond between an individual and his or her state, 
acquired by birth or naturalisation, whether by declaration, choice, marriage or other means 
according to national legislation (European Migration Network, 2014). In the Irish Constitution, 
the individual member of the State is referred to as a ‘citizen’ but the status is referred to as 
‘nationality and citizenship’.80 The Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956 provides for the issue 
of ‘certificates of nationality’. The use of the word ‘nationality’ is interpreted by the EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory81 to reflect the fact that such certificates may be used as evidence of 
status in states other than Ireland. The term ‘nationality’ is often used to denote Irish ethnicity 
(‘Irishness’) and the concept of ‘Nation’ continues to be important in constitutional terms, to 
describe the collectivity of the Irish people. All citizens are entitled to be part of the Irish Nation.  
Citizenship through naturalisation 
An application for a certificate of nationality is considered under the Irish Nationality and 
Citizenship Act, 1956, as amended. Foreign nationals living in Ireland may apply to the Minister for 
Justice and Equality to become an Irish citizen by naturalisation if they are over 18 years, or a 
minor who was born in the State after 1 January 2005. The applicant must ‘be of good character’ 
and have had a period of one year continuous reckonable residence in the State immediately 
before the date of application and, during the previous eight years, have had a total reckonable 
residence in the State amounting to four years. The applicant must intend in good faith to 
continue to reside in the State after naturalisation and make a declaration of fidelity to the nation 
and loyalty to the State. Applicants are usually required to have been ‘self-supporting’ i.e. not 
dependent on social welfare for the three years prior to application. Periods spent in Ireland as an 
asylum applicant or as a student are not considered when calculating reckonable residence. The 
spouses/civil partners of Irish citizens may apply for citizenship by naturalisation if they are 
married to or in a recognised civil partnership with the Irish citizen for at least three years. 
Applicants must have resided in Ireland for at least three out of the previous five years, including 
one year of continuous residence immediately before the date of application. 
There is now an obligation on the State to provide reasons for a refusal of an application for 
naturalisation (although this issue continues to be a source of some debate). Aside from judicial 
review of proceedings there is no mechanism for challenging the refusal of an application. 
Currently Irish citizenship acquired through naturalisation may be withdrawn no matter how long 
a person has been an Irish citizen (though not if it would make them stateless). 
 
 
                                                          
 
80  The EUDO Citizenship Observatory notes that the two terms describe different elements of the relationship between 
the individual and the Irish State. Nationality relates to the external (international) dimension, whereas citizenship 
relates to the internal (domestic) dimension. EUDO Citizenship Observatory, ‘Translations and a brief discussion of 
the use of the terms ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality in legal documents and political debates’. Available at: http://eudo-
citizenship.eu.  
81  http://eudo-citizenship.eu. 
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McGinnity et al. (2018) showed that social contact generally promotes less 
negative attitudes to immigration and immigrants, and suggest that enhancing 
opportunities for meaningful and positive interactions may help to reduce anti-
migrant sentiment. Volunteering represents one avenue to such interaction but 
unfortunately national level data on volunteering disaggregated by nationality 
remain unavailable. Studies have indicated however that the migration ‘crisis’ 
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78  Comments received from the Immigrant Council of Ireland, June 2018. 
79  Indicators on a broader range of forms of civic participation of migrants are recommended in the evaluation report 
on the Zaragoza indicators, including on: participation in voluntary organisations; membership of trade unions; 
membership of political parties; political activity (European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 2013). 
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Citizenship through birth or descent 
The Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004 provides that only children born to Irish citizen 
parent(s) automatically become Irish citizens. A child born on the island of Ireland on or after 1 
January 2005 is entitled to Irish citizenship if they have a British parent, or a parent who is entitled 
to live in Northern Ireland or the Irish State without restriction on their residency. Other foreign 
national parents of children born on the island of Ireland on or after 1 January 2005 must prove 
that they have a genuine link to Ireland (evidenced by being resident legally for at least three out 
of the previous four years) in order for their child to claim Irish citizenship. Irish citizens may hold 
the citizenship of another country without giving up their Irish citizenship.  
Application Fees 
The standard application fee payable by all applicants is €175. A further €950 is payable by 
successful adult applicants for naturalisation. The naturalisation fee is €200 in the case of minors 
and widows or widowers of Irish citizens. Persons granted refugee status and those recognised as 
stateless persons are exempt from payment of the naturalisation fee. There is no possibility to 
have the naturalisation fee waived on economic or hardship grounds (Becker and Cosgrave, 2013). 
The Migrant Integration Strategy undertakes to ensure that costs are reasonable and do not deter 
applicants who are qualified (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017). 
 
BOX 5.2  ACCESS TO LONG-TERM RESIDENCE  
Ireland does not have a statutory long-term residence status. The Migrant Integration Strategy 
also contains an action to introduce a statutory scheme for Long-Term Residence, but this has not 
happened to date (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017). The current administrative scheme 
allows persons who have been legally resident in the State for a continuous period of five years or 
more on the basis of an employment permit (and their dependent spouses) or scientific 
researchers, to apply for a five-year residency extension. They may also then apply to work 
without the need to hold an employment permit. A €500 fee for processing applications under 
this scheme was introduced in 2009. This long-term residence scheme is available to those who 
are still in employment and to those with an employment permit who, having completed five 
years’ work, have been made redundant. 
A small number of non-EEA nationals who have lived in Ireland for at least eight years and who 
are of ‘good character’ are permitted to remain in Ireland ‘without condition as to time’. They 
receive a Stamp 5 registration on their passport and can work without an employment permit 
(Becker, 2010). In 2017, 246 Stamp 5 registrations were issued out of a total 107,954.82 
 
                                                          
 
82  Data received from Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, August 2018. 
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CHAPTER 6  
 
Special Topic: Muslims in Ireland 
By Éamonn Fahey and Frances McGinnity 
 
As a group, Muslims are defined by religion rather than by nationality, and 
therefore are not technically an immigrant group. Yet the Muslim experience in 
Ireland is inextricably linked to the challenges of immigration and integration for 
two reasons. First, recent European scholarship has identified both Islamophobia 
and the integration of Muslims into European societies as a growing issue for 
public policy (Helbling, 2012; Carr, 2016). However, most of this research has 
been focused on countries like Britain, France and Germany, all of which have 
relatively large and long-standing Muslim communities (e.g. Adida et al., 2016; 
Bertelsmann Foundation, 2017). Second, the vast majority of the Muslim 
population in Ireland is newly arrived, meaning that even more so than in 
European countries with long histories of Islam, they resemble an immigrant 
group from an integration perspective. Before the recent economic boom (the 
Celtic Tiger), the Muslim population in Ireland was largely comprised of doctors or 
medical students, some of whom stayed in Ireland to practice medicine 
(Scharbrodt and Sakaranaho, 2011). Since the early 1990s the Muslim population 
has grown rapidly from its small base. There are currently over 62,000 Muslims 
living in Ireland compared to just under 4,000 in 1991. 
 
Scharbrodt et al. (2015) documents increased flows of Muslim migrants to Ireland 
for a variety of reasons – to study, to work or to seek international protection. 
This reflects more general migration patterns in Ireland. Both Scharbrodt et al. 
(2015) and Fanning (2018) make the point that a socio-economic gap has emerged 
between two distinct Muslim populations in Ireland – more privileged students 
and highly educated professionals on the one hand, and disadvantaged asylum 
seekers and refugees on the other. What can we learn about the Muslim 
population from the 2016 Census? 
 
This special theme uses 2016 Census data to give a broad overview of the 
circumstances of Muslims in Ireland. The analysis is split into four sections. First, 
we look at basic demographics, focusing on age, sex and geographic distribution 
within Ireland. Second, we study Muslims as a group that has been shaped by 
recent immigration, by analysing their place of birth, ethnic background and 
nationality. Third, we build on the contributions of Chapters 2 and 3 of this 
Integration Monitor by briefly reporting their labour market and educational 
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happened to date (Department of Justice and Equality, 2017). The current administrative scheme 
allows persons who have been legally resident in the State for a continuous period of five years or 
more on the basis of an employment permit (and their dependent spouses) or scientific 
researchers, to apply for a five-year residency extension. They may also then apply to work 
without the need to hold an employment permit. A €500 fee for processing applications under 
this scheme was introduced in 2009. This long-term residence scheme is available to those who 
are still in employment and to those with an employment permit who, having completed five 
years’ work, have been made redundant. 
A small number of non-EEA nationals who have lived in Ireland for at least eight years and who 
are of ‘good character’ are permitted to remain in Ireland ‘without condition as to time’. They 
receive a Stamp 5 registration on their passport and can work without an employment permit 
(Becker, 2010). In 2017, 246 Stamp 5 registrations were issued out of a total 107,954.82 
 
                                                          
 
82  Data received from Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, August 2018. 
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status. Finally, we look at other aspects of wellbeing by turning our attention to 
housing and health. 
 
This chapter exploits the rich data from recent Irish Censuses published online. 
Without access to the Census microdata, it is not possible to conduct a statistical 
analysis of these outcomes to investigate the mechanisms underlying the 
patterns, but we do suggest avenues for further research. We use the term 
Muslim as people report their religion in the Census as a social grouping. 
However, we appreciate that what being a Muslim means is not accurately 
conveyed in this classification, as it underestimates the diversity of the group 
(Scharbrodt et al., 2015). As Fanning (2018) notes, Muslims living in Ireland come 
from a range of countries, speak different languages, identify with different 
denominations of Islam and differ in the extent and nature of their religious 
practice: readers should bear this in mind.  
6.1  THE MUSLIM POPULATION IN IRELAND: AGE, GENDER AND 
LOCATION 
The Census data reveal that there are substantial differences in the socio-
demographic characteristics of Muslims and non-Muslims resident in Ireland. 
Demographically, Muslims are a disproportionately young, male, urban, non-
White community, most of whom were born abroad, particularly in South Asian 
countries. Due to naturalisations and an increasing share of Muslims being born in 
Ireland, however, just over half of Muslims living in Ireland now have Irish 
citizenship.  
 
The Census data detail exactly how many Muslims live in Ireland, going back as far 
as 2002. The data show a strong and steady growth in the Muslim population 
from 2002 to 2016. The Muslim population increased at a rate well beyond the 
total population, rising from just under 20,000 in 2002 to over 62,000 in 2016. 
However, in a cross-national European perspective, the Muslim share of the 
population remains quite small, at 1.3 per cent of the total in 2016. Typical values 
in large European countries such as Germany and France range between 5 and 10 
per cent (Hackett, 2017). The Muslim community is also small relative to the 
overall foreign-born population in Ireland, which at almost 17 per cent of the total 
is among the highest in the OECD.  
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FIGURE 6.1  MUSLIM POPULATION IN IRELAND 
 
 
Source:  CSO Statbank Tables E8009, Census 2016 and C1316, Census 2006. 
 
Age and Sex 
One of the most striking features of the Muslim population in Ireland is its 
demographic profile. Figure 6.2 presents two overlapped population pyramids, 
one for the entire Irish population (in light blue) and one for the Muslim 
population (in grey). Areas where the grey lines extend out from the centre 
beyond the blue lines indicate demographic segments that are over-represented 
in the Muslim population compared to the total population. Areas where the grey 
lines are shorter than the blue lines are segments where Muslims are under-
represented. It clearly shows that the Muslim population is particularly young and 
male. Children (both male and female) and young adults (especially young men) 
are much more common in the Muslim population. For instance, men aged 30-34 
make up 6.6 per cent of the Muslim population, but only 3.3 per cent of the total 
population. Conversely, there are very few elderly Muslims living in Ireland. In 
fact, the average age of a Muslim resident in Ireland in 2016 is only 26 years old – 
more than ten years younger than the average Irish person. Even when compared 
to immigrant groups, this is remarkably young. For instance, the labour force 
survey shows that the mean non-Irish age is just under 34 and the mean age for 
non-EU nationals is 31. In the population as a whole, there are 0.97 men for every 
woman. Among the Muslim population, however, there are almost 1.3 men for 
every woman.  
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(Scharbrodt et al., 2015). As Fanning (2018) notes, Muslims living in Ireland come 
from a range of countries, speak different languages, identify with different 
denominations of Islam and differ in the extent and nature of their religious 
practice: readers should bear this in mind.  
6.1  THE MUSLIM POPULATION IN IRELAND: AGE, GENDER AND 
LOCATION 
The Census data reveal that there are substantial differences in the socio-
demographic characteristics of Muslims and non-Muslims resident in Ireland. 
Demographically, Muslims are a disproportionately young, male, urban, non-
White community, most of whom were born abroad, particularly in South Asian 
countries. Due to naturalisations and an increasing share of Muslims being born in 
Ireland, however, just over half of Muslims living in Ireland now have Irish 
citizenship.  
 
The Census data detail exactly how many Muslims live in Ireland, going back as far 
as 2002. The data show a strong and steady growth in the Muslim population 
from 2002 to 2016. The Muslim population increased at a rate well beyond the 
total population, rising from just under 20,000 in 2002 to over 62,000 in 2016. 
However, in a cross-national European perspective, the Muslim share of the 
population remains quite small, at 1.3 per cent of the total in 2016. Typical values 
in large European countries such as Germany and France range between 5 and 10 
per cent (Hackett, 2017). The Muslim community is also small relative to the 
overall foreign-born population in Ireland, which at almost 17 per cent of the total 
is among the highest in the OECD.  
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FIGURE 6.2 AGE AND SEX OF MUSLIM POPULATION RESIDENT IN IRELAND 
 
 
Source:  CSO Statbank Table E8055, Census 2016. 
 
When comparing employment and education figures later in this chapter, it is 
important to keep these different age profiles in mind, as the Census data as 
accessed do not permit comparisons of, for example, educational qualifications 
for different age groups.  
Geographic location 
Where do Muslims in Ireland live? In line with previous research on the 
geographic distribution of immigrants in Ireland, we expect Muslims to be 
concentrated in urban regions, in particular around Dublin. This is indeed what 
the data reveal: 43 per cent of Muslims in Ireland live in Dublin city or its 
surrounding suburbs, compared to 25 per cent of the total (Muslim and non-
Muslim) population. The smaller cities of Cork, Limerick, Galway and Waterford 
account for between 6 per cent and 2 per cent of the total each, bringing the 
share of the Muslim population living in urban regions up to 60 per cent, 
compared to 33.8 per cent for the entire population. Figure 6.3 shows that 
Muslims are over-represented in all cities, meaning that they are under-
represented in small towns and rural areas. 
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FIGURE 6.3  PERCENTAGE OF MUSLIMS LIVING IN URBAN AREAS 
 
 
Source:  CSO Statbank Table E8055, Census 2016. 
6.2  COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY 
This section considers country of origin, ethnic background and nationality of the 
Muslim population in Ireland, and indicates the considerable diversity within the 
population. 
Place of Birth 
The Census contains three measures of the origin of Muslim people – place of 
birth, nationality and citizenship. While all of these measures are important, place 
of birth is particularly useful, because the CSO publishes a detailed breakdown for 
each religious group, allowing for more comprehensive analysis.  
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FIGURE 6.2 AGE AND SEX OF MUSLIM POPULATION RESIDENT IN IRELAND 
 
 
Source:  CSO Statbank Table E8055, Census 2016. 
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FIGURE 6.4  PLACE OF BIRTH OVER TIME – MUSLIM POPULATION 
 
 
Source:  CSO Statbank Tables E8058, Census 2016 and C1315, Census 2006. 
 
Over 82 per cent of all people enumerated in the 2016 Census were born in 
Ireland. This figure is much lower, but is rapidly rising, among the Muslim 
population. It has increased from 23.6 per cent in 2002 to just under 30 per cent 
in 2016. There was a similar increase of four percentage points among the Asian 
Muslim population, but the share born in non-EU European countries and Africa 
fell substantially.  
 
Turning to individual countries, we find that one-in-five Muslims living in Ireland 
(12,400 people) in 2016 were born in Pakistan. This is also the foreign-born group 
that grew the most from 2011, accounting for almost a third of the overall 2011-
2016 increase displayed in Figure 6.1 above. Scharbrodt (2012) notes how 
migrants from Pakistan come to Ireland as work permit holders, seeking asylum, 
and as students. Just over 8 per cent (348 individuals) of the total increase can be 
attributed to arrivals from people born in Afghanistan, and 5.7 per cent to people 
born in Saudi Arabia. However, it is noteworthy that the largest increase, over 
one-third, is attributable to natural population increase i.e. to Muslims born in 
Ireland.  
 
Only 17 per cent of the Muslim population was born in Africa, but this group 
exhibits interesting compositional changes between 2011 and 2016. In 2011, 63 
per cent of Muslims born in Africa originated from Sub-Saharan Africa, with the 
remainder from the five North African nations of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, 
and Tunisia. In 2016, the split was 58 per cent Sub-Saharan Africa to 42 per cent 
North Africa. This change is largely due to an absolute fall in the number of 
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Muslims born in Nigeria living in Ireland, from 2,314 to 1,835, and an increase of a 
similar order in Muslims born in Egypt (1,064 to 1,412). 
Ethnic background 
A related but distinct concept is the ethnic background of the Muslim population. 
It refers to an individual’s self-perception as relating to a group of people who are 
similar with respect to a range of ethnic or cultural factors (Nandi and Platt, 2012). 
Consistent with the place of birth analysis, these data show a clear increase in the 
percentage of Muslim Census respondents identifying as ethnically Asian, and 
concomitant decline in those reporting Black or Black-Irish ethnicity.  
 
FIGURE 6.5  ETHNIC BACKGROUND OF MUSLIMS RESIDENT IN IRELAND 
 
 
Source: CSO Statbank Tables E8009, Census 2016 and C0507, Census 2006. 
Nationality 
As noted in Chapter 5, acquisition of Irish citizenship may indicate an intention to 
remain in Ireland. Indeed the naturalisation rate is a recommended indicator of 
integration (see Table 1.1). Chapter 5 documents how almost 100,000 non-EEA 
nationals have naturalised since 2005, and estimates that a significant minority of 
the non-EEA population – perhaps as high as 47 per cent – now holds Irish 
citizenship. What about the nationality of Muslims living in Ireland?  
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FIGURE 6.6  NATIONALITY OF MUSLIMS IN IRELAND 
 
 
Source:  CSO Statbank Table E8082, Census 2016. 
 
Even though only 29.7 per cent of Muslims were born in Ireland, almost 55 per 
cent report their nationality as Irish. The data suggest a significant increase in the 
attainment of citizenship by naturalisation since 2011, which has resulted in fewer 
Muslims reporting African and Asian nationalities. The fall in the share of Muslims 
with Asian nationalities from 2011 to 2016 is remarkable considering the marked 
increase in the proportion that were born in Asia in this period. These changes in 
nationality may be in part explained by the clearing of the backlog of citizenship 
applications by the Irish State in the last inter-census period (2011-2016, see 
Chapter 5). 
 
Irish nationality among Muslims is highly contingent upon their length of 
residence in Ireland. This is not surprising, given that applicants are required to 
have lived in Ireland for at least five years before being eligible to apply for 
citizenship (see Box 5.1). The CSO publish data on the year of taking up residence 
in Ireland among the Muslim population that had previously lived outside of 
Ireland for at least one year.83 The stacked bars in Figure 6.7 show the number of 
Muslim arrivals by the date of arrival, with the dark blue portion indicating the 
share that are Irish nationals, and the light blue portion the share that are non-
Irish nationals. The dark blue line details the percentage of each bar that is Irish-
born. 
 
 
                                                          
 
83  Of course, some of this group may be Irish-born, who had subsequently moved abroad for over a year and then 
returned to Ireland. However, judging by the previous figures, which show that a large majority of Muslims are 
foreign-born, and that the Muslim population in 2002 was very small, it is likely that the vast majority of this group is 
foreign-born. 
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A clear pattern emerges in Figure 6.7. In addition to the immigration of Muslims 
clearly being a fairly recent phenomenon, we see that among the small numbers 
that arrived before 1990, 80 per cent are Irish nationals. This compares to just 9 
per cent among those that arrived between 2012 and 2016. The downward trend 
of the dark blue line clearly shows that the less time that has elapsed since a 
Muslim residents’ arrival in Ireland, the lower the probability that they will have 
attained Irish citizenship.  
 
FIGURE 6.7  CITIZENSHIP AMONG MUSLIM RESIDENTS BY YEAR OF ARRIVAL/RETURN 
 
 
Source:  CSO Statbank Table E8076, Census 2016. 
6.3  EDUCATIONAL PROFILE AND LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES  
The socio-economic situation of Muslims in Ireland is positive on some measures 
but not others, and any evaluation of Muslim integration is complicated by their 
atypical demographic characteristics as described above. Although the Census 
does not gather poverty data, the wellbeing and social inclusion of minority 
groups can be assessed using measures of employment, education, housing 
tenure and health.84 The situation of Muslims in Ireland is mixed on these counts. 
While Muslims have above average levels of education and are more likely to be 
students, they are more at risk of unemployment and exhibit low levels of 
homeownership. Some of these patterns may be driven by the age and 
immigration histories of Muslims in Ireland.  
 
                                                          
 
84  Social class is another relevant Census measure, but between 37 and 39 per cent of Muslims are enumerated under 
an ‘unknown’ category on this item, making interpretation of social class patterns unreliable. However, when these 
‘unknowns’ are excluded, we find Muslims to be disproportionately concentrated in the higher managerial and 
professional classes. 
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Source:  CSO Statbank Table E8082, Census 2016. 
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83  Of course, some of this group may be Irish-born, who had subsequently moved abroad for over a year and then 
returned to Ireland. However, judging by the previous figures, which show that a large majority of Muslims are 
foreign-born, and that the Muslim population in 2002 was very small, it is likely that the vast majority of this group is 
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Labour market 
Some of the principal Zaragoza integration indicators pertain to the position of 
immigrants in the labour market (see Chapter 2). Figure 6.8 presents selected 
findings for the principal economic status of Muslims in Ireland aged 15 or older 
with the equivalent figures for all Irish people marked as a reference. The 
employment rate of Muslims, at 40.7 per cent, is markedly lower than the 
national average of 53.3 per cent in 2016. This is partly explained by higher 
unemployment among Muslims,85 but also by a greater concentration of students. 
In fact, one in every five Muslims in Ireland is a student, compared to one-in-ten 
across the entire population. Considering the age structure of the Muslim 
population (see Figure 6.2), it is not surprising that the share of Muslims in 
retirement is a fraction of the national average. 
 
FIGURE 6.8  PRINCIPAL ECONOMIC STATUS AMONG MUSLIMS IN IRELAND 
 
 
Source:  CSO Statbank Table E8060, Census 2016. 
 
We would expect integrated groups to have high employment rates and a larger 
student population than groups which struggle to integrate. On the former count, 
Muslims had employment rates around 13 percentage points lower than the total 
population; on the latter, they outperform the rest of the population. However, as 
noted above, these results must be interpreted with some caution because 
Muslims are on average much younger than non-Muslims, and age is strongly 
related to educational attainment (see also Chapter 3).  
 
 
                                                          
 
85  Note that this refers to the population unemployment rate, rather than unemployment as a percentage of the labour 
force. 
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Do labour market patterns differ by gender? Some scholars have posited a 
negative relationship between Islam and the position of women in society 
(Korotayev et al., 2015). However, the exact causal mechanism behind the 
relationship is still debated, and evidence of lower labour market participation 
among Muslim women in Western countries is weaker (Abdelhadi, 2017). Here we 
take a first step in investigating the issue in Ireland by disaggregating rates of 
homemaking and employment by gender and religion.86  
 
An initial glance at the data reveals that 4 per cent of non-Muslim homemakers 
and 7 per cent of Muslim homemakers are male. However, because of the 
difference in the overall gender composition of the Muslim and non-Muslim 
populations, the effect of gender on homemaking is best calculated at the 
individual level rather than the population level. In other words, by how much 
does being female increase one’s chances of being a homemaker? And how does 
this effect differ for Muslim women?  
 
TABLE 6.1  GENDER DIFFERENCES IN EMPLOYMENT AND HOMEMAKING BY RELIGION 
  Men Women 
Female to 
Male Ratio 
Percentage 
Homemakers 
Non-Muslim 1.2% 14.9% 12.1 
Muslim 2.5% 27.6% 11.0 
Percentage 
Employed 
Non-Muslim 58.4% 48.4% 0.8 
Muslim 53.0% 23.4% 0.4 
 
Source:  CSO Statbank Table E8060, Census 2016. 
 
Table 6.1 presents these rates and ratios for the two economic statuses of interest 
– homemaking and employment. It shows that women are much more likely to be 
homemakers than men, and that this holds across both Muslims and non-
Muslims. However, both Muslim women and Muslim men are almost twice as 
likely to be homemakers as their non-Muslim counterparts. Because this religious 
difference is found across the gender divide, the values for the ratio between the 
two remains fairly stable, at 11 and 12. Gender differences in employment rates 
between Muslims and non-Muslims are more marked than gender differences in 
homemaking. Here we see that lower employment rates exist for women  in both 
religious groups, but that the gender ‘penalty’ in employment is much higher for 
Muslim women. While the employment rate for non-Muslim women is 80 per 
cent that of non-Muslim men, the rate for Muslim women is only 40 per cent that 
of Muslim men. Additional analysis shows that is largely driven by relatively higher 
unemployment rates among Muslim women (nearly 20 per cent) compared to 
non-Muslim women (7 per cent), although a difference in employment rates 
remains.  
 
                                                          
 
86  This information is based on respondents’ responses to a question on their principal economic status.  
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A number of other factors may explain these lower employment rates. Muslim 
mothers may be more likely to face issues with childcare, if there are no relatives 
available to assist with child-rearing and they cannot afford expensive market-
based care (see Röder et al., 2017). Accessing employment may also be a 
challenge for some women if they have come to Ireland to join a spouse as they 
may be required to apply for an employment permit. Arnold and Quinn (2017) cite 
evidence that a lack of employer engagement in this process may be a barrier to 
employment for some migrants arriving in Ireland under family reunification 
legislation. Further analysis would be required to investigate these causal 
mechanisms. 
Education 
A second measure related to the income and living standards of the Muslim 
community is the distribution of educational attainment. Given that over 20 per 
cent of Muslims in Ireland are students, it is not surprising that we find Irish 
Muslims to be highly educated. Furthermore, the educational profile of Muslims 
appears to be improving over time. However, the same can be said for the rest of 
the population, which is improving its educational profile at an even faster rate. 
The proportion of Muslims who had completed education with a tertiary 
qualification increased from 45.6 per cent in 2006 to 56.9 per cent ten years later 
– an increase of 25 per cent. The share of the entire Irish population with third-
level education increased by 65 per cent over this period, meaning that if current 
trends were to continue, the Muslim advantage in this area may disappear.  
 
FIGURE 6.9  HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE COMPLETED 
EDUCATION BY RELIGION 
 
 
Source:  CSO Statbank Table E8065, Census 2016. 
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6.4  HOUSING AND SELF-REPORTED HEALTH 
Housing 
The prevalence of homeownership among a minority group is often taken to be a 
sign of a settled, integrated community (see Chapter 4). However, the opposite is 
not necessarily true of a group that is highly concentrated in the private rental 
sector, as the Census data show that Muslims are (Figure 6.10). That is because 
homeownership among migrants in Ireland, much like citizenship, is highly 
conditioned by the duration of their residence. Nonetheless, it is a cause for 
concern that in 2016, 64 per cent of Muslims are tenants in the private rented 
sector (compared to just 18 per cent for the total population), especially in the 
current rental market in Ireland. Previous research has shown that private renters 
are twice as likely to experience housing deprivation and almost 2.5 times as likely 
to experience overcrowding as owner-occupiers (see Grotti et al., 2018). This 
research has also shown that Muslims are over-represented among Ireland’s 
homeless population (ibid). 
 
FIGURE 6.10  HOUSING TENURE BY RELIGION  
 
 
Source:  CSO Statbank Table E8070, Census 2016. 
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A number of other factors may explain these lower employment rates. Muslim 
mothers may be more likely to face issues with childcare, if there are no relatives 
available to assist with child-rearing and they cannot afford expensive market-
based care (see Röder et al., 2017). Accessing employment may also be a 
challenge for some women if they have come to Ireland to join a spouse as they 
may be required to apply for an employment permit. Arnold and Quinn (2017) cite 
evidence that a lack of employer engagement in this process may be a barrier to 
employment for some migrants arriving in Ireland under family reunification 
legislation. Further analysis would be required to investigate these causal 
mechanisms. 
Education 
A second measure related to the income and living standards of the Muslim 
community is the distribution of educational attainment. Given that over 20 per 
cent of Muslims in Ireland are students, it is not surprising that we find Irish 
Muslims to be highly educated. Furthermore, the educational profile of Muslims 
appears to be improving over time. However, the same can be said for the rest of 
the population, which is improving its educational profile at an even faster rate. 
The proportion of Muslims who had completed education with a tertiary 
qualification increased from 45.6 per cent in 2006 to 56.9 per cent ten years later 
– an increase of 25 per cent. The share of the entire Irish population with third-
level education increased by 65 per cent over this period, meaning that if current 
trends were to continue, the Muslim advantage in this area may disappear.  
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in self-reported health may therefore signal a degree of health disadvantage 
among Muslims, but this would require further investigation. 
 
FIGURE 6.11  SELF-REPORTED HEALTH STATUS BY RELIGION 
 
 
Source:  CSO Statbank Table E9094, Census 2016. 
6.5  SUMMARY 
This chapter has sought to make the most of published Census data to sketch the 
socio-demographic characteristics of Muslims in Ireland, and to evaluate the 
extent to which they are successfully integrating into Irish society. We find that 
much of the recent increase in the Muslim population is due to natural increase. 
Approximately one-in-three Muslims was born in Ireland. By 2016, over half (55 
per cent) were Irish citizens. Regarding the flow of Muslim immigrants in recent 
years, we observe a shift in origin, with more arriving from South Asia, and fewer 
from Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Muslims in Ireland are more likely to be students and are on average more highly 
educated. However, we also find that they have lower employment and higher 
unemployment rates. They live disproportionately in urban areas, in particular in 
Dublin, and a sizeable majority live in private rental accommodation.  
 
On the basis of this relatively extensive analysis of the published Census data, it is 
not possible to evaluate the claims made by Scharbrodt et al. (2015) and Fanning 
(2018), that there are essentially two Muslim populations in Ireland – one a highly 
educated, settled class of professionals, the other a more disadvantaged group 
fleeing conflict and persecution in the developing world. Nor is it possible to 
investigate whether outcomes differ for African and Asian Muslims, for example. 
Using Census microdata to address this question and others raised in this chapter 
would be an exciting avenue for future research. 
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CHAPTER 7  
 
Issues for Policy and Data Collection 
By Frances McGinnity 
 
The primary aim of this Integration Monitor is to report on integration outcomes. 
This chapter briefly discusses some implications for future data needs, as well as 
highlighting policy issues that have emerged.  
 
While immigration to Ireland is far behind the 2007 peak, a significant proportion 
of the population now living in Ireland is born abroad (17 per cent were born 
abroad in 2017). Most migrants to Ireland come from other EU countries: EU 
migrants make up around three-quarters of residents born abroad in 2017. This 
proportion is among the highest in the EU (Figure 1.1.). Another distinctive 
feature of migrants in Ireland is that a significant minority of those of non-EEA 
origin are now Irish citizens (see Chapter 5). This raises questions about how to 
identify those of migrant origin, and measure their outcomes. It also underlines 
the need for a long-term proactive approach to policy on integration. 
 
The Migrant Integration Strategy, published in early 2017, represents a significant 
statement of policy intent. While not without limitations, the strategy has brought 
new energy and focus into efforts to integrate migrants in Ireland. Whether those 
policy intentions are realised depends on how effectively the strategy is 
implemented: an interim report to government is due in late 2018. 
7.1 ISSUES FOR FUTURE DATA COLLECTION  
While both the OECD and the EU continue to highlight the importance of 
monitoring integration (European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 
2013; OECD 2015; 2016), the value of such monitoring will only be as good as the 
evidence on which it is based.  
 
For an Integration Monitor primarily based on repeated national social surveys, an 
important issue is how well the migrant population is represented in these 
surveys. Some groups, both Irish and non-Irish nationals, are excluded from 
survey data, such as those residing in institutions, communal accommodation, 
direct provision centres and the homeless, a group that may be particularly 
disadvantaged and has grown considerably in recent years. This means that 
asylum seekers will be excluded from measures of poverty using SILC, for 
example, if they are living in direct provision centres. To the extent that non-Irish 
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in self-reported health may therefore signal a degree of health disadvantage 
among Muslims, but this would require further investigation. 
 
FIGURE 6.11  SELF-REPORTED HEALTH STATUS BY RELIGION 
 
 
Source:  CSO Statbank Table E9094, Census 2016. 
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nationals are disproportionately excluded from surveys, their disadvantage may 
be underestimated. Other groups, while not excluded from the data by design, 
may be under-represented in the surveys.  
 
In the short term, it is important that efforts be continued to encourage the 
participation of non-Irish nationals in the SILC and the LFS, the major sources of 
information on income, poverty and the labour market in Ireland. Immigrant or 
ethnic minority boost samples, like in many other European countries, could 
address the problem of small sample sizes in these ongoing large-scale surveys. 
Small sample size is a particular problem for SILC. Chapter 4 showed high rates of 
deprivation and poverty among non-EU nationals, yet we know this is a very 
diverse group. Employment rates vary considerably between Asian and African 
nationals, for example (Chapter 2). It would be of considerable benefit to the 
monitoring of integration in Ireland to know which national groups are most 
disadvantaged. Ireland needs a survey that allows us to track poverty and 
deprivation among migrant groups.  
 
While it is only carried out every five years, small numbers are not a problem in 
the Census of Population. Chapter 6 of this Integration Monitor illustrates what a 
rich resource this is. The Census is invaluable for measuring the outcomes of 
smaller population groups, and is now easier to access than before. And of course 
the Census has a role not just in investigating outcomes, but for adjusting ongoing 
surveys and creating valid estimates of the migrant population, given that Ireland 
lacks a population register. As noted in Chapters 1, 2 and 3, the recent 2016 
Census has led to revised population and migration estimates, as well as a revised 
Labour Force Survey.  
 
Of course some indicators are specific to the migrant population and will never be 
collected on national surveys. Migrants’ feeling of belonging in Ireland, their 
intentions to stay, motives for migration, migration history, social contact with the 
Irish population, work experience in their country of origin could only be collected 
in a dedicated survey of migrants. Some smaller scale surveys of immigrants have 
been collected, for example the cross-national Socio-cultural Integration 
Processes among New Immigrants in Europe (SCIP) survey of new Polish 
immigrants in 2011 and 2013 (Diehl et al., 2015). But a large survey of the migrant 
population in Ireland has not yet been fielded.  
 
The fact that a significant group of immigrants are now Irish citizens may be a 
positive development in terms of their integration, but this does present a 
challenge for monitoring integration. By measuring integration on the basis of 
nationality, as this publication does to be consistent with previous Integration 
Monitors, and because it is sometimes the only option, we are likely to miss an 
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increasing number of naturalised citizens. This is particularly relevant for migrants 
of non-EEA origin, given that we estimate up to 45 per cent of them may have 
become Irish citizens by the end of 2017. Any statistics on the basis of nationality 
will miss an important proportion of the population it is designed to measure, and 
those remaining in the non-Irish group may differ from those who have 
naturalised. To address this issue, at least in part, Chapter 2 examines outcomes 
of foreign-born Irish nationals. This is very useful, yet around half of these were 
born in the UK and came to Ireland many years ago. Their profile is rather 
different to recent migrants who naturalised in the past five to ten years.  
 
What are the alternatives to monitoring based on nationality and/or place of 
birth? One possibility is to use a more durable measure like ethnicity or ancestry 
to include both naturalised citizens and second-generation immigrants when 
measuring integration (Waters, 2014). Yet some have criticised the ethnicity or 
ancestry approach as being too subjective and linked to identity (Massey, 2018). 
Another alternative currently under discussion at European level, is to include a 
question on standard social surveys (LFS, SILC) about the country of birth of the 
respondents’ parents. The increasingly permanent nature of migration in Ireland 
means researchers and policymakers working on integration need to think 
carefully about whose outcomes they are measuring and how they do this; and 
those collecting data, such as the Central Statistics Office, need to continue to 
develop measures to respond to the changing migrant population in Ireland.  
 
Survey data are crucial for monitoring immigrant outcomes, but administrative 
data sources are another potentially rich resource for measuring a range of 
migrant outcomes. The clear advantage is that administrative data record all 
recipients of a given training, benefit, or examination outcome, for example, and 
if migrant status is recorded this allows monitoring of both participation and 
outcomes. This assumes the data are usable and accessible for the purpose, which 
may not be the case. Administrative data are limited by the underlying policy; in 
particular the continued lack of residence permit data on non-EEA children is a 
challenge. Under Action 8 of the Migrant Integration Strategy a data gaps working 
group has been set up to identify both shortcomings in data collection and under-
use of existing data. Ideally, administrative data would form an important 
complement to outcomes measured using survey data.  
 
With the exception of data gathered on residence permits (see Chapter 1), 
refugees are not identified in national survey or general administrative data in 
Ireland. While recent migration debates in Europe have been dominated by the 
refugee crisis, and Ireland has increased its intake of resettled and relocated 
refugees, there is no way of tracking how well refugees are integrating into Irish 
society in terms of employment, income and poverty, political participation and 
socio-cultural integration, aside from occasional ad hoc studies, such as the 
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been collected, for example the cross-national Socio-cultural Integration 
Processes among New Immigrants in Europe (SCIP) survey of new Polish 
immigrants in 2011 and 2013 (Diehl et al., 2015). But a large survey of the migrant 
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The fact that a significant group of immigrants are now Irish citizens may be a 
positive development in terms of their integration, but this does present a 
challenge for monitoring integration. By measuring integration on the basis of 
nationality, as this publication does to be consistent with previous Integration 
Monitors, and because it is sometimes the only option, we are likely to miss an 
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Refugee Integration Capacity and Evaluation (RICE) report (UNHCR, 2014). This is 
true regardless of whether they have come here as part of a refugee programme, 
or seeking protection, later determined to be Geneva Convention refugees. This 
gap is all the more problematic given that research shows that refugees face 
greater challenges when compared to other groups of migrants, for example in 
the labour market, due to lower language proficiency, trauma and lack of support 
from social and other networks (Connor, 2010; Bevelander, 2011). 
 
Many studies have stressed that integration takes place at local level, and 
understanding neighbourhoods and their composition plays an important role 
(Casey, 2016). National and ethnic concentration within neighbourhoods is a 
major topic in international research (Massey and Mullan, 1984; Charles, 2003), 
but has received less recent attention in Ireland. An investigation of how 
national/ethnic groups are distributed across localities in Ireland using Census 
data is now underway, and should significantly enhance our understanding of the 
experience of integration at local level in Ireland. The accurate tracking of racist 
incidents is crucial and addressing underreporting is an action under the Migrant 
Integration Strategy. Academics and various NGOs such as ENAR Ireland, the 
Immigrant Council of Ireland, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties and NASC Ireland 
have expressed concern about the under-reporting of racism (Haynes and 
Schweppe, 2017). IReport, an online system of reporting was established in 2013 
with public funding.87 Data on volunteering would usefully enhance our 
understanding of migrant participation and integration in local communities.  
7.2 POLICY ISSUES 
The Migrant Integration Strategy is ambitious in scope and covers a very broad 
range of policy areas from employment, education, health, political participation 
to intercultural awareness. This discussion is a more focused consideration of 
some issues arising from previous chapters.  
 
In terms of employment, Chapter 2 assesses the extent to which migrants have 
shared in the ongoing recovery in the Irish labour market. Overall, the picture is 
positive: there is no longer a significant gap in unemployment rates between Irish 
and non-Irish nationals overall. In fact, we find slightly higher employment and 
participation rates among non-Irish nationals than Irish nationals. To maintain this 
trend, it is important that the jobseeker engagement and labour market activation 
policies described in Actions 39, 40 and 41 of the Migrant Integration Strategy are 
appropriate to the needs of migrants and are effectively implemented.  
 
 
                                                          
 
87  Funded by Pobal, SSNO (Scheme to Support National Organisations) and the Department of Housing, Planning, 
Community and Local Government. 
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However, not all groups of non-Irish nationals are faring so well. Chapter 2 finds 
that in general non-EU nationals have higher unemployment rates and lower 
employment rates than Irish nationals. In particular, we find high unemployment 
and a very low employment rate among African nationals. Investigating the 
factors underlying this disadvantage is beyond the scope of a report like this, but 
Chapter 2 points to a number of explanations: time spent in the asylum system 
and not in the labour market for those who were seeking protection, and 
potentially also the experience of racism and discrimination in the Irish labour 
market (see Kingston et al., 2015). Fanning and Michael (2017) argue that much of 
the institutional infrastructure for responding to racism in Ireland – for example 
the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism – was 
dismantled during the recession and has not been replaced.  
 
Chapter 4 also documents high rates of poverty and deprivation among the non-
EU population. The overall non-EU population has a consistent poverty rate of 29 
per cent, compared to 8 per cent for the Irish population. (Consistent poverty 
measures those who are income poor and deprived on two or more items). Some 
of this is accounted for by the high proportion of students in the non-EU group. 
However, when students are excluded, consistent poverty still remains quite high, 
at 23 per cent. Previous research in Ireland has shown clearly the link between 
low employment rates and income poverty and deprivation for working-age 
adults and children (Watson et al., 2012). Further detailed research on African 
migrants would allow us to investigate their outcomes in more depth, and point at 
some potential policy responses. Ongoing work by the Department of 
Employment Affairs and Social Protection on the jobseekers longitudinal dataset 
will also be useful in this regard.  
 
Housing and homelessness are not identified as issues in the Migrant Integration 
Strategy. Yet findings from this Integration Monitor suggest that migrants 
(Chapter 4) and Muslims (Chapter 6) are much more likely to be in private rented 
accommodation than Irish nationals, which is a potential problem in the current 
housing market. Grotti et al. (2018) find non-EU nationals to be at greater risk of 
overcrowding compared to others on the same income and with the same 
characteristics. They also find higher rates of homelessness among both African 
migrants and the Muslim population than among the Irish population.  
 
The key message from Chapter 3 is that while educational achievement of non-
Irish adults is similar to or even slightly better than Irish nationals, there are gaps 
in reading proficiency at age 15 between Irish children and migrant children who 
do not speak English as their first language. This is important as many non-Irish 
adults in Ireland were educated abroad, so the performance of children is a better 
indicator of how well the Irish education system is integrating migrants. The 
findings suggest maintaining language support for migrant students is very 
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to intercultural awareness. This discussion is a more focused consideration of 
some issues arising from previous chapters.  
 
In terms of employment, Chapter 2 assesses the extent to which migrants have 
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87  Funded by Pobal, SSNO (Scheme to Support National Organisations) and the Department of Housing, Planning, 
Community and Local Government. 
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important. In order to plan effectively, policymakers need to know what 
proportion of students at primary and secondary level require English language 
tuition, what the budget requirement is and how effective English language 
tuition is (see Actions 29 and 33 in the Migrant Integration Strategy). The fact that 
the budget allocation for English language tuition in schools has now been 
combined with the budget for special needs education and can no longer be 
monitored separately remains problematic (see Box 3.1). To supplement PISA data 
more differentiation of education statistics would be very useful. Are there 
differences in achievement between Irish students and those from a migrant 
background in State examinations? What about the post-school transitions of 
students from a migrant background? Chapter 3 did note that the rate of early 
school leaving among young East European adults was twice as high as the 
national average. Were this pattern consistent over time, and relating to those 
who have come through the Irish education system, as opposed to having been 
educated abroad, this may be in need of policy attention.  
 
Chapter 5 shows that although the annual naturalisation rate has now declined 
from the 2012 peak, there has been a rapid rise in the size of the naturalised 
population in the last few years. This is due to increased applications, as more 
migrants became eligible to apply, as well as improvements in the processing of 
applications. Over the last decade just over 100,000 migrants of non-EEA origin 
acquired Irish citizenship, resulting in improved opportunities for integration. 
Recent years have also seen a rise in naturalisation of EEA migrants, albeit from a 
low base. This also represents important progress. Yet Ireland remains without a 
Long-Term Residence permission with transparent rules and predictable benefits 
for immigrants. The current administrative scheme has unclear conditions and 
access is limited to a very specific group of migrants. Placing the Long-Term 
residence permission on a statutory footing would allow legally resident migrants 
to benefit from increased transparency and security. 
 
Given generous voting rights, the political participation of migrants in Ireland is, in 
principle, favourable. Yet Chapter 5 documents a serious under-representation of 
migrant candidates in politics and on the voting register. NGOs have been active 
in trying to increase participation, but some commentators argue that political 
parties have tended to give insufficient attention to potential migrant candidates 
and the migrant electorate (O’Boyle et al., 2016). Continued efforts to encourage 
migrant voter registration and voting could potentially increase the proportion of 
migrants registered to vote and migrant participation in Irish politics (see Actions 
58, 59 and 60 of the Migrant Integration Strategy). Commentators argue that the 
low naturalisation rate of EEA migrants is a problem for their long-term 
integration into Irish politics, given that they cannot stand and vote in national 
elections or referenda.  
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Immigration may have fallen, but there are no indications that the proportion of 
migrants living in Ireland has fallen. If anything, the indications are that many 
migrants have settled in Ireland. In this context, the publication of the Migrant 
Integration Strategy in early 2017 presents a positive opportunity, assuming the 
strategy is effectively implemented. Of course as migrant integration policies are 
mainstreamed into government departments, implementing the strategy is not 
just the responsibility of the Department of Justice and Equality, but of all relevant 
government departments and agencies who interact with migrants. In addition, if 
migrant integration policy adopts a mainstreaming approach, it is crucial that any 
integration strategy is accompanied by monitoring of migrant outcomes to ensure 
the needs of the target population are being served. 
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principle, favourable. Yet Chapter 5 documents a serious under-representation of 
migrant candidates in politics and on the voting register. NGOs have been active 
in trying to increase participation, but some commentators argue that political 
parties have tended to give insufficient attention to potential migrant candidates 
and the migrant electorate (O’Boyle et al., 2016). Continued efforts to encourage 
migrant voter registration and voting could potentially increase the proportion of 
migrants registered to vote and migrant participation in Irish politics (see Actions 
58, 59 and 60 of the Migrant Integration Strategy). Commentators argue that the 
low naturalisation rate of EEA migrants is a problem for their long-term 
integration into Irish politics, given that they cannot stand and vote in national 
elections or referenda.  
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Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the 
European Union 
1  Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all 
immigrants and residents of Member States.  
2  Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.  
3  Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the 
participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host 
society, and to making such contributions visible.  
4  Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions is 
indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic 
knowledge is essential to successful integration.  
5  Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their 
descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society.  
6  Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods 
and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory 
way is a critical foundation for better integration.  
7  Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a 
fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, inter-cultural 
dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and 
stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions 
between immigrants and Member State citizens.  
8  The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict 
with other inviolable European rights or with national law.  
9  The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the 
formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, 
supports their integration.  
10  Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy 
portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important 
consideration in public policy formation and implementation.  
11  Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary 
to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange 
of information more effective. 
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Definition of indicators, based on those agreed at Zaragoza 
 
Indicator Definition Data Source 
1. Employment 
Employment rate Proportion of population of working age (15-64) who are employed. 
Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) 
Unemployment rate Proportion of labour force (employed plus unemployed) of working age (15-64) who are unemployed. 
Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) 
Activity rate Proportion of adults of working age (15-64) who are in the labour force (employed and unemployed). 
Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) 
Self-employment rate 
Proportion of employed population who are self-employed 
(that is working in his or her own business, professional 
practice or farm for the purpose of making a profit). 
Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) 
2. Education 
Highest educational 
attainment 
Share of population aged 15 to 64 with third-level, Post-
Leaving Certificate, upper secondary and no formal/lower 
secondary education. 
Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) 
Share of 25- to 34-year-olds 
with tertiary educational 
attainment* 
Share of 25- to 34-year-olds with tertiary (third-level) 
education. 
Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) 
Share of early leavers from 
education and training* 
Share of population aged 20 to 24 with no more than lower 
secondary education and not currently in education. 
Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) 
Mean achievement scores 
at primary level in reading 
and Mathematics at age 15* 
Mean achievement scores in reading and Mathematics at 
age 15. PISA 2015 
3. Social inclusion 
Median net income 
Median net income – median net (household and 
equivalised) income of the immigrant population and the 
Irish population. 
SILC 
At risk of poverty rate 
At risk of poverty rate – share of population with net 
disposable income of less than 60 per cent of national 
median.  
SILC  
Consistent poverty rates 
Proportion of population both (1) at risk of poverty and (2) 
living in households that lack two or more basic items such 
as food, clothing or heat. 
SILC  
Share of population 
perceiving their health 
status as good or very good 
Share of population aged 16+ perceiving their health status 
as good or very good. SILC  
Ratio of property owners to 
non-property owners 
among immigrants and the 
total population 
Percentage of property owners among immigrant and Irish 
household respondents.  SILC  
  Contd. 
 
118 | Mon itor in g report  on integrat ion 2018  
Indicator Definition Data Source 
4. Active citizenship 
Share of immigrants that 
have acquired citizenship 
(best estimate) 
Share of estimated non-EEA immigrant population who 
have acquired citizenship (best estimate). 
Department of 
Justice and 
Equality 
Share of immigrants holding 
permanent or long-term 
residence permits 
Share of estimated non-EEA immigrant population granted 
long-term residence (best estimate). 
Department of 
Justice and 
Equality 
Share of immigrants among 
elected representatives 
Share of immigrants among elected national 
representatives. 
Immigrant 
Council of 
Ireland 
 
Notes: Employment and unemployment are defined in this table and elsewhere in this report using the standard International Labour 
Organisation’s (ILO) definitions. People are defined as employed if they have worked for pay in the week preceding the survey 
interview for one hour or more, or who were not at work due to temporary absence (i.e. sickness or training). Unemployed 
persons are those who did not work in the week preceding the interview, but were available to start work in the next two weeks 
and had actively sought work in the previous four weeks. ILO unemployment estimates differ from both the live register of 
unemployment and from the individual’s own self-assignment of his or her principal economic status. * indicates where definitions 
of the indicators differ slightly from those proposed at Zaragoza, based on data constraints. Share of 25- to 34-year-olds with 
tertiary educational attainment instead of the share of 30- to 34-year-olds with tertiary educational achievement; share of early 
leavers from education and training aged 20 to 24 instead of 18 to 24; mean achievement scores among 15-year-olds instead of 
the proportion achieving Level 1 or under in the PISA assessment tests. 
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